(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "United States agreements for cooperation in atomic energy : an analysis prepared for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate"

6Tf/t + I 



94th Congress 1 
2d Session / 



COMMITTEE PRINT 



UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR 
COOPERATION IN ATOMIC ENERGY 



AN ANALYSIS 



PREPARED FOR THE 

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

BY THE 

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 










y 



JANUARY 1976 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 



64-626 O 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 1976 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $2.60 




The Library of Congress 

Congressional Research Service 
Washington, DC. 20540 



UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION 
IN ATOMIC ENERGY: AN ANALYSIS 



A report prepared for 
The Senate Committee on Government Operations 



By 
Warren H. Donnelly, Senior Specialist 

and 

Barbara L. Rather, Research Assistant 

Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division 

January 15, 1976 



COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

ABRAHAM RIBICOFP, Connecticut, Chairman 
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois 

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington JACOB K. JAVITS, New York 

EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine WTLLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware 

LEE METCALP, Montana BILL BROCK, Tennessee 

JAMES B. ALLEN, Alabama LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr., Connecticut 

LAWTON CHILES, Florida 
SAM NUNN, Georgia 
JOHN GLENN, Ohio 

Richard A. Wboman, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

Paul Hofp, Counsel 

Paul L. Leventhal, Counsel 

Eli E. Nobleman, 'Counsel 

David R. Schaefer, Counsel 

Matthew Schneider, Counsel 

John B. Childers, Chief Counsel to the Minority 

Brian Conboy, Special Counsel to the Minority 

Marilyn A. Harris, Chief Clerk 

Elizabeth A. Preast, Assistant Chief Clerk 

Harold C. Anderson, Staff Editor 

(II) 




THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

Congressional Research Service 



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540 



January 15, 1976 



Honorable Abraham Ribicoff 

Chairman, Committee on Government Operations 

United States Senate 

Honorable John Glenn 

Ad Hoc Chairman for Nuclear Affairs 

Committee on Government Operations 

United States Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Senators Ribicoff and Glenn: 

I am submitting the enclosed report, "United States Agreement for 
Cooperation in Atomic Energy: An Analysis," which was prepared at your 
request for use in your hearings on S. 1439, The Export Reorganization 
Act of 1976. Its purpose is to provide background for your continued 
inquiry into Federal interagency organization and administration for 
nuclear exports and the relevance of these agreements to the export of 
nuclear products and technology and to proliferation of the ability to 
make nuclear weapons. The research and analysis was performed by 
Dr. Warren H. Donnelly, Senior Specialist, with the assistance of 
Ms. Barbara Rather, Reference Assistant. The authors are aware of the 
controversial and sensitive nature of the subject and have tried to state 
issues clearly based upon solid analysis. 

We hope this report will be of assistance to the Committee. 

Sincerely, 




Norman Beckml 
Acting Director, CRS 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2013 



http://archive.org/details/uniagreOOIibr 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 



Letter of submittal 



I. Summary of observations and issues 1 

Summary of factors affecting 

agreements for cooperation 1 

Matters of likely interest to Congress 3 

1. Organization for nuclear cooperation and 

agreements for cooperation 3 

2. Administration of agreements 4 

3. Revision of agreements 7 

4. Future trends --the pending Egyptian agreement 8 

5. Re-export control 9 

6. Safeguarding nuclear technology 10 

7. Reprocessing of spent fuels 11 

8. International safeguards for all nuclear activities 

in agreement nation 12 

9. Physical security 14 

10. Preference for NPT adherents 15 

11. Government-to-government transfers 16 

12. NRC findings on defense and security 17 

13. Peaceful nuclear explosives 18 

14. Public participation 20 

II. Purpose, approach and information sources 22 

III. Bilateral Agreements: what are they and why? 24 

Transfer of information: the prime mover for world use 

of atomic energy and nuclear power 24 

The era of restricted transfer: 1946-1954 26 

The era of open exchange: 1954 to the present 28 

International cooperation in nuclear energv 28 

U.S. agreements for cooperation in nuclear energv 29 

Negotiation of agreements for cooperation 31 

U.S. control of nuclear exports 31 

Differing criteria for decisions 33 

IV. Provisions of special relevance to proliferation 36 

Exchange of information 36 

Access to special facilities 38 

Cooperation between persons 39 

Transfer of materials and equipment 39 

Supply of special nuclear materials 40 

Reprocessing of irradiated special nuclear material 43 

Guarantees 45 

A commitment to civil use 46 

U.S. safeguards rights 48 



TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 



Page 

V. Principal features of agreements for cooperation 54 

Types of agreements 54 

Comparative contents of agreements 57 

Contents of research and power agreements 60 

Contents of research agreements 62 

Contents of international agreements 62 

The agreement with the International 

Atomic Energy Agency 62 

The agreement with EURATOM 66 

VI. Commentary 69 

Effects of the agreements upon proliferation 70 

Agreements to agree 73 

Accomplishments of the agreements for cooperation 73 

Changing times and goals 77 

The situation 20 years ago 77 

The situation today 78 

The situation 20 years hence 81 

Future expectations of agreements for cooperation 82 



List of Tables 

I. Criteria for decisions affecting nuclear exports 34 

II. List of agreement nations and their NPT status 55 

III. Comparison of contents of three typical 

agreements for cooperation 59 

IV. Contents of research and power agreements 61 

V. Contents of research agreements 63 

VI. Potential effects of agreement provisions on 

proliferation of nuclear weapons 72 

VII. Provisions of agreements for cooperation that 

require additional negotiations and decisions 74 

Appendices 

I. An analysis of agreements. 

II. Comparative texts of provisions for agreements for research and power, 
research only, and power only 

III. A selected chronology of international activities of the U.S. Atomic 

Energy Commission, 1955-1974 

IV. Principles of EURATOM safeguards 



I. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES 
Summary of Factors Affecting Agreements for Cooperation 

At the request of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, the 
authors examined U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation in relation to 
(1) proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons, and (2) to legis- 
lation before the Committee to reorganize certain export functions of the 
Federal Government.* This examination has produced a commentary on 
factors that Congress may wish to keep in mind while considering the pend- 
ing legislation and an identification of 14 related issues which appear to 
merit consideration. 

The report identifies five overall factors relevant to negotiation and 
administration of the agreements for cooperation: 

1. The agreements for cooperation and export licenses have fostered 
the substantial export of U.S. nuclear materials, equipment and technology 
since 1955 which have stimulated and strengthened the growth of nuclear 
energy industries abroad. This industrial growth probably would have oc- 
curred without U.S. nuclear cooperation, but at a slower pace. Nonethe- 
less, the stronger and more diversified is the nuclear industrial base of 
a nation, the more readily it may, at its option, produce nuclear explosive 
materials and develop nuclear weapons. 

2. The United States through the agreements for cooperation has 
obtained unprecedented modification of national sovereignty through 

* S. 1439, the Export Reorganization Act of 1976. 



CRS-2 

commitments of agreement nations to safeguard U. S. -supplied nuclear ma- 
terials and equipment and to permit inspection by inspectors of the United 
States or the International Atomic Energy Agency. Provisions in the agree- 
ments which require application of international safeguards in agreement 
nations gave the International Agency practical working experience that was 
important preparation for its responsibilities under the Non Proliferation 
Treaty. 

3. The formulation of the functions, negotiation and administration 
of agreements for cooperation and export licenses was dominated by the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for the period 1955-1974 and the pattern 
it established has changed little since the Energy Reorganization Act was 
passed in 1974. 

4. Times and circumstances have changed markedly since U.S. nu- 
clear cooperation began in 1955. Concern about proliferation was then fo- 
cused on the vertical proliferation of U. S. competition with the Soviet Union 
in production of nuclear weapons. Now concern has been extended to in- 
clude horizontal proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons among 
many nations. In 1955 there was little thought of a chronic world shortage 
of oil and natural gas, although there should have been, so that use of nu- 
clear power depended upon its economic competitiveness with cheap and 
plentiful fossil fuels. Now many nations are turning to nuclear power, 
rightly or wrongly, to relieve their dependence upon imported, high-priced 
oil from possibly unreliable suppliers. In 1955 one Federal agency, the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, dominated U. S. nuclear cooperation with 



CRS-3 

its attendant agreements and export licenses. Today four Federal agencies 
are involved, three of which are under direction of the President and one of 
which is an independent regulatory agency substantially, but not wholly, 
independent of the President and his influence, raising possibilities for di- 
vergent or conflicting decisions and actions. 

5. The implementation of the Energy Reorganization Act has helped 
draw attention to several matters meriting congressional attention in con- 
nection with the pending export reorganization legislation, and also with 
oversight of the administration of U.S. nuclear cooperation. The report iden- 
tifies and discusses 14 specific issues and matters meriting such attention. 
Matters of likely interest to Congress 

During the examination of the agreements and writing of the commen- 
tary a number of matters became evident concerning negotiation and ad- 
ministration of the agreements for cooperation. There follows an identifi- 
cation of 14 such matters together with brief supporting discussion. 
1. Organization for nuclear cooperation and negotiation of agreements for 
cooperation . 

Four Federal agencies participate in U.S. nuclear cooperation. 
Three of them answer to the President and one is an independent 
regulatory agency. This arrangement provides an independent 
check upon the executive branch actions, and could, there- 
fore, lead to divergent or conflicting policies and decisions. 

Four Federal agencies participate in various aspects of U.S. nuclear 
cooperation with other nations. The Department of State and the Energy 
Research and Development Administration negotiate the agreements for co- 
operation. The Administration administers them and authorizes certain 



CRS-4 

activities of U.S. nationals abroad. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
licenses the export of nuclear materials and equipment by the U. S. nuclear 
industry, and the Department of Commerce licenses exports of nuclear com- 
ponents not licensed by the Commission. The three departments and agencies 
report directly to the President while the Commission is an independent 
regulatory agency with substantial independence from Presidential direction, 
although the President has means to exert powerful indirect influence. * 

The present organization opens possibilities for divergent or conflict- 
ing action between the executive branch agencies on the one hand and the 
independent Commission on the other. However, this independence provides 
a separate check upon nuclear exports under agreements for cooperation. 
To what extent the Commission needs to consider U.S. foreign policy and 
how consideration of this factor in addition to consideration of national de- 
fense and security are coordinated with the departments with primary re- 
sponsibility for these functions are matters likely to merit congressional 
attention. 
2. Administration of agreements 

The administration of agreements for cooperation appears 
largely the responsibility of the Energy Research and Development 
Administration which may make decisions for re-export of U.S. 
transfers or other decisions that could differ from or conflict 
with similar decisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
The nature and extent of interagency coordination in administra- 
tion of agreements merits congressional attention. 



* The President designates the chairman, nominates Commissioners for 
appointment or reappointment, and controls the Commission's budget. 



CRS-5 

The Department of State has primary responsibility for negotiation of 
agreements for cooperation. However, the subsequent administration of 
those agreements appears to be primarily up to the Energy Research and 
Development Administration. The agreements in many provisions name the 
Administration to make subordinate decisions, arrangements and judgments. 
Assuming that the lead role of the State Department in negotiation of agree- 
ments stems from the importance of the agreements to foreign policy, then 
it seems reasonable to expect that the Department also should have a sub- 
stantial, perhaps the principal role in administration. For example, the 
re-export of transferred materials and equipment is subject to approval by 
the Administration although some such transactions could have substantial 
foreign policy implications. 

The arrival upon the scene of the independent Nuclear Regulatory Com- 
mission makes the interaction of the Commission with the Department of 
State and the Energy Research and Development Administratation a whole 
new field of public administration. To what extent are consistent judgment 
and action desirable in relation to the congressional desire for an indepen- 
dent check upon executive branch judgments and actions when nuclear ma- 
terials or equipment are presented for export or re-export? Are informal 
contact and coordination, which now seem to be improving, sufficient or 
are statutory relations needed as insurance against a day when interagency 
relations may be strained or at odds ? 

Some examples. It seems likely that the Commission will take more 
of an interest in the physical security to be provided for U.S. exports 



CRS-6 

by agreement nations or international organizations. Yet administration of 
safeguards provisions of the agreements is the function of the Administration 
which thus also will be increasingly concerned with physical security. Con- 
sider also the export of enriched uranium. Many agreements limit the en- 
richment to 20 percent for U.S. exports unless the Administration decides 
otherwise. Yet at the time and place of export it will be the Commission 
that decides whether to issue a license for the supply of enriched uranium 
already agreed to by the Administration. These examples involve consider- 
ations of foreign policy as well as national defense and security. It is not 
clear how consideration of these factors by the Commission and the Ad- 
ministration should be coordinated, if at all. 

It should be noted that one interpretation of the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974 underscores the importance of the Commission as an indepen- 
dent check and balance upon executive branch decisions for nuclear exports. 
In essence, the Commission is seen as possessing a potential veto over 
executive branch export actions, a veto that Congress expects the Agency 
to use if it cannot make the required findings for defense and security. 
Since there are no statutory provisions for appeal or reconsideration, pre- 
sumably this veto power is absolute. Considering the substantial impact 
of this veto power, what provisions should there be, if any, for coordination 
between the Commission, the Administration and the State Department in 
instances of controversy? What consideration, if any, should the Com- 
mission be required to give to U. S. foreign policy and views of the executive 



CRS-7 

branch? Also, to what extent should Congress be able to make a final de- 
termination on a controversial export? 
3. Revision of agreements 

The agreements for cooperation contain no provisions for up- 
dating which may be a disadvantage for the future. However, 
agreements have been modified without such provisions, indicating 
they can be changed as needed. 

Many agreements for cooperation have been changed or superseded since 
1955 although they contain no provision for formal revision or updating. 
Nonetheless, some agreements contain out-of-date provisions such as re- 
ferences to then pending agreements with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency now long consumated, or to leasing of special nuclear materials. 
While the presence of out-of-date provisions probably does not impair the 
administration, they do become clutter. More important are prospects for 
future modification of the agreements to adapt them to changing times and 
conditions, particularly should the United States succeed in getting the nu- 
clear exporting nations to agree upon common prerequisites for exports of 
sensitive nuclear technologies such as fuel reprocessing. It would seem 
desirable to have a right to reopen agreements as times change. Of course 
this implies a reciprocal right of an agreement nation to reopen an agree- 
ment and perhaps to seek to weaken present U.S. rights. So there are disad- 
vantages as well as advantages to seeking provisions for routine updating. 
Nonetheless, the absence of such a provision is a matter of administration 
that Congress may wish to consider. 



CRS-8 

4. Future trends- -the pending agreement with Egypt 

Of particular interest to Congress are the pending agreements for 
cooperation with Egypt and Israel. The one for Egypt appears nearest to 
completion and information on its principal provisions has been issued 
by the State Department.* 

On November 5, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger and Egyptian De- 
puty Prime Minister Fahmy agreed in principle to conduct a program of 
cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy. Their agreement was viewed 
as an important step toward completing negotiations which, it is now hoped, 
can produce an agreement for cooperation in the near future. 

From information released by the State Department, it appears that 
the agreement will closely follow typical agreements for research and power, 
with a few notable differences. 

The scope of the agreement includes design, construction and operation 
of research and power reactors but does not mention fuel reprocessing or en- 
riching which presumably are excluded. 

The proposed commitment not to use any of the assistance for military 
purposes also specifically excludes the manufacture of any nuclear explosive 
device. 

The plutonium produced in the powerplants covered under the agree- 
ment or derived from U.S. fuel supplied for these facilities will be repro- 
cessed, fabricated and stored outside Egypt. 

* Department of State release no. 533, November 4, 1975. 



CRS-9 

Also, facilities utilizing relevant nuclear technology obtained from the 
United States will be under safeguards. There is, however, no commitment 
to place all nuclear materials and equipment in Egypt under international 
safeguards. The Egyptian Government also guarantees to apply "effective 
physical security measures" to the facilities and nuclear material covered 
by the agreement. How these measures might apply, if at all, to faci- 
lities and nuclear materials from other sources is not specified. Finally, 
the State Department release notes the intention of the United States that 
at such time as negotiations are completed, the same safeguards and special 
measures will be included in both the agreements for cooperation with 
Egypt and Israel respectively: "If certain provisions are modified or al- 
tered in one agreement, it is the intention of the United States Government 
to introduce such modifications or alterations in the other agreement. " 
5. Re-export control 

While initial exports of nuclear materials and equipment are li- 
censed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the agreements for 
cooperation require approval of the Energy Research and Develop- 
ment Administration for re-export of such items by an agreement 
nation. This anomaly could lead to confusion or divergent actions 
and therefore merits congressional attention. 

The organization and administration of agreements for cooperation and 
the licensing of nuclear exports present an anomaly concerning export and 
re-export of nuclear materials and equipment. If an item such as a quan- 
tity of enriched uranium, is to be exported directly from the U.S. nuclear 
industry to an agreement nation, a license must be obtained from the Nu- 
clear Regulatory Commission. However, if the agreement nation later 



64-626 O - 76 - 2 



CRS-10 

wishes to re-export that item to another nation, it must obtain the approval 
of the Energy Research and Development Administration, even though a 
similar direct export to the second nation would require an export license 
from the Commission. In situations where one nation can turn to another 
or to the United States for a desired nuclear item, there is the possibility 
of inconsistent or even contradictory decisions and actions by the Commis- 
sion and the Administration. This anomaly merits congressional attention. 

Another facet of re-export is that of nuclear technology. U. S. agree- 
ments for cooperation provide for control over re-export of material things 
but not for re-export of nuclear technology supplied by the United States. 
6. Safeguarding nuclear technology 

The agreements for cooperation require international safeguards 
for nuclear materials produced from exported nuclear materials 
or equipment, but not for nuclear materials produced in facilities 
built only with the help of U. S. technology and "know how". This 
appears to be a loophole which other governments are beginning 
to close in their agreements for nuclear cooperation. The safe- 
guarding of U. S. -furnished nuclear technology is a matter war- 
ranting congressional attention. 

The agreements for cooperation provide for safeguards for U.S. -sup- 
plied nuclear materials and equipment, and for nuclear material produced 
from them. The agreements do not, however, commit the agreement nation 
to declare nuclear facilities made with U. S. information and technology or 
by persons trained in the United States and to apply safeguards to them. 
In recent innovative actions, the governments of France and West Germany 
have sought to close this loophole in agreements for nuclear cooperation 
with South Korea and Brazil, respectively. 



CRS-11 

The general adoption of this innovation would help to assure nations 
throughout the world that their neighbors are not using imported technology 
to build unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Of course, the effectiveness of 
such a provision depends ultimately upon the motivations of the agreement 
state and the factors that sustain its compliance with the terms of an agree- 
ment. Assuming, however, that agreements will be honored, it seems likely 
that this innovation is desirable and that the United States should seek to 
add it to existing as well as to future agreements. 
7. Reprocessing of spent fuels 

The agreements for cooperation provide assurances that repro- 
cessing of U. S. supplied nuclear materials will be done only in 
facilities acceptable to the United States. Since there is little re- 
processing of commercial nuclear fuel, these commitments re- 
main untried. The demand for fuel reprocessing is likely to in- 
crease, however, and with it the desire of agreement nations to 
reprocess, particularly if there are no regional reprocessing cen- 
ters or access to reprocessing in the United States. What changes 
can be made in terms and administration of agreements for co- 
operation to minimize the metastasis of fuel reprocessing among 
individual nations is a likely matter for congressional interest. 

The agreements for cooperation generally provide that all alteration and 
reprocessing of nuclear fuel from the United States shall be done in faci- 
lities acceptable to both parties upon a joint determination that safeguards 
may be efficiently applied. The power agreement with the United Kingdom 
is silent on this matter. The power agreement with India specifies that 
India may reprocess any special nuclear material used in the Tarapur 
Atomic Power Station upon a joint determination that safeguards may be 
effectively applied, or in such other facilities as may be mutually agreed. 
Of special interest in India is that its reprocessing facilities can reprocess 



CRS-12 

its own materials, which are not under the agreement. This can compli- 
cate the workings of materials accountability and safeguards systems. It 
is somewhat akin to the problem of a butcher shop in keeping higher and 
lower grades of meat separate in the meat grinder: it requires unusual 
measures and discipline. 

In the early years of the agreements, the used fuels from research re- 
actors were returned to the United States for reprocessing, which was fea- 
sible because these fuels were comparatively simple in chemical and metal- 
lurgical qualities. At present there is little commercial reprocessing of 
nuclear power fuels. Used fuels are mostly stored until reprocessing be- 
comes available, or a decision is made not to reprocess but to store used 
fuels indefinitely. So there is no commercial competition on the world mar- 
ket for fuel reprocessing and the attendant risks that some reprocessors 
might pay less attention to safeguards than others. However, several nations 
are trying to acquire their own fuel reprocessing capability, including 
Brazil, Iran and South Korea. A trend toward national fuel reprocessing 
would compete with and perhaps weaken the efforts to establish regional 
fuel reprocessing facilities under international safeguards. 

In the administration of agreements for cooperation, the United States 
can expect future pressure from agreement nations concerning reprocessing. 
If the United States does not permit those nations to reprocess U.S. -supplied 
fuel in their own plants, it will have to offer alternatives. But these are 
few. At present no commercial fuel reprocessing plants are operating in 
the United States to perform this service. Reprocessing of nuclear power 



CRS-13 

fuel in the facilities of the Energy Research and Development Administration 
would interfere with production of plutonium for weapons and would require 
extensive modification of process equipment. The concept of regional plants, 
while supported by interested parties, has yet to attract enough concrete 
support to begin their construction. For a while the agreement nations 
probably could store used fuels in their own facilities. Sooner or later, 
however, their storage capacity will be filled up. Used fuel could be col- 
lected and stored at regional centers awaiting reprocessing, but this con- 
cept too requires much more international commitment than is now on the 
horizon. Used fuels could be returned to the United States for indefinite 
storage or temporary storage pending reprocessing. This alternative, how- 
ever, would require construction of storage facilities, for the present ones 
would be inadequate. 

The world situation for reprocessing of nuclear fuels is likely to under- 
go fundamental changes within the coming decade. What these changes may 
be and how the agreements for cooperation can be modified in terms and 
administration to anticipate and to influence these changes appear to be 
likely matters for congressional interest. 
8. International safeguards for all nuclear activities in an agreement nation 

The agreements for cooperation with non-weapons nations do 
not require international safeguards on all nuclear materials and 
facilities of an agreement nation, whether or not supplied by the 
United States. U.S. attempts to have nuclear supplier nations 
agree upon prerequisites for exports have yet to succeed. 
What can be done to obtain such commitments collectively with 
other supplier nations, or unilaterally, and what the benefits and 
disadvantages might be, are matters for congressional attention. 



CRS-14 

The agreements for cooperation commit agreement nations to place 
U. S. -supplied nuclear materials and equipment under international safe- 
guards but do not require the nations to place all of their nuclear materials 
and equipment from whatever source under these safeguards. According to 
recent press reports, the United States has been trying with little success 
to convince nuclear supplier nations to require such a commitment as a pre- 
requisite for their nuclear exports. Whether the United States should uni- 
laterally attempt to require an expanded safeguards commitment as a con- 
dition for U.S. nuclear cooperation is a controversial question. Such a 
position might serve only to deny the U.S. nuclear industry access to the 
world market, with the advantage then going to the nuclear industries of 
other exporting nations. What measures the United States might take to 
convince other nuclear supplier nations of the desirability of the U.S. po- 
sition is a matter worth congressional attention. 
9. Physical security 

The agreements for cooperation do not reflect the current im- 
portance attached to physical security and protection of U. S. nu- 
clear exports against theft or sabotage. The relationships among 
the State Department, the Energy Research and Development Ad- 
ministration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should be 
considered if the Commission is directed by statute to consider 
physical security in issuing export licenses. 

The increase in terrorist acts over recent years has caused some ob- 
servers to warn that terrorists might try to steal nuclear explosive mate- 
rials and to make and use nuclear weapons. This concern has generated 
increasing attention in the United States to physical protection a,nd security 
for nuclear materials and facilities. The greatest risks for terrorist theft 



CRS-15 

would appear to be at fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants and for 
materials in transit. These risks of terrorist, or other subnational, theft 
will increase if plutonium and highly enriched uranium become widely used 
as nuclear fuels, particularly if and when breeder reactors come into 
general use. At present responsibility for protection of nuclear materials 
and equipment is that of the nations involved. There is no international nu- 
clear security agency. 

U.S. agreements for cooperation do not commit agreement nations to 
meet U.S. standards for physical Security. Although the agreements place 
U.S. supplied materials and equipment under international safeguards, these 
do not extend to physical security. The furthest that the International Atomic 
Energy Agency has gone is to issue a security guide. If the Nuclear Regula- 
tory Commission is required to decide whether physical security in an agree- 
ment nation is adequate to permit licensing of a proposed nuclear export, 
then some consideration is indicated of the relationships between the State 
Department, the Energy Research and Development Administration and the 
Commission in considering physical security in the negotiation and adminis- 
tration of agreements for cooperation and in the licensing of nuclear ex- 
ports. 
10. Preference for NPT adherents 

Although encouraging nations to ratify the Non Proliferation 
Treaty is a goal of U.S. foreign policy, the agreements for co- 
operation do not include preferential terms for nations that have 
ratified the treaty. Whether such preferences should be provided, 
and in what forms, is an open question for the 1970s. 



CRS-16 

The Non Proliferation Treaty has been in effect for five years. During 
this time, none of the agreements for cooperation have been amended to give 
any preference to those agreement nations which ratify the treaty, or at 
least to agree to place all of their nuclear activities under international safe- 
guards. Whether such preferences would affect the hard core of industrial 
nations opposed to the treaty is debatable, regardless of whether other, 
less determined nations might be influenced to ratify. Whether it would be 
feasible to offer some preferential treatment for agreement states that ratify 
the NPT and whether such preferences would be worth their cost and pos- 
sible disadvantages are questions meriting congressional attention. 
11. Government-to- government transfers 

Although most nuclear exports are now made via export li- 
censes issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to private 
parties, the Energy Research and Development Administration 
still may make government-to-government transfers. Two issues 
arise from this situation. First, to what extent could the exe- 
cutive branch use such transfers to circumvent export controls 
by the Commission? Second, what voice, if any, should the Com- 
mission have in the negotiation and administration of government- 
to-government transfers? 

In the early years of nuclear cooperation, the U.S. Atomic Energy Com- 
mission often transferred materials directly to agreement nations without 
export licenses. Such licensing was limited to exports by fledgling com- 
panies in the U.S. nuclear industry. In later years, direct government to 
government exports decreased as the USAEC withdrew from competition 
with the growing U.S. nuclear industry. 

Now most nuclear exports are made via export licenses of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission issued to companies in the industry or to persons 



CRS-17 

who act as agents in the United States for foreign customers. However, 
government to government transfers remain possible and under 
the Energy Reorganization Act still require no license. 

Although there is little serious anticipation that the Nuclear Regu- 
latory Commission would be continually at loggerheads with the State Depart- 
ment or the Energy Research and Development Administration over nuclear 
cooperation and exports, it appears that the executive branch could try to 
circumvent an obstinate Commission by reviving government to government 
transfers. If this loophole is real, then Congress may wish to consider 
the future use of government to government exports, limitations upon their 
use, and the relationships of the State Department, the Administration and 
the Commission in their arrangement. 

Concerning information in the public record, the Commission's prac- 
tices for domestic licenses would suggest full information in the dockets 
for export licenses. On the other hand, details of foreign policy matters 
usually are not open to the public. The extent to which the Commission's 
decisions on export licenses should be documented in the public docket is 
a question likely to be raised by public interest groups concerned about 
U.S. nuclear exports. 
12. NRC findings on defense and security 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has to make findings in- 
volving the common defense and security, based largely upon in- 
formation and analysis provided by the executive branch. Of likely 
congressional interest is the ability of the Commission to develop 
resources capable of arriving at sound findings, and the extent of 
documentation of these findings in the public record. 



CRS-18 

Before it can issue an export license, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis- 
sion must find that the export is not inimical to the common defense and 
security. Since the Commission is primarily an independent regulatory 
agency concerned with certain economic and safety and environmental effects 
of civil nuclear power, it has comparatively little experience with consider- 
ation of national defense and security. 

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended contains no guidance or 
detailed definition of this criteria and the Commission's resources to con- 
sider these factors are small in comparison with those of the Federal de- 
partments having primary responsibility for defense and security. The 
Commission receives advisory analyses from the Department of State after 
that Department has obtained comments and inputs from other departments 
and agencies. It serves as the funnel for a homogenized statement of 
advice from the executive branch. Also, the dockets of the Commission's 
license actions contain little information of the Commission's analyses. 

Of potential interest to Congress are two matters. First, the Com- 
mission's ability to independently arrive at sound findings concerning the 
relation of a particular export to national defense and security. Second, 
in the light of recent moves to open up the processes of government to 
the public, it may be time to consider what information should appear in 
the Commission's dockets for export licenses. 
13. Peaceful nuclear explosives 

Although the U.S. opposition to non- weapons states' developing 
nuclear explosives of any kind is well known, except for three 



CRS-19 

cases the agreements for cooperation are silent on the use of U. S. - 
supplied materials and equipment for this purpose. How important 
are guarantees not to use U.S. exports for this purpose, and what 
can be done to obtain the guarantees, are matters of current in- 
terest. 

The agreements for cooperation are silent about use of U. S. -supplied 
materials and equipment to develop so-called peaceful nuclear explosives. 
Only four agreements, those with Israel, Portugal, Spain and South Africa, 
note the U.S. opposition to such use. Although all agreement nations are 
committed to use transferred items solely for civil purposes and not to use 
them for atomic weapons or for military purposes, there is no prohibition 
on peaceful nuclear explosives. The definition of atomic weapons in the 
agreements does not include such devices,* and civil uses are not defined. 
Considering that United States opposition to the development of such devices 
by non-weapons nations is well known, it seems unlikely that an agreement 
state would resort to a legalistic reading of the present terms to justify its 
misuse of U.S. supplied materials and equipment. Nonetheless, it could 
happen. Considering that the echoes of the Indian Government's detonation 
of a peaceful nuclear explosive are still being heard in discussions of safe- 
guards and proliferation, it seems likely that Congress will be interested 
in the administration of agreements for cooperation to prevent such use of 
U. S. -supplied materials and equipment. 



* An atomic weapon is defined in U.S. agreements for cooperation to mean 
any device utilizing atomic energy the principal purpose of which is for use 
as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapons test 
device. There is no reference to explosive devices. 



CRS-20 

14. Public participation 

The public has no opportunity to participate in the negotiation or 
administration of agreements for cooperation and limited oppor- 
tunities for participation in the licensing decisions of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. Whether and to what extent such par- 
ticipation is desirable, its advantages and disadvantages, and the 
nature of information to be made available to the public are con- 
troversial questions. Nonetheless, it may be desirable to con- 
sider them in the light of recent trends toward openness in go- 
vernment. 

The negotiation and administration of agreements for cooperation pro- 
vide for no public participation nor would they usually be expected to for 
subjects of less importance than proliferation of nuclear weapons. Details 
of foreign relations historically have been kept confidential without public 
participation. Now the procedures of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
provide for some public participation for decisions on nuclear exports and 
the possibility of a hearing before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. So 
far these provisions have been little exercised. 

As for documentation for the public, the records of agreements for co- 
operation are not public documents whereas certain documents appear in 
the Commission's dockets for export licenses. These dockets, however, 
contain little detailed information or analysis used by the Commission. 

Whether there should be expanded opportunity for public participation 
in arrangements for nuclear cooperation with other nations is a contro- 
versial question. It is complicated by the organizational situation in which 
two Federal agencies with little history of public participation have the re- 
sponsibility for negotiation and administration of agreements and an inde- 
pendent regulatory agency with a history of openness acts on export licenses. 



CRS-21 

Nonetheless, with the present trends toward participatory democracy and 
openness in government, the matter of public participation may merit atten- 
tion. * 



* One difficulty encountered in making this study was obtaining complete 
and authentic texts of many of the agreements for cooperation. Often a 
final version had to be assembled by cutting and pasting changes from vari- 
ous documents. So there is some uncertainty that all of thes reconstructions 
are wholly accurate. Since the agreement documents are comparatively 
short, it would appear both feasible and desirable to republish complete, 
authentic texts for revised agreements, and to reissue a complete text when- 
ever an agreement is modified in the future. 



CRS-22 

II. PURPOSE, APPROACH AND INFORMATION SOURCES 
The Senate Committee on Government Operations requested the Congres- 
sional Research Service to prepare a background report on U. S. agreements 
for cooperation in atomic energy, more commonly known as bi-lateral agree- 
ments. The purpose of the report is to provide background information for 
hearings on S. 1439, The Export Reorganization Act of 1976, which proposes 
to revise Federal organization and control for U.S. nuclear exports. 

The report describes the origins of the present web of U.S. bilateral 
agreements, identifies and discusses features relevant to limiting the fur- 
ther proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations of the world, describes 
similarities and differences of several kinds of bilateral agreements, and 
concludes with a statement of observations and issues for further congres- 
sional attention. 

The report is based upon the examination of 32 agreements for co- 
operation with foreign nations and international organizations plus a review 
of information previously presented to Congress and to the public on the ne- 
gotiation, administration and use of these agreements. The approach is 
comparative, seeking to point out salient features, similarities and differ- 
ences, and to indicate the significance of some of these features to the or- 
ganization and management of nuclear exports under new organizational re- 
lationships established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. 

Sources of information include the texts of the agreements, and hearings 
before the Senate Committee on Government Operations, the House Commit- 
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and the House Committee on International 



CRS-23 

Relations. While the authors have had a few contacts with the Energy Re- 
search and Development Administration and with the Department of State, 
these contacts have been deliberately minimized in preference to use of 
the public record and information generally available to the public, parti- 
cularly the texts of the agreements. Any consequent gaps in this analysis 
with respect to the changing role of agreements for cooperation, their uses, 
their limitations, and their relevance to the troublesome issue of prolifer- 
ation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the world can be corrected 
by the agencies concerned in their appearances before the Committee. 



CRS-24 
III. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS; WHAT ARE THEY AND WHY ? 

The fundamental mechanism for international nuclear cooperation be- 
tween the United States and other nations or international organizations is 
an Agreement for Cooperation. These agreements are popularly known as 
"bilateral agreements." A variation which involves commitments by the 
United States and the other party to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
is known as a trilateral or tripartite agreement. Agreements for coopera- 
tion are negotiated for the United States by the Department of State with 
the strong participation of the Energy Research and Development Admini- 
stration. To take effect, they require a Presidential finding and approval, 
and must lie before Congress for a specified time during which Congress 
in essence can exercise a veto. The agreements provide the framework for 
technical cooperation and for export of U. S. nuclear materials, powerplants 
and related equipment to nations abroad, and for safeguarding of exported 
items against theft, diversion or illicit use. 
Transfer of Information: a Prime Mover for World Use of Nuclear Power 

The worldwide spread of the science and technologies of atomic energy 
and nuclear power was extended greatly beginning in the 1950s by an outward 
surge in information from the United States. * 

* The two terms, atomic energy and nuclear power, are frequently used. 
They are not synonyms. Atomic energy is the more inclusive term which 
encompasses uses of radiation and radioactive materials as well as pro- 
duction of useful energy from fission and fusion. Nuclear power is limited 
to the technologies for producing useful energy (process heat or electricity) 
from fission of uranium atoms. 



CRS-25 

The transfer of scientific and technical information has been a driving 
force for development of atomic energy ever since O. R. Frisch and L. 
Meitner early in 1939 speculated that absorption of a neutron by a uranium 
nucleus sometimes caused fission. The role of information exchange became 
immediately evident. News of this speculation was brought to the United 
States in January 1939 by Niels Bohr who at once communicated this idea to 
his former student, J. A. Wheeler and others at Princeton. From them the 
news spread by word of mouth to neighboring physicists, including E. Fermi 
at Columbia University. By January 26, 1939, the fission process was 
discussed at a conference on theoretical physics in Washington, D. C. Be- 
fore this meeting was over, experiments had confirmed that neutrons could 
initiate fission and other confirmations were reported in the February 15, 
1939, issue of Physical Review . From then on there was a steady flow 
of papers on fission. The scientific community itself soon attempted to stop 
publication of further data by voluntary agreement because of military im- 
plications but was not able to do so for about a year. * The voluntary con- 
trol of 1940 was soon supplanted by government controls and restrictions 
as the wartime atom bomb project began to move. Information on military 

* Professor Smyth in his famous report noted that in the spring of 1939 
a small group of foreign -born physicists in the United States attempted to 
stop publication of further data on fission by voluntary agreement. Leading 
American and British physicists agreed, but F. Joliot, France's foremost 
nuclear physicist, refused, apparently because of the publication of one let- 
ter in the Physical Review sent in before all Americans had been brought 
into agreement. Consequently, publication continued freely for about another 
year although a few papers were withheld voluntarily by their authors. Cf. , 
H. D. Smythe. Atomic energy for military purposes . Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1945, p. 45. 



64-626 O - 76 - 3 



CRS-26 

and civil uses of nuclear energy was held secret, and Congress in the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946 continued this secrecy and the premise that certain in- 
formation was born classified and subject to strict control. In the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946, Congress in an extraordinary grant of peacetime author- 
ity gave the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission control over the dissemi- 
nation of restricted data" in such a manner as to "assure the common de- 
fense and security. "* "Restricted data" was defined to include information 
relating to civil use of nuclear power. ** In the Act, Congress limited in- 
ternational exchange of information on industrial nuclear power, but en- 
couraged the dissemination of scientific and technical information relating 
to uses other than weapons and industrial power. 

The policies of the United States for exchange of information and tech- 
nology for atomic energy is characterized by two distinct phases. From 
1946 to 1954 the national policy sought to confine and prevent the export of 
U. S. nuclear information and technology. From 1954 to the present national 
policy has emphasized the benefits of such transfers and has promoted them. 
The era of restricted transfer: 1946-1954 

After the rejection in the United Nations of the U. S. proposals for in- 
ternational control and development of atomic energy (the Ache son -Lilien- 

* Section 10(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 

** The 1946 Act defined "restricted data" to mean "... all data concerning 
the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fission- 
able material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power, 
but shall not include any data which the Commission from time to time de- 
termines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense 
and security. 



CRS-27 

thai report and the Baruch Plan), the United States sought to bar the export 
of U.S. technology for nuclear weapons and power. Beginning with the Atom- 
ic Energy Act in 1946, there followed almost a decade of secrecy and severe 
limitations upon exports and international cooperation. 

While the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 did contemplate sharing of infor- 
mation concerning the practical industrial applications of atomic energy with 
other countries, this was prohibited until "effective and enforceable safe- 
guards against its use for destructive purposes [could] be devised." This 
statutory condition never was fulfilled and the restrictions of the Act ended 
the wartime nuclear collaboration of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Belgium. The only cooperation permissible in 1946 was for 
exploration for uranium ores and their procurement. Five years later Con- 
gress slightly relaxed the restrictions by authorizing the Atomic Energy 
Commission to exchange certain information with other countries about the 
"refining, purification and subsequent treatment of source materials, re- 
actor development, production of fissionable material, and research and de- 
velopment. "* In this amendment Congress laid down four limitations for 
U. S. technical assistance in nuclear energy limitations that have become 
the foundation for negotiation and approval of agreements for cooperation. 
These limitations were: 

(1) a prohibition against communication of weapons design and fa- 
brication data; 

* Public Law 82-235, 65 Stat. 692, 1951. 



CRS-28 

(2) a requirement for adequate security standards in countries re- 
ceiving classified information; 

(3) a determination by the President that the arrangements would 
promote and would not endanger the common defense and security; 
and 

(4) a requirement that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy be 
informed of the arrangement 30 days prior to its consummation. 

The era of open exchanges: 1954 to the present 

By 1954 the impetus of the Atoms for Peace Program of President Eisen- 
hower and the failure of U.S. restrictions on international nuclear coopera- 
tion to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons abroad combined with techno- 
logical optimism for the future of nuclear power to reverse U.S. policy 
on exchange of nuclear information and cooperation. 

International cooperation in nuclear energy . --When Congress rewrote 
the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, it greatly expanded the prospects for inter- 
national cooperation in civil nuclear energy. * The Act includes major pro- 
visions in section 54 for the United States to distribute special nuclear ma- 
terials. Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, this distribution 
function was assigned to the Energy Research and Development Agency. ** 
Section 54 limits such distribution to nations or groups of nations with an 
agreement for cooperation with the United States. Also, with one exception, 
the Energy Research and Development Administration is to be compensated 

* The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, P.L. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919. 

** The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, P.L. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233. 



CRS-29 

for special nuclear materials distributed at not less than ERDA published 
charges. Also, ERDA is authorized to enter into contracts to provide for 
the producing or enriching of special nuclear materials in its facilities for 
exports to nations or organizations with an agreement for cooperation. * 

Section 54 authorizes the Energy Research and Development Adminis- 
tration to distribute to the International Atomic Energy Agency, or to any 
group of nations, only such amounts of special nuclear materials and for 
such periods of time as are authorized by Congress. 

Section 54 also provides for repurchase of special nuclear materials 
distributed under a sale, and to purchase special nuclear materials produced 
through use of special nuclear materials which were sold or leased. 

U.S. agreements for cooperation in atomic energy . --When Congress re- 
wrote the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, it greatly expanded the prospects for 
international cooperation in civil nuclear energy, but within specific statu- 
tory restriction. Section 123 of the Act provides approaches to international 
cooperation by forbidding cooperation with any nation or regional defense 
organization until four conditions are fulfilled. These four conditions are: 

(1) ERDA has submitted to the President the proposed agreement 
for cooperation, together with its recommendations thereon; 

(2) The President has approved and authorized the execution of 
the proposed agreement and has made a determination in writing 
that "the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and 

* The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 161(v)(B). 



CRS-30 

will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and 
security;" 

(3) The proposed agreement, together with the approval and de- 
termination of the President, has been submitted to the Joint Com- 
mittee and has lain before the Committee for thirty days; and 

(4) Certain agreements, together with the President's approval 
and determination have lain before the Joint Committee for sixty 
days during which Congress by concurrent resolution may state it 
does not favor the proposed agreement. For these agreements, 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is required to report its 
views and recommendations to Congress during the first 30 days 
and to supply a draft concurrent resolution stating in substance 
that the Congress favors or does not favor the agreement. * 

As for terms and conditions of the agreements, Congress specified in 
Section 123 that each agreement must include: 

(1) The terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the co- 
operation; 

(2) A guaranty by the cooperating party that security safeguards 
and standards agreed upon will be maintained; and 



* The agreements which are to receive this special attention are those in- 
volving a nuclear reactor that may be capable of producing more than five 
thermal megawatts or special nuclear materials for use in connection there- 
with. Also included are agreements arranged under subsection 91(c) of the 
Act (dealing with military applications), and under subsections 144(b) and (c) 
(dealing with international cooperation for weapons. ) 



CRS-31 

(3) A guaranty by the cooperating party that any material and 

any restricted data to be transferred will not be transferred to 

unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the cooperating 

party except as specified in the agreement. * 

Negotiation of agreements for cooperation . --The Department of State 
and the Energy Research and Development Administration are the two agen- 
cies primarily responsible for drafting and negotiating agreements for co- 
operation. 

An Executive order in 1959 by President Eisenhower specified that the 
negotiating functions are J:o be performed by or under the authority of the 
Secretary of State and further specified that international cooperation under 
the Act shall be subject to the responsibility of the Secretary of State with 
respect to the foreign policy of the United States pertinent thereto. ** It 
appears that since then the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission and now the 
Energy Research and Development Administration have had the major re- 
sponsibility of drafting and negotiating the agreements, finally submitting 
them to the Department of State for review. 

U. S. control of nuclear exports . --The agreements for cooperation pro- 
vide a framework for commercial exports of nuclear materials, equipment 
and technology to agreement nations. However, many of the commercial 
transactions are subject to government controls. The Nuclear Regulatory 

* Restricted data is a term with special meaning under the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954. It is defined as "all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, 
or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear ma- 
terial; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, 

•^Executive Order 1084-1. September 30, 1959 



CRS-32 

Commission licenses the commercial export of source and special nuclear 
materials to agreement nations and also the nuclear part of nuclear power 
plants and fabricated nuclear fuel. The Energy Research and Development 
Administration, by regulating activities of U.S. nationals abroad, controls 
one important avenue for the export of nuclear technology and know-how. 
The Department of Commerce licenses the export of parts to nuclear power 
plants which are not controlled by the Commission. In addition, the Ad- 
ministration can directly export nuclear items through government-to- go- 
vernment transfers that require no NRC license. 

The export control authority of the Energy Research and Development 
Administration is of particular interest as one approach to controlling the 
export of technology. Section 57(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as 
amended makes it unlawful for any person to directly or indirectly engage 
in the production of any special nuclear material outisde of the United States 
except (1) under an agreement for cooperation, or (2) upon authorization by 
the Commission (now ERDA) after a determination that such activity will 
not be inimical to the interest of the United States. This function went to 
the Administration in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Using this 
authority, the Administration's regulations now require authorization for the 
following activities by U.S. nationals: * 

(i) Designing or assisting in the design of facilities for the 
chemical processing of irradiated special nuclear material, faci- 
lities for the production of heavy water, facilities for the separation 

* Unclassified activities in foreign atomic energy programs, 10 CFR 810. 
Federal Register, vol. 40. Sept. 30, 1975: 44826-44828. 



CRS-33 

of isotopes of uranium, or equipment or components especially 
designed for any of the foregoing; or 

(ii) Constructing, fabricating, or operating such facilities; 
or 

(iii) Furnishing information not available to the public in 
published form for use in the design, construction, fabrication, or 
operation of such facilities or equipment or components especial- 
ly designed therefore. 

The regulations appear to require, for example, authorization for a 
U. S. engineering firm to design a fuel reprocessing plant for a foreign 
country, or to send its engineers abroad to help in such design. By so con- 
trolling the activities of experts and companies in the nuclear industry, the 
Administration controls some export of technology. Note that if a company 
proposes to export a fuel reprocessing plant, it has to get a Commission 
license. How these respective authorities will interact in the future is not 
clear. For example, could ERDA insist that it must authorize the design 
part of an export while the Commission licenses the physical part? Which 
agency would control follow-on technical assistance and servicing associated 
with a major export of U. S. nuclear equipment? 

Differing criteria for decisions . --Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
as amended, the President, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
Energy Research and Development Administration all make decisions of 
one kind or another concerning nuclear cooperation and exports, some of 
which involve statutory criteria for decision. Table I identifies eight such 
decisions and the associated statutory criteria. Criteria for five decisions 
require consideration of national defense and security, two require con- 
sideration of risk to the public health and safety, and one consideration 



CRS-35 

of the interests of the United States. The Act defines the term "common 
defense and security" to mean the common defense and security of the United 
States. * "Health and safety" is not defined, nor are "interests of the United 
States. " In any event, the President has to determine whether a proposed 
agreement for cooperation will "promote and will not constitute an unreason- 
able risk to the common defense and security" while the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has to consider whether certain licenses would be "inimical 
to the common defense and security" and in some cases to the "public health 
and safety. The Energy Research and Development Administration has to 
consider whether declassification of restricted data would constitute "undue 
risk to the common defense and security", and whether authorizing certain 
activities by "persons" abroad would be "inimical to the interests of the 
United States". 

The variety of these statutory criteria and their use by different parts 
of the Government suggests the possibility that strict adherence to the cri- 
teria can produce decisions on a common matter that could be inconsistent 
or at cross purposes. 



The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, section 11(g). 



CRS-36 
IV. PROVISIONS OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO PROLIFERATION 

The provisions of the agreements for cooperation relevant to prolifer- 
ation of the ability to make nuclear weapons are identified and discussed in 
this chapter. An examination of several types of agreements follows in 
Chapter V. 

Some provisions of agreements for cooperation relate to proliferation 
of the ability to make nuclear weapons through their effect upon the use of 
nuclear power and the nuclear industrial base of agreement nations. Other 
provisions relate to proliferation through their effect upon the prevention 
and detection of theft or diversion of nuclear materials, or the misuse of 
equipment transferred from the United States. This chapter identifies and 
briefly discusses the major provisions of each category that appear in agree- 
ments for cooperation. 
Exchange of information 

The agreements for cooperation establish the basis for virtually unre- 
stricted exchange of scientific information about nuclear energy between the 
United States and agreement nations, and for Restricted Data that has been 
declassified. The opening up of exchange of information caused by the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 was dramatic. Before then, information on the first U.S. 
nuclear powerplant at Shippingport was kept almost as secret as information 
on the powerplants for the atomic submarine. By 1955 declassification had 
progressed far enough for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to fully 
describe Shippingport in Geneva at the first United Nations International 



CRS-37 

Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. However, some restric- 
tions remain. 

The agreements for cooperation specify that Restricted Data is not to 
be communicated, and that no materials, or equipment and devices are to 
be transferred and no services furnished if that transfer or furnishing in- 
volves the communication of Restricted Data. Since the Energy Research 
and Development Administration decides what information can be declas- 
sified, in a sense it controls the information which can be transferred. 

As for information which may be exchanged, the agreements commit 
the Parties to exchange unclassified information (note, the term Restricted 
Data is not used) with respect to the application of atomic energy to peace- 
ful uses and the considerations of health and safety connected therewith. 
The agreements specify that the exchange will be accomplished through var- 
ious means including reports, conferences, and visits to facilities. The 
subjects of such exchange may include information on: 

(1) Development, design, construction, operation and use of re- 
search, materials testing, experimental, demonstration power and 
power reactors, and reactor experiments; 

(2) The use of radioactive isotopes and source material, special 
nuclear material, and byproduct material in physical and biolo- 
gical research, medicine, agriculture and industry; and 

(3) Health and safety considerations related to the foregoing. 

It is notable that the agreements do not apply several anti- prolifera- 
tion provisions to information transferred by the United States to other 



CRS-38 

nations. These anti- proliferation provisions include (1) the safeguards rights 
of the United States; (2) the guarantees not to use transferred materials, 
including equipment and devices, for weapons or for military purposes; (3) 
the commitments to use materials, equipment or devices transferred solely 
for civil purposes; and (4) the application of international safeguards. 
Access to special facilities 

The agreements for research and development and for research commit 
the Parties to make available for mutual use specialized research facilities 
and reactor materials testing facilities, if terms and conditions can be 
agreed upon at the time and if space, facilities and personnel "conveniently 
available" permit. 

At the outset these provisions were unilateral, for with the exception 
of Canada, the agreement nations had few if any facilities of interest to 
the United States. The flow of scientists and engineers from other lands 
to U.S. nuclear facilities has helped these nations to acquire a cadre of per- 
sonnel with practical training and working experience in nuclear science, 
technology and power. 

There are now some prospects of reciprocal value to the United States 
as the nuclear programs of major supplier nations diversify and move in 
directions not of primary interest to the U.S. nuclear program. For ex- 
ample, in the third decade of the nuclear age, specialized facilities in West 
Germany could become of interest to the United States. 



CRS-39 

Cooperation between persons 

The agreements for cooperation in addition to providing for cooperation 
between governments and their agencies also opened the way to cooperation 
between "persons" of the United States and an agreement nation.* The 
agreements typically state the understanding of the Parties that arrange- 
ments may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its 
jurisdiction for the transfer of equipment and devices and materials. Ar- 
rangements may also be made for the transfer of special nuclear material 
and for the performance of services with respect thereto for uses specified 
in the agreement. 

In essence, these provisions permit companies in the U.S. nuclear in- 
dustry to deal directly with the governments, and with the nuclear and 
electricity industries of the agreement nations for export of nuclear 
products and for performance of nuclear services such as fuel reprocessing. 
Note, however, that performance of enrichment services by U.S. firms 
is still moot, at least until privately owned enrichment facilities are li- 
censed and built in the United States. 
Transfer of materials and equipment 

The research and power, and research agreements provide for 
the transfer of source material, heavy water, byproduct material, other 

* Note, however, that the definition of "person" in the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 is broad. The term means (1) any individual, corporation, partner- 
ship, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, 
governmental agency other than the Commission, any State or any foreign 
government or nation or any political subdivision of any such government or 
nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, representative, agent 
or agency of the foregoing. 



CRS-40 

radioisotopes, stable isotopes and special nuclear material for purposes 
other than fueling reactors and reactor experiments. The transfers may 
be made for defined applications and in such quantities and under such terms 
and conditions as may be agreed upon when such items are not commercially 
available. The provisions also extend to transfer of equipment and devices 
under such terms and conditions as may be agreed. 
Supply of special nuclear materials 

The agreements for cooperation contain elaborate provisions for the 
United States to supply enriched uranium and other special nuclear materials 
to agreement nations. Depending upon the agreement, the materials may be 
supplied by government-to- government transfer, by lease or sale of the ma- 
terials, or by supplying enrichment services to the agreement nation or 
persons under its jurisdiction. The export shipment of the enriched ura- 
nium, once it leaves the Government's enrichment plant usually is arranged 
by an agent who must obtain an export license. 

The research agreements are the simplest, for the amounts of special 
nuclear materials transferred are small, usually only enough to operate a 
research reactor or a reactor experiment. Here the United States commit- 
ment is simply to transfer the desired materials, with terms and conditions 
for contracts to be agreed upon in advance. 

The research and power agreements are more complicated. They pro- 
vide for contracts with the Energy Research and Development Administration 
for the production of enriched uranium from U.S. ores, or for enrichment 
of normal uranium supplied by the agreement Nation. The agreements 



CRS-41 

assure the agreement nation that it will have access on an equitable basis 
with other purchasers of such services to uranium enrichment capacity 
available in the Administration's facilities and not already allocated. Here 
too the assurance is becoming academic for the U.S. enrichment plants 
have been booked to capacity since mid 1974; so no further long-term en- 
richment or production contracts can be signed. 

The agreements set general limits upon the amount of special nuclear 
materials to be transferred. Sometimes a numerical limit is used. For 
example, a research agreement may limit the net amount of uranium- 235 
contained in enriched uranium which may be transferred. * Typically, 
there is further restriction that the quantity of enriched uranium transferred 
for the fueling of reactors or reactor experiments shall not at any time 
be in excess of the quantity necessary for the loading of such reactors or 
experiments plus an additional quantity as, in the opinion of the Adminis- 
tration, is necessary to permit the efficient and continuous operation of such 
reactors or experiments. 

As for the power only agreemments, that with India commits the Energy 
Research and Development Administration to sell to the Government of In- 
dia as needed all requirements of India for enriched uranium for use as 
fuel at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, with the further understanding 

* Note, the limits on transfers are not quantities of enriched materials, but 
rather quantities of the uranium-235 isotope contained within the enriched 
materials. So the weight of enriched uranium exportable would vary in- 
versely with the enrichment: the less the enrichment, the more enriched 
uranium could be transferred. 



64-626 O - 76 - 4 



CRS-42 

that Tarapur is to be operated on no special nuclear material other than 
that provided by the United States or produced therefrom. The Indian agree- 
ment sets a ceiling of 14, 500 kilograms of U-235 contained in enriched ura- 
nium sold. The net amount is defined to be the gross quantity of U-235 
contained in the enriched uranium sold to India less the amount of recoverable 
uranium resold or otherwise returned to the United States or transferred 
to any other nation or group of nations or international organization with 
the approval of the United States. The quantity of enriched uranium sold 
by the Administration and held by the Government of India is not at any 
time to be in excess of the quantity necessary for the full loading of the 
Tarapur Atomic Power Station, plus such additional quantity as, in the 
opinion of the Parties, is necessary to permit efficient and continuous oper- 
ation of the Station. 

The agreement with the United Kingdom sets out a ceiling of 8, 000 kilo- 
grams for the net quantity of U-235 contained in enriched uranium trans- 
ferred, and specifies a detailed formula for computation of net amount. 
In this agreement the Administration states its readiness to sell enriched 
uranium to the United Kingdom for fueling reactors of its civil power pro- 
gram, including merchant marine propulsion. * The Administration is also 
committed to enter into contracts for producing or enriching uranium for the 
United Kingdom, to such extent and subject to such terms and conditions 
as may be established by the Administration. 

* Note, however, the British did not develop merchant marine applications 
of nuclear power and are making little use of power reactors fueled with 
enriched uranium. 



CRS-43 

While enriched uranium gets most of the attention in agreements for 
cooperation, other special nuclear materials can be provided. The research 
and power agreements with Argentina and Brazil specifically mention for 
the transfer of plutonium to both nations for use in reactor and reactor 
experiments under terms and conditions to be agreed. The agreement with 
Greece permitted transfer of plutonium provided that the quantity within 
Greek jurisdiction not exceed 250 grams of plutonium in the form of fabri- 
cated foils and sources and 10 grams in other forms. The power agreements 
with India and the United Kingdom are silent about U. S. supply of plutonium. 
Reprocessing of irradiated special nuclear materials 

A provision of special relevance to proliferation is that dealing with 
the reprocessing of used nuclear fuels to recover plutonium or U-233 and 
residual uranium. It is at the reprocessing plant that recovered plutonium 
or U-233 are in a form most usable for the making of nuclear weapons and 
most susceptible to deversion or theft. 

The research and power, and research agreements require that repro- 
cessing shall be performed in facilities acceptable to both Parties upon a 
joint determination that the safeguards requirements of the agreement may 
be effectively applied. The agreements go a step further and require that 
any alteration of irradiated fuel elements removed from a reactor be per- 
formed in mutually acceptable facilities. Under this commitment, the agree- 
ment nations can only remove and store spent fuel pending the required joint 
determination. It is not clear, however, whether the joint determination is 



CRS-44 

a one-time affair made once during the term of an agreement or whether it 
applies each time fuel reprocessing is required. 

The power agreement with India provides that reprocessing may be per- 
formed in Indian facilities upon a joint determination of the Parties that 
safeguards may be effectively applied, or in such other facilities as may 
be mutually agreed. It is understood that except as may otherwise be agreed, 
the form and content of any irradiated fuel elements removed from the re- 
actors are not to be altered before delivery to the reprocessing facility. 
The agreement with the United Kingdom is silent on reprocessing. 

As for who owns plutonium produced in irradiated fuel supplied by the 
United States, if the agreement nation bought the original fuel material from 
the United States, the agreement nation has title. Also, if the special nu- 
clear material is leased from the Energy Research and Development 
Administration, the lessee has title unless the Administration and the agree- 
ment nations otherwise agree. 

The Indian agreement gives the United States a first option to purchase 
such nuclear material at the fuel value price of the Administration which 
may be in effect at the time. If the Administration does not exercise this 
option, India, with the approval of the United States, may transfer such 
excess special nuclear material to any nation or group of nations or inter- 
national organizations. This agreement includes no limitation upon the na- 
tions to which special nuclear materials from reprocessed fuel can be trans- 
ferred. In comparison, the research and power agreements require that 



CRS-45 

the receiving nation have an agreement for cooperation with the United 
States, and the research agreements require Administration approval. 
Guarantees 

Two guarantees included in agreements for cooperation apply to use of 
transferred items for atomic weapons or military purposes and transfer of 
items to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the agreement 
nation. Concerning use for nuclear weapons, the agreements typically pro- 
vide that: 

No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to 
the government of. . . or authorized persons under its jurisdiction 
by purchase or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement or the super- 
seded Agreements, and no special nuclear material produced 
through the use of such material, equipment and devices, will 
be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development 
of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose. 

(Note: There is no specific prohibition of use of U.S. transfers 
to make nuclear explosives. ) 

The commitment concerning transfers is designed to assure the United States 
that items it supplies, or that are exported by the U.S. nuclear industry, 
will not be transferred without the agreement of the Energy Research and 
Development Administration to unauthorized persons or outside the juris- 
diction of the agreement nations. Typically, the agreements provide that: 

No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the 
Government of . . . or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction 
pursuant to this agreement or the superseded agreements will be 
transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of 
the Government of. . . except as the Commission [Administration] 
may agree to such a transfer to the jurisdiction of another nation 
or group of nations, and then only if, in the opinion of the Commis- 
sion [Administration], the transfer is within the scope of an agree- 
ment for cooperation between the Government of the United States 
and the other nation or group of nations. 



CRS-46 

The power agreement with India contains a commitment not to use trans- 
ferred material, equipment or devices for atomic weapons or for research 
on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose. 
The word "material" is not defined but would seem to include special nu- 
clear materials. In this agreement the United States likewise guarantees 
that no special nuclear material produced at the Tarapur Atomic Power 
Station and acquired by it, or an equivalent amount of the same type sub- 
stituted therefor, shall be used for atomic weapons or for research on or 
development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose. It is 
not clear why the Indian commitment mentions only "materials" while the 
U.S. commitment specifies special nuclear materials. 

The power agreement with the United Kingdom contains the atomic weap- 
on commitment by both Parties and specifically extends to special nuclear 
material produced through the use of any transferred materials. As for 
transfers, the provisions are similar but somewhat changed in that neither 
Party is to transfer materials to any unauthorized person or beyond its 
jurisdiction without the written consent of the supplying party. 
A commitment to civil use 

In addition to commitments by agreement nations not to use transferred 
materials, equipment and devices for nuclear weaponry or military pur- 
poses, the agreements typically include an expression of common interest 
that any material, equipment or devices made available to the agreement 
nation or any person under its jurisdictionn shall be used solely for civil 
purposes. Whether civil purposes premit "peaceful nuclear explosives" is 



CRS-47 

not usually not specified. The power agreement with India limits this commit- 
ment to items made available to the Government of India for use in the 
Tarapur Atomic Power Station, or in connection therewith. The Indian agree- 
ment indicates a difference of opinion between the Parties in the following 
observation included in the text: 

. . .The Government of India emphasizes, in contrast to the po- 
sition of the United States, that its agreement to the provisions of 
this Article in relation to equipment or devices transferred pur- 
suant to this Agreement has been accorded in consideration of the 
fact that, as provided in this Agreement, the Tarapur Atomic 
Power Station will be operated on no other special nuclear material 
than that furnished by the Government of the United States of 
America and special nuclear material produced therefrom, in con- 
sequence of which the provisions of this Article in relation to 
equipment or devices in any case ensue from the safeguard on 
fuel. 

The meaning of this qualification is not clear. The power agreement 
with the United Kingdom contains no commitment to civil use. 
U.S. safeguards rights 

The agreements for cooperation broke new ground in the guarantees and 
rights obtained for the United States concerning the safeguarding of nuclear 
materials, including an unusual right to send its inspectors into the sovereign 
territory of the agreement nation. 

The agreements for cooperation in research and power, and for research 
onl, all contain commitments relating to review of the design and operation 
of facilities and to safeguarding of source and special nuclear materials. 
Typically, an agreement commits the agreement nation to permit the United 
States to review the design of any reactor and any other equipment and de- 
vices the design of which the Energy Research and Development Adminis- 
tration determines to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards. 



CRS-48 

with the objective of assuring design and operation are for civil purposes 
and permit effective application of safeguards. 

The United States also has unusual rights for source and special nuclear 
material made available to the agreement nation or individual to any person 
under its jurisdiction, and any source of special nuclear material". . .utilized 
in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of ... " specified 
materials, equipment or devices. These rights are: to require records and 
reports, to require that materials be subject to all safeguards provided 
in the agreement, to require deposit of materials in storage facilities desig- 
nated by the Administration, and to designate inspectors after consultation 
with the agreement government. 

The agreements typically specify the rights of the United States as 

follows: 

To designate, after consultation with the Government of . . . , per- 
sonnel who, accompanied, if either Party so requests, by personnel 
designated by the Government of .... shall have access in. ..to 
all places and data necessary to account for the source material 
and special nuclear material which are subject to. ..this Article 
to determine whether there is compliance with this Agreement and 
to make such independent measurements as may be deemed neces- 
sary. 

In case of noncompliance with these safeguards provisions, or the com- 
mitment for application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the United States has the right to suspend or terminate the agree- 
ment and to require the return of any materials, equipment and devices 
under the agreement. 

The power agreement with India has similar provisions, with enough 
differences to be worth noting here. Concerning design review rights, the 



CRS-49 

agreement notes the Parties had reviewed the design of the Tarapur Atomic 
Power Station and made a review of any significant modification in design 
for the sole purpose of "...determining that the arrangements provided in 
this Article can be effectively applied. " For the same purpose, the Parties 
may review the design of other facilities which will use, fabricate, or pro- 
cess any special nuclear material made available under the agreement or 
produced in the Station. The agreement contains an interesting exemption 
to the design review for India. The Indian agreement specifies that: 

. . . Such a review of the design of these other facilities will not 
be required if the Government of India, pursuant to mutually ac- 
ceptable measurement arrangements, has placed an agreed equi- 
valent amount of the same type of special nuclear material under 
the scope of this Agreement. 

It is not clear what this substitution provision accomplishes. The Indian 
agreement provides for a system of records and reports to be established 
to assure the complete accountability of any special nuclear material which 
is made available to that Government pursuant to the agreement, or which 
is produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. Any special nuclear 
material provided under the agreement or produced in the Tarapur Atomic 
Power Station which is surplus to the current needs of the fuel cycle for 
the Station and which is not transferred by the Government of India shall, 
unless otherwise mutually agreed, be stored at the Tarapur Atomic Power 
Station. 

Concerning inspections, the Indian agreement provides for consultations 
and periodic exchanges of visits to give assurance that the objectives of li- 
miting Tarapur to peaceful purposes and the provisions concerning transfers 



CRS-50 

are being observed. To the extent relevant to the accomplishment thereof, 
personnel designated by the Government of the United States, following con- 
sultations with the Government of India, have full access to the Station and 
to conversion, fabrication and chemical processing facilities in India at such 
time as special nuclear material transferred to the Govenment of India for, 
or received from, the Station is located at such facilities, and at such other 
times as may be relevant. Personnel so designated are to be afforded ac- 
cess to other places, and data, and to persons, to the extent relevant. The 
personnel designated by either Party, accompanied by personnel of the other 
Party, if the latter so request, may make such independent measurements 
as either Party considers necessary. Nothing in the Agreement is intended 
to impede the ability of either Party to have prompt access to data, places 
and persons to the extent relevant to the objective of civil use. The United 
States commits itself to keep such access to a minimum consistent with the 
need for effective verification that the objectives are being observed. 

Another interesting provision unique to the Indian power agreement deals 
with substitution of nuclear materials. The agreement provides that: 

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement, the Go- 
vernment of India shall have the right, upon prior notice to the 
Government of the United States, to remove from the scope of this 
Agreement quantities of special nuclear material, provided it has, 
pursuant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, placed 
agreed equivalent quantities of the same type of special nuclear ma- 
terial under the scope of this Agreement. 

Concerning noncompliance, the Indian agreement gives the United States 

the right to suspend or terminate the agreement, within a reasonable time, 



CRS-51 

and require the return of any equipment and devices transferred under it 
and any special nuclear material safeguarded pursuant to the agreement. 

The power agreement with the United Kingdom, a nuclear weapons coun- 
try, has no specification of U. S. rights. 

The Atomic Energy Commission exercised these rights of inspection 
until the safeguards functions were transferred to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency through tripartite agreements. As late as 1969, AEC in- 
spectors made 52 inspections of facilities in five countries. The end of the 
era of AEC inspections was signalled in 1963 when the AEC, Japan and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency entered into the first tripartite agree- 
ment. 
IAEA safeguards 

One early purpose of the U.S. agreements for cooperation was to pro- 
vide the International Atomic Energy Agency with working experience in the 
application of safeguards. This was done by including in the agreements a 
commitment by the agreement nations to apply the Agency's safeguards to 
materials, equipment and facilities transferred from the United States. The 
international safeguards are carried out either under a trilateral agreement 
among the Parties and the Agency, or as provided in an agreement between 
the agreement nation and the Agency pursuant to the Non Proliferation 
Treaty. During the time the international safeguards apply, the safeguards 
rights of the United States are suspended to the extent that the United States 
agrees that the need to exercise such rights is satisfied by the international 
safeguards. Should the international safeguards be terminated, the United 



CRS-52 

States reassumes its full safeguards rights. At that time the Parties are 
to examine the situation so that appropriate measures can be taken, if neces- 
sary, to satisfy any obligations of the United States under the Treaty. 

The agreement for cooperation for power with the United Kingdom pro- 
vides for termination of international safeguards by either Party. In that 
case, the United Kingdom upon request will return all special nuclear ma- 
terial received and still under its jurisdiction. The United States, in turn, 
is to compensate the United Kingdom for its interest in returned materials 
at the schedule of prices then in effect. 

The power agreement with India likewise provided for application of in- 
ternational safeguards to such special nuclear material produced in the Ta- 
rapur Atomic Power Station as may be received in the United States, or to 
equivalent material substituted therefor. The agreement provided for termi- 
nation of the agreement for cooperation if there was not mutually satisfac- 
tory agreement on the terms of the contemplated trilateral agreement. If 
such termination was invoked, India would return all special nuclear mate- 
rials under the agreement and the United States would compensate India for 
such material at current prices. Each Party further agreed not to invoke 
its termination rights before carefully considering the economic effects of 
such termination. Neither was to terminate until the other party had been 
given sufficient advance notice to permit arrangements by the Government 
of India for an alternative source of power and to permit adjustment of pro- 
duction schedules for nuclear materials by the United States. It appears 
that these termination rights and conditions applied only at the time the 



CRS-53 

trilateral agreement was pending. The agreement is silent on what would 
happen if the trilateral agreement which is in effect were to be terminated 
in the future. 



CRS-54 

V. PRINCIPLE FEATURES OF AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION 

The agreements for cooperation, as noted earlier, provide a framework 
for cooperation in civil use of nuclear energy between the United States and 
other countries and international organizations. This framework initially 
supported a great unilateral outflow of nuclear science and technology from 
the United States in the late 1950s and now supports a web of commercial 
nuclear transactions and exports of the U.S. nuclear industry in the world 
market. 

The agreements are notable in that although not treaties, they deal 
with matters of substantial international importance, particularly with re- 
spect to the further spread of national manufacture of nuclear weapons. 
They contain unusual assurances of the agreement nations, assurances in- 
tended to bar the possibility that nuclear materials and facilities supplied 
by the United States will be used to make nuclear weapons or for other mili- 
tary purposes. Additionally, they are unique in the rights obtained for the 
United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency to send inspectors 
into the agreement nations to verify compliance with the agreements. 
Types of agreements 

The U.S. agreements for cooperation with individual countries can be 
conveniently divided into three categories. Twenty agreements are for co- 
operation in nuclear research and power, eight for nuclear research only, 
and two for power only. The United States also has three agreements for 
cooperation with international organizations: one with the International 



CRS-55 



Table II. List of Agreement Nations and their NPT Status 



C ountry 


Effective Date 


Termination 


Ratified NPT 




Research and Power 


Agreements 




Argentina 


July 25, 1969 


July 24, 1999 


No 


Australia 


May 28, 1957 


May 27, 1997 


Yes 


Austria 


Jan. 24, 1970 


Jan. 23, 2014 


Yes 


Brazil 


Sept. 20, 1972 


Sept. 19, 2002 


No 


Canada 


July 21, 1955 


July 13, 1980 


Yes 


China, Rep. of 


June 22, 1972 


June 21, 2014 


Yes 


Finland 


July 7, 1970 


July 6, 2000 


Yes 


Italy 


April 15, 1958 


April 14, 1978 


Yes 


Japan 


July 10, 1968 


July 9, 2003 


No* 


Korea 


March 19, 1973 


March 18, 2014 


Yes 


Norway 


June 8, 1967 


June 7, 1997 


Yes 


Philippines 


July 19, 1968 


July 18, 1998 


Yes 


Portugal 


June 26, 1974 


June 25, 2014 


No 


South Africa 


Aug. 22, 1957 


Aug. 21, 2007 


No 


Spain 


June 28, 1974 


June 27, 2014 


No 


Sweden 


Sept. 15, 1966 


Sept 14, 1996 


Yes 


Switzerland 


Aug. 8, 1966 


Aug. 7, 1996 


No* 


Thailand 


June 27, 1974 


June 26, 2014 


Yes 


United Kingdom 


July 21, 1955 


July 20, 1976 


Yes 


Venezuela 


Feb. 9, 1960 


Feb. 8, 1980 


No* 



Have signed, but not ratified, the NPT, 



CRS-56 



Table II. (cont. ). List of Agreement Nations and their NPT Status 



Country 


Effective Date 


Termination 


Ratified NPT 




Research Agreements 




Columbia 


March 29, 1963 


March 28. 1977 


No* 


Greece** 


Aug. 4. 1955 


Aug. 3. 1974 


Yes 


Indonesia 


Sept. 21. 1960 


Sept. 20. 1980 


No* 


Iran 


April 27, 1957 


April 26. 1979 


Yes 


Ireland 


July 9, 1958 


July 8. 1978 


Yes 


Israel 


July 12, 1955 


April 11. 1977 


No 


Turkey 


June 10, 1955 


June 9, 1981 


No* 


Viet Nam, Rep.*** July 1. 1959 


June 30, 1979 


Yes 




Power 


Agreements 




India 


Oct. 25. 1963 


Oct. 24, 1993 


No 


United Kingdom 


July 15, 1966 


July 14, 1976 


Yes 




International Cooperation 




EURATOM 


Feb. 18, 1959 


Dec. 31, 1985 




EURATOM (Add'l) 


July 25, 1960 


Dec. 31, 1995 




IAEA 


Aug. 7, 1959 


Aug. 6. 2014 





* Have signed, but not ratified, the NPT. 

** Superseding, research and power agreement in abeyance; U.S. material by 
IAEA (NPT) safeguards and Greek "peaceful uses" guarantees. 

*** In abeyance. 



CRS-57 

Atomic Energy Agency and two with EURATOM.* Table II lists these 
agreements by type and expiration date, and the adherence of agreement 
nations to the Non Proliferation Treaty. 

Note that France is not on the list of nations with agreements with the 
United States. The French were party to an agreement for research and 
development which was terminated in 1966, the same year that France with- 
drew from NATO. 
Comparative contents of agreements 

The provisions of the agreements for cooperation can be divided into 
two categories: (1) measures to permit the transfer and use of nuclear 
information, materials, parts and facilities; and (2) measures to prevent 
the improper or illicit use of items supplied by the United States. In some 
agreements the United States is also committed to similar measures to pre- 
vent misuse of items transferred from the agreement nation to the United 
States. 

Concerning transfer of nuclear science and technology, the agreements 
typically specify the intention of the parties to cooperate in civil use of nu- 
clear energy and include provisions for: 

— exchange of information, 
--transfer of materials, 
— access to facilities, 

— cooperation between commercial organizations and persons, 

* EURATOM is a regional, multinational nuclear organization that is part 
of the European Economic Community. 



64-626 O - 76 - 5 



CRS-58 

--supply of enriched uranium and other special nuclear materials, 

-- reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel, and 

--title to special nuclear materials produced from U. S. -supplied 

materials. * 

As for limitations and controls, the agreements include guarantees not 
to use transferred items for nuclear weapons or military purposes, to use 
them for civil purposes, and provisions for safeguards by the United States 
or the International Atomic Energy Agency. Table III lists the major pro- 
visions of three typical agreements, one with Portugal for research and 
power, one with Indonesia for research only, and one with the United King- 
dom for power only. A detailed identification of provisions of agreements 



* Congress in writing the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the revision in 
1954 defined three categories of nuclear materials affected by the legislation. 
The categories are source materials, special nuclear materials and bypro- 
duct materials which are defined as follows in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
as amended: 

"The term 'source material' means (1) uranium, thorium, or any 
other material which is determined by the Commission to be source 
material; or(2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, 
in such concentration as the Commission may by regulation determine 
from time to time. 

"The term 'special nuclear material' means (1) plutonium, uranium 
enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material 
which the Commission determines to be special nuclear material, but 
does not include source material; or (2) any material artificially en- 
riched by any of the foregoing, but does not include source material. 

"The term 'byproduct material' means any radioactive material (ex- 
cept special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by ex- 
posure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or uti- 
lizing special nuclear material. 

Note that under the first two definitions, the Commission (now the Energy 
Research and Development Administration) can add other items to these 
categories. 



CRS-59 

Table III 
Comparison of Contents of Three Typical Agreements for Cooperation 



Provision 



Research and Research Power 

Power only only 

Portugal Indonesia United Kingdom 



Definitions 


X 


X 


Scope 


X 


X 


Exchange of information 


X 


X 


Transfer of materials & 






access to facilities 


X 


X 


Responsibility of 






receiving party 


X 


X 


Cooperation between 






persons 


X 


X 


Materials for civil 






power applications 


X 


X 


Supply of SNM other than 






enriched uranium 


X 


o 


Enrichment of uranium 






supplied 


X 


X 


Limitations on quantity of 






enriched uranium 


X 


X 


Reprocessing of fuel, alter- 






ation of fuel elements 


X 


X 


Produced SNM- -title 






and transfer 


X 


X 


Receiver's responsibility 






and indemnification 


X 


X 


Limits on separative work 


X 


o 


Guarantees 


X 


X 


Commitment to civil use 


X 


X 


U.S. rights 


X 


X 


IAEA safeguards 


X 


X 


Entry into force, term 


X 


X 



CRS-60 

for cooperation appears in Appendix X and a side-by-side comparison of 
the texts of provisions from typical agreements appears in Appendix II. 
Contents of research and power agreements 

The agreements for cooperation for nuclear research and power are 
the most comprehensive type in scope and content. They call for coopera- 
tion in achievement of uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a term 
which is not defined. As shown in Table IV, the agreements all include 
sections dealing with: definitions; exchange of information; access to 
facilities; transfer of materials, devices, equipment, and special nuclear 
materials; transactions between persons and organizations; reprocessing of 
nuclear fuel materials supplied by the United States after irradiation in the 
agreement nation; disposition of special nuclear materials produced in U.S. 
supplied materials; guarantees not to use the transferred items for nuclear 
weapons or military purposes; a commitment to use transferred items for 
civil purposes; and safeguards rights for the United States and IAEA safe- 
guards. A few agreements provide for conversion or fabrication services 
involving U.S. supplied special nuclear materials. 

Variations occur among provisions for materials to be transferred, 
conditions of transfer, supply of enriched uranium and enrichment services, 
limitations upon amounts of nuclear fuel materials to be transferred, re- 
processing of U. S. supplied special nuclear materials after they have been 
irradiated, and disposition of additional special nuclear materials produced 
by such irradiation. 





































-J***!* 




y 


X 


X 


X 


X 






X 


X 


X 








P*T* 


X 




X 


x 


X 


^ 






X 


x 


X 








***m 


X 




X 


x 


y 


k 


X 




X 


X 


X 








vfpns 


X 




X 


X 


y 


X 






X 


X 


X 








y$d$ 


X 




X 


X 


X 


X 






X 


X 


x; 






****. 




V 


X 


K 


X 






X 


X 


x; 


X 








r**»A 


X 




>< 


* 


* 


X 






X 


X 


x, 








**ru 


X 




y 


K 


X 


X 






X 


X 


X 








ftVflMOty 


X 




y 


x; 


X 


X 






X 


X 


X 








VM^| 


V 




^ 


x, 


V 


X 






X 


X 


>c 








'*•**£- 


> 




X 


X 


x 


X 






X 


X 


*; 








f|«tf 




x 


y 


x; 


X 








X 




X 




* 




WW 


V 




x 


^ 


X 


> 






X 


X 


X 








wiiift 


X' 




X 


X 


X 


X 






X 


X 


X 








l««^| 


X 




X 


x 


X 


X 






X 


X 


X 








*M*Y 


X 




X 


X 


X 


X 






X 


X 


y. 


X. 






*W»I 




x> 


X 


X 


X 








X 


X 


X. 








T**^ 


* 




X 


X 


X 


X 






X 


X 


X 








J 

! 

<§ 

u. 

o 

Ml 

H 


Definitions 

Parties, atomic weapon, byproduct material, 
equipment and devices, person, reactor, restricted 
data, aafoguarda, aouroa material, special nuclear 
material. 


o 

c 

i 
i 
| 

I 
I 

a 

3 

3 


I 

1 

e 
& 

s 


• 

i 


! 

i 

p. 

z 
I 

■ 

c 
e 
u 

m 
a 

s 

c 
• 

3 

o 
c 

f 

1 

c 

i 

I 


i 
1 

i 

< 

i 

2 


JZ 

E 

a 
1 
i 

a 

e 
a 
• 
• 

e • 

Is 
|5 

a • 

s* 

• • 


E 

1 

• 
.o 

» 

ft 

I 

• 

1 

I 
! 

o 

• 

a 

u 
a 
t 

V 

1 

a 
c 
| 

■s- 


■ 
• 

o 

a 

"u 

s 

i 

c 

a 
a 

8 

i 

5 

1 
S 
■ 
§ 


Kxchsjige of unclaaalfled Information on geology, exploration technlquea, 
chemlatry and technology of extrecting uranium and thorium from their ores and concen- 
trate, the chemistry, production technology, and techniques of purification and 
fabrication of uranium and thorium compounds and metal, Including design, construction, 
and operation of plants. 


§ 

a 
| 

c 

i 

i ■ 
i I 

i a 

c — 

5 i 

* 1 
1 I 
£ i 

rH • 

o o 

s 1 

c 

1 


£°Ddltl°ni f°r Iranarer 

Arrsngments may be made between either Party or lta authorized persons for transfer 
of equipment and devices, snd mstcrlals other than SNM. 


s 
1 

a 

Lt 


a 

a 
t. 
o 

Y 

c 
a 

i 

| 

I 

m 

«-, 

o 

c 

S 

i 

1 

■ 

it 

fi 


Provision for transfer of SNM or pointed services provided that arrangements Involving 
persona under the Jurisdiction of the recipient nation will not be undertaken 
until the U.S. Government is notified by the recipient nation that these persons may 
undertake the necessary arrangements. 


if 

ii 

V a 

j! 

K 

IS 

- ■ 

SI 

-o 

m 

s«« 

^^! 

HI 

III 

i- l- c 
a. a-o 


X 



ypm?\rtfl 


X 




X 










— 


pWjiWl 


X X 










tqjn),m$ 


X *■ 










r*npmb 


> 


: x 










wod^ 




, > 


c 










> 






V»»tiW*y 


> 


: * 










TfoWty 


> 


v 










SW.'<W'|.'M<1 


* 




x x^ 










troauQCt 


v 




v: k 


-x. 








A 


, 




tmjovj 


X 


> 












'MrtXh>£ 


X 


X 












VTTflU 


X 




X 


"X 








JDWV\Ul£ 


X 




y V X 










turNQ 


X 


V 












intiuQ) 


X 




X X X 




"X 


X 




TOtJJplty 


X 


X 












vrfeywtf 


x: 




X x 










vu^ynkj^ 


-x 




X x- X 


X 


X 


H 








3 355 

B BOO 
O JZ B -C O 

O O r, rH 

C t- B >> 

£ -2 If 2 

c t. 0- 

If-1l 

S- S 0^ 

B > ♦> C 

♦» c I, c » 

Hlft 

s 111 

xl "J °- 

-H C O O 8 

£ J *" O £ 
r3 " ° a 

ill I! 


£ I i 

0. *• a 

S O O < 

§.5 °§& 

I -2 1 5 c • 

issii 1 

** C "b g * 
^p"\ 

l!o^ : 

lilt I • 
l^"<£ £ . i 

v- c -3 » 

t B O c O 2 

3 *> « b r 

B C +> *> U i 
B C C I. 

n £ " " ° § 

•SBti* 5 3 £ 

♦> C -r> -P > 2 

■rt c O -H 3 

ic<2 ,*2 t 1 

--< c O c 

B B O *> « C 

:i^§ - J 

sfe£^i j 3 


! Pi 

5 ell 

I b£S 

S c c c 

-H 3 B B O 

I "S ll^ 

1 1 £|S 

5 c * * 

; 1 ^g| 

*-i 3 5 X, B 

1 1 Sf^ 

bL • i^ c ° 

1 si ^££ 
^ •§ oc 5 

" c J? So 
£ t, <o if « 5 

a O -< G.-n 3 

ri n £ a lit ^ " 
tj 00 a| m a " in 

§ &5 &£^5 

W 6 *> E O r-, *J 
--. +J B 

-J S Si £ £S£ 


J 

Si & 

•e b 

£ T5 

3 

^5 
it 
I s 

II 

^: 

♦J B <M 

|i! 

if: 

^: 

B 

!^! 

00^ 


e 

US 

■p 

■n n 

5 § 

£| 

I 
c 

a 


Ik 

c 

i 

B 

♦> 
C 
B 
| 

O 






B~~ g ■ SV 

Ill "3^ °-o*l 

£"0 | 55c >,£ | »® 

I.BO O-rtB-PO-g^B 

•§«& &§ &I s-s i & 

§=.« E-^oo-o^B 

-"5 C §" C ® 3 t!BB 
B^B --»E 5*C.B-HTJ 
CO COl, t C 

I. £ 1 § UH l-O 

O R D£ (.t « > C -^ 

1 * fiJ || I iff 1 1 1 

^BBOCC^^OB £ <- O 
•rt O V( Ol 5 TJ £ B • => 

£■£"* £ = 5 | | £ t .1 

1 "O 4-. -C O _C CO &, 

r-J J O ^ ° B0>-g3 

i- ^OVB^C Jo >, >• * 

3 b : ss^i^^s^ *x 

2 u l -£ 34, | i"g »"g5 B 

■ x-2 c"H.2 K .*"3' s & 
"a 1^2^ ij ^ ** ^" fc 6 . 

-J-i-c Xbc^vocc 

B QOJJB O C 3 O CO 

w u°&o-5°'£t) C '£§22 

1 irsfK^p? 

» 5 £ 8 " 5 S S ° " 8 
| E 8J5 x£ ^ £ „ G-*,, 

l_|-S £See°bco-°«« 1 

M 


-C5 

g 

r 


& 









• X 


X 
X 
















X 
X 

X 


X 




X 
X 










x: 




ww)$ 


X 


> 




y 


X 












^n 


X 


x 




X 
















X 

x 


X 




X 














*rnfWJPn 


x 


y 










X 






-x 


'•M'H 


x 


x 




X 














— v — : — 


X 


y 




X 




X 




7< 






*rpn 


x 




y 








X 








pwiw 


X 


y 








x. 






X 




XWHft) 


y 


x 




X 














r*»j 


X 


X 




X 




X 










^sny 


X 


X 




X 














■»rjTU|S>iy 


X 


y 










* 








vuifiufcjy 


X 


X 




y 




X 












i 

M 

B 

■o 



■p 

c 

B 

S T> 

H£ 

a t. 
« 5.2 

* B 
| gf 

£ 3| 
» 31 

- ♦> ■£■ 

lit! 

c e i- 

* s-s 

5 BE 

^ u O 
•1 3 c 


s 
"o 

c • 
o c 

sfi. - 

e b -g 

J-5 c 

5« | 

t c I 

56 | 

•OB .a 
c c r 

•g* | 

1 r> -1 

l. B O V 

-P a c 

1 4! i 

1 -S3 § 

fc. o fc 
-i -o 

3 ^ d 

-T II I 

1 %: * 

•S 12 1 
S H 

o 

4 


♦> 

1 i 

C-* CM 

•a -c 

c e 
c . 

1 I 

2 2 
t t 

c - 

% s 

c c 
E C 

3 3 

1 1 

• s 

"5 *S 

1 1 

o o 

I 1 

- f 

£ 1 


XI 

I -go 

O >>P P 

r^t-2 . 
B • £ TJ 
£ B B rl ttt 

| ifir 

'o -r, ^ — B e 

c ' "" * h' s 3 

! Nil- 

1 1 fete! 


■ 

B 
It 

£& 

u 

S " 
o e 

;i 

gs 

Is 

It 

Ji'i 

• £ 1 

O T C 

§5 &£ ° 

•O -r* I 

i!i 

A£i 


Reproceasing may be performed in the recipient nation upon a .ioint determination by 
the Parties that the safeguards of the bilateral agreement will be effectively 
applied. Reprocessing may also be performed inr»>utually agreed facilities. 


3d 

1* 

° £3 

•P c^ 

ia 

' -21 

OS; 

r^ 

o 8| 

13' 

£^ 
1*1 


Conversion and/or Fabrication Snrvlcea 

Either party or their authorized persons arc authorized to reoeife material for the 
performance of conv-rslons and/or fabrication services under agreed terms and 
conditions. The processed material will then be returned to the terri*oty of the 
nation from which it was transferred or transferred to another nation or international 
.....i..t^n In .wimi.no with the provisions of this agreement. 


Special nuclear material may be transferred to the recipient nation or its «uthorized 
persons for performance of conversion and/or fabrication services and for subsequent 
transfer to another nation or prop of nations in accordance with this agreement and 
under agreed ter^s nn-1 conditions. 


c c 

3S 


5. 

to 




"TThe reolplent nation, under terms and conditions agreed to for each transfer, nay 
[receive SNM for the performance of conversion and/or fabrication services for subsec 
Jtronsfer to a netlon or group of nations with whloh the U.S. has an applicable Agre< 
If or Cooperation. 



~w> 



><. 



A^/w 



7< 



fMyjnpfnS 



X 



>< 



-vrjjjf//^" 



X 



o^t3^ 



X 



vnftWQ 



X 



X 






y 



x 



Jnxfijon 



X 



X 



-t?^ 



ivvcfaE 



3 
x 



■^r 



*; 



^ 



x 



^/^^ 



7*W 



wpf 



>< 



vrjVMfW 



X 



wfmij 



s — 

5 !- § f 

feet 



ill! 

i|£: 

3-t M 



• 5 . 6 5 

fe o5 |5 

O « O CO ■ 

*HI: 




if 

II 



6 . 
t\ 
ji 

ii? 

Sit 



Mil 

a. »> • 



b 

5 

i 



J 5 



85' 



*sfsf!:$J 

c c a o. S -c 5 



hUUth 

HmIJJ I 
i'frii!|l 



-< G 

' = 5 

;4 



5 A.'J-S'ltS 
ittfttitlje 

l£H313J!i 



I 

I 

i* c 

3 ll 

i?i 

Til 

*| 
J 

:l 
t s 

23 a 

111 

111 

Hi 

SS5 

-ill 



| 

!I 

hi 



35, 
i" 

IB 

n 

Is* 























vjnrzjuty 




X 










X 




puppg: 


X 












^ 




WWW 






>< 






X 






"WOWS 


X 












X 




^ 


> 










X 






WfTf^ 


X 












x. 




r*^«H 


X 








X 






X 


GWKJdifii 




X 










y: 




JktK*^ 






X 






X 






*fl 


X 












* 




^Vcdt7F 


X 










x 






wr 








X 






X 




pww^viy 






X 






X 






)WMT> 


X 












>< 




jrz»tf 


X 










X 






vu^ny 


X 










X 


~ vT 




v»yjne»fnv 




_^ 










--T— 


DUHf*^>r/ 


X 


• 




1 




X 






O 

in 


f 

S 


Parties note that under a trilateral agreement the IAEA haa been applying safeguards 
to materials, equipment and facilities tranaferred to the Juriadlctlon of the 
recipient nation. Parties recognise the desirability of continuing to use facilities 
and aerrloea of IAEA. IAEA safeguards art to continue to apply to all items tfcana- 
ferred under the Agreement. U.S. aafeguarda a-Va. suspended during the application 
of IAEA aafeguarda. 


The Parties note that they have been applying IAEA safeguards to materials, 
equipment and facilities tranaferred to the recipient nation. The Parties agree 
that I1EA aafeguarda should continue to apply to those items tranaferred under the 
agreement. U.S. safeguards rights avg. suspended 
during the time and to the extent that IAEA aafeguarda apply . 


IAEA will be promptly requested to assume responsibility for applying ssfeguards to 
materials and facllltiea aubjeet to aaf guards under this Agreement. The Parties 
contemplated that the necessary arrangements would be effected without modification 
of thg. Agreement through an agreement to be negotiated between the Parties and the 
IAEA which might include provisions for suspension of the safeguarda rights 
accorded to the U.S. under thla Agreement. If the Parties did not reach a mutually 
eatisfactory agreement on the terms of the trilateral arangement, either Party 
oould terminate the agreement. 


Mi 

a a 8 c 

1sl« 
-S^B-a 

^2§ 
E3-« 

iff!] 

J a " o t 

BO. k l. c. 

A. 9m* 

■P E .p 

till* 

£ E E fc> o 
E a JTi a 
, c s a 2 

ilil 5 ° i 

*t?S2 g 
B G B *> 

f sJfJ 

an s o S J 


lamination, of IAEA S.fe^-^n 

If IAEA trilateral safeguards are terminated, the U.S. IS to reaasume the aafeguarda 
rights referred to in the Agreement. Then the Parties art to examine the aituatlon 
in the light of the obligation assumed by the U.S. under the NPT to determine 
what measures could be taken to oomply with the NPT. 


If the IAEA trilateral aafeguards are terminated and the Partiefl fail to promptly 
»grea (within three months for Brazil) upon a resumption of IAEA safeguards, either 
Party can bfj notification, terminate the Agreement. Before either Party takes steps 
to terminate, the Parties are to carefully consider the economic effects of terminstion. 
Neither Perty is to Invoke t'lT^CgUfm ^Iprhte until the other Party has been given 
sufficient advance notice to pwWrrtrtrrWngements. The recipient nation is to return 
to the U.S. all SNM reeelved under the Agreement and still In its possession or 
persons under its Jurisdiction. The U.S. is to compensate the recipient nstlon for 
Jthe material. 


■o 
■ 

fill 

iir.i 

■H B Ui 

c e p • p 

if!j] 

*ffS£ 
1*5. Ei 

a e j: 3 p 
11° I" 

s § i I i 

a 6 o- e 

=■ til I 

a *> tj « v. 

ft;;: 

iff* 

a »< s ._ c 

a >CB 
►. a B 5 B 
222Z Q 
2t?S" 

■c -p o a t. 

P E -< S 


11,. U..,. Government. « to reassume the safeguarda rights referred to in the agreement. 1 
'he the Partlesn^a ^examine the situation in the light of the obllgat on assumed 
b the U.S. under the terms of the NPT so that appropriate measurea CO* be taken, 
if necessary, to comply satisfactorlty with those obligations. 



CRS-62 

Contents of Research agreements 

Of eight research agreements negotiated, seven are still in effect. The 
one with Viet Nam has been in abeyance since the fall of that government. 
The research agreements also begin with a commitment to cooperation in 
the achievement of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which 
also are not defined. As shown in Table V, they are similar in content to 
the research and power agreement as to kinds of terms and conditions. 
The principal differences lie in the amounts of nuclear fuel materials to 
be made available and the supply of enrichment services. Four of the agree- 
ments extend the cooperation to include power reactors while three are 
limited to cooperation concerning research reactors. 
International agreements 

Among the U.S. agreements for cooperation are three with international 
organizations: one with the International Atomic Energy Agency and two 
with EURATOM. 

The agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency . --In 1957 
Congress passed the International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act, 
which provided for the participation of the United States in the activities of 
the Agency. * Subsequently, in 1959, the United States and the Agency con- 
cluded an agreement for cooperation. The agreement deals primarily with 
U.S. supply of source and special nuclear materials, including provisions 
for: 

* Public Law 85-177, 71 Stat. 453. 



TTPZDSJ7 

pwopuT 



X 



x 



X 



X 



X 



X 



K 



X 



">r 



nrorrMO 



X 



X 



TP^»«P/^ 



* 






S 8 

£ § 



i. a o 8 
coco 






II 



feS £ 



- a 
1° 

•'J 



Il : 



£ 2 e 0) 
»> o u c E 

| Sk"I a 

a a « o « 



§5.2 , 



O O •« XI C 

O •►> rt C 

o -p a S. 

*> o e « ^ 

« --IT) « « 

• J CO 

t- = - 

a xi -c 

» « • u • 

_. -< O U Z -i 

a a 3 a e 3 

o. E <H o 



HI 



5 5- 

5-S 



S So 



18- 



S"S = ^ 



3 S £' 



.c"3c3 









« en » 
a o 4i :■> 

Jits 



•P C C O V +> 

&§Ie^ C 

I «- E E C XI O -H 

o i_ •> u -= 



r>j cr 

o X! 



o c th «j a o = 
e'"i>.c*' «*>t- 



>L.C-PV.OOU£ l. 

§C -^ C O O Z a> ' 

t-Mxc to c <~ O -C 



\£%3? 



g 

8 

i 



0!-£»!CGO-~*>O » C 

■3JS -JJi c 5£ * § 

05 .C B *> ■►> n t K I, W O 

r-< Of [■ o a 9 IV i 

i-i .*>«->««Xt.Cr-! 

§ o-gSg° =, sife z . 

tthhcaiMaxiOfOa 

coceo-cuoEO 



§ trs 



t °j- 



; ; c °i 



-c o c - E 

*> rt o *> 3 



£§>* ii-3 



55 6-8-3 S 











- - 






Xrf^jml 






X 


X 




^ 


'jWiSi; 






x 


X 




>c 


fwopn 


X 




X 


X 




>c 


ifO*1 




X 


X 




* 


X 


visnopMi 


* 




X 




X 


* 


<ynf9jQ 




X 


X 


x 




X. 


*q«wW 






X 


x 




>c 


4 


U.S- Camission (ERDA) shall provide the Other Party or persons under ita Jurisdiction 
with uranium enriched in U-235 for use aa fuel in defined research applications. 
Contracts Betting forth terms, a.ondltions, and delivery schedules will be ngnr-a upon 
in advance. The net amount transferred during the term of the Agreement will not 
exceed 25 kg. The amount of U-235 shall not exceed the neoeasary amount plus some 
addition for operating needa. All or a portion of the SNM may be made »™il«°J e •• 
uranium enriched to more than 20* if there is a technical or economic Justification 
for auch a transfer for use in research reactors, each capable of operating with a 
fuel load of not more than eight kilograms of contained U-235. 


The U.S. Commission (IRDA) will transfer uranium enriched in U-235 to the other Party 
*t its" authorized persons for use In defined reseorch application. Contracta setting 
forth the terms, conditions, and delivery acheduje will be agreed upon in advance. 
The quantity of enriched U-235 transferred will not at any time be in excess of 6 kg. 
of contained U-235 *» enriched uranium plus additloral quantlttes needed for efficient 
reactor operations. The enriched uranium aupplled may contain up to twenty percent 
U-235. All or a portion of the SNM may be made available as uranium enriched to more 
than 20* when the U.S. CommlssionfE.KXW) finds there is a technical or economic 
Justification for such a transfer for use in research reactors, each capable of 
operating with a fuel load not to exceed aix kg of contained U-235. , 


Reprocessing 

When the source or special nuclear mate-ial received from the U.S. requires reproces- 
sing, it shall be performed at the discretion of the U.S. ERDA with in its facilities 
or facilities acceptable to MDA on terms and conditions to be agreed later. Except 
as otherwise agreed, the form and content of any irradiated fuel shall not be altered 
after its removal from the reactor and prior to delivery to the EBDA o» other 
accepted facilities. 


Disposition of SNM Produced bv Irradiation of U.S. Material 

SNM produced from the irradiation of fuel leased hereunder shall be for the account 
of the recipient party. After reproceaslng it shall be returred to the recip ent, 
et which time title to the material will be transferred to that Government, unleaa 
the U.S. exercises its option to retain the material while crediting the other 
nation for such material in its program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
Concerning SNM not subject to the above optiona but which ia produced from reactors 
fueled with U.S. material and ia in exceas of the need of the other Party'a peaceful 
atomic program, the U.S. ahall have the first option to purchase such excess material 
at prevailing U.S. prlcea. The U.S. alao has the right to tranBfer such materiol te 
any other nation or international organization in the event the purchaae option la 
not exercised. 


SNM produced aa a result of irradiation processes in any part of fuel leased by 
ERDA hemnder shall be for the account of the leaaee and, after reprocessing, shall 
be returned to the leasee at which time title to such material shall be transferred 
to the lessee, ("unless the Commission and the lessee other wise agree" in the 
Indonesian agreement) No SKM produced through the use of material transferred to 
these nationa or their authorized persons under the Agreement will be transferred 
to any other nation or group of nations, except as ERDA may agree. 


a 
1 

s 

1 

i 

a 

5 

E 


a 

■3 
*> 
| 

j 

j 

ii 

b a 

•O B 
• -C 

U 

1 V 



-Bra)*! 



O -C B *) *> .8 

a ♦• E o o I 

B C C 3 B X 

£ EEEt 
SS§ a &* , B S 

a - si -C u u 
dtp o O b 

£ 8" s S b i. -h 

■ -C U » TJ 

CT 01 B ■ M C 

C Tlrti C 

tj e a a a -ho 

B rtCHrtri 
N g O -H >. rH B -C 
-HO-nv,e-rl3C 



c3 



J i 



> c a C O a -c 

■hojiob -.Co 

•P -r. B HP 3 

1-0) «-■ C I O 10 

•p o e 3 lv u • 

4>C«C tlOlVri 
IH~HBOt.BBfirH 

a oo-H-riOSe 

a o * C !» ■ &-C O 
I. In -H MtH 9 C U 

HP O </. B 4> JS ■ f 

OBeaBBOBO 

e e a: o 73 a *> 

.£eBHP<HGSnHe 
■PL. CEOtlri 

•p .c P i- a b 3 rH 

C O Of. 0"-H 

c «-i v. c. o a 

n jc • b o 6> d .e > 
2* ""b b'S >» 3 

rlZO^eB«3B«> 
f- CO O e 3 O BC C 

<H £ t_ u «. <P B 

■ ♦> j: . e £ c 

J ° £ "3 .*|| 

o rt .8 H " 2 * "S 

KB C B <~ 

1- C c -P t B *> ep 

ob£b£S«£Eb 



K fr C -rH B 

C B P a B > 

o •■ o c B 

CO- c c 

""5 £ & e § 

•o o o £ a 

a -p tj -p — 



B O <h B B tH B 
--> 3 S f) h 



p -P B O B Z 

b 5 o. *» tj 

■P O C B E <H 

JC (T-P hJ O e 3 

I ■ ■ ShiH fi 

> • JTIH C 

O >> C <P C 3 -C 

•P B ti B K 

O B 3 -COB 

C • t. >- -c O 

O 1-H O In B r- -r. 

C S V< ■ I hh -P 

•>n a o 

<p ■ i- i- x v. 

k e t ♦» e u c 

a c -g u ■* 

i § b >, s * 

■rf O ■ 1 C * * 

^ " & ■ • £ § 

•• 6 * B rH O 

<■ 5 v £ S 

C rH A s C E B 

fc ♦» & 3 I e 

■rt B 6 O- O t. 



p ■ «* B J 

o£Bf£ 

ox ' • 

I " 1 1 1 

■3?i"i 



o •+> c rH 

1- >-. O O -H 

C.^ B B 

X ■ O ■ B 



•S^ .8*3 

(. o o 

C « *» p. 3 



c a s t- 

-h ^. a 

S +> -S <- ^ 

bee 

C C k t E 

^ a S S B 

«« art i e 

§ 3 K « 

" 5 "3 £ 3 

<S e a <-i c 



e -g a en e £ 

*> -^ Ji «r1 k o 



-S jrl f o7 g 

« +» O fc C TJ O 

v 3 n a a 

a b a c c 
E C rH b ~ T> 

i 



o I * - - 

-P a 3 D. O B 

O a j= rH O U rH 

fc. -rf .H B O «H 

•5 C-S *.1 |-g 



3&^' 



e &5 



5 " 

aft S 'H°2 
a o 3 a e «» 

« 1.11 OIh 

r- "a I! B B i, 

fflltai 

S o « a t- e 3 
<e afci-J 6 " 



rH B O « C B 

• -H N rH O E 

to a «H a e b 

• > 1- Z -H >, L. 

» e o t c « 
xif-i. a a _ 



m 



^S 



o o c 



C 1-> HH 



_»; c a i ; a -S- " 

IJflsIill 

-it! 5 o a c 

3 a Vh 3 S ^Tr-T ° 



♦>a^'0> ohjio 
m-r.*>iJ.riat-ac 
i- a 3 a -p -h 

* e -a c t. .c c i< a 
•p o ^ o =Oh 
c 1- I.HO > 

HH--P.-P i-iOCO 

I 2 ° S"^ o hS £ x ^ 

IHlnax «Ha*>HJa 
■r. c -p a k -n a 

■px^.£hj o S-- ac 

J ^ ^o • «r a« 
|^3 b <j a "° b 6 J 

§£o c -rfecco 

|^|-S < 3c-r5 e :°i 

e t f loo' 5 ^ " 1 § 



53 ° js's 

b a a c 
a & E «■ 



V £-E 



SrH>^V 



e 3 ♦» 

Si's £ 



x a a o E 

o x C B 

3 -p 3 a 

a e tj l. 

s t s r i 

CO Co 



COB 



X 



I 5 



II 
II 

S b 

I- TJ B 

a a 3 

1 § S 

•Jo 



5 2.^ 

-Is 
<?"■? 
gfe, 

B^l 

ill 

IK 























-frrw|,rol 


X 






X 




X 


Tr°BJsr 






V 




X 




lP""***^ 






X 




X 




~~*r>A_T 




X 






X 




"omnwpMi; 




X 






>c 




-»>▼*>£) 






V 




X 




T^^'/V 






X 




X 




d 

v9 




fss, 

1 ^"E £ g B* ° 

B >, a & t, rH O 

■•s &-"* S g 

>»_ B « O O 

U V U B -r> <~ 

I 3 "3 J * £ °- 

• It • Ot.£ 
C O CO O -t> 

s"3 5 "l s 

nit. 5 &« ° 

T B O CO 
B -2 dOO 1 "^ 
£ 1 -5 B E > 

«« o o o c"- 5 

OS « B § * 1 

"5 o -h *- <« a S 
3 6 o b " *" " 

-" V, 3 p"o T) rH 

g 3 s fe ||| .; 

BrH B r. J; j» E E 

£§ c o ^ a £ CO 
b0« o .e t. e 
oce^o^bs 
o o <~ <-> ♦> 

♦> -a ■* b o o-.c 
"| o So ££ * 

O C t, ♦> "g rH§ I. 

-H O 3 >1 CU O 

■£• o n u 3 * • o 

E ** S S fc =' £ . 

oie-sss.B " 

S5£S^£55 


O O O i-t bo*-> 
•^ E B a o 

o Gj bo o ot ~u 

T-H « S CO 

«J e -5 | •§ 

Sr.1.^ g § 

O O rH O E C 
B 3 •►> rH B 

tci'S £ 

rH o c >||<l 

&"* sfl 

B c » o 3 o • 

O - •£ B T3 £ r^? 
X3 -5" O ^H £ < £ 

g *> » c £ >> 3 

"27? "b^<£ 

J§* 3^1 gg 

« B rH s O S> 
■g t >, C t, o •£ 
CI.C &TJ • +> 

*> o b c to a 

£ B < £ " E> 5 

• J B T) CO J c 
♦> -H -C €> B *> O 

C rH *> -O Q. -P 

O -H C -n O X 
•< • Iff*' " 

£^ fc 8 "3 J 
f?«£ ,-E- 

OB rH O O 

£g£ E o S E ' 

■P E O B *J B O 

r5£-°- «^, 

■n 3 o -o Mb 
>. ctje So »-, 5 j 
£>ct-o*>t.*> t 


5 

S C B I. r^ B 
Tj | B O c 5 o 

f«Eococ-a *> 
u j: a -n a +> oco 

O &•§ B C O * *> E 
T> H-> «* I- o-nt.cE 
B--; B § t: | 3 § 1 $ 

a)0-r><^ofet*<2£c' 
•poOBBaB&O 

-^ HH | g ^ « ? | £> g 

4h"o<2 <2 "° ** ^ * "•"" 

OOB "o -^". 
Of,™ Z?£ | "S ^ rH" S" 

m= vSh?I s ^I^ 

^ g"S «^-^x_o 

OQ.nt.-POOBB'*-} 

= _ _o u s: *> o .rt 

sl? slg § «°1 
a £"-3 .$£ f° P 
s^fe^ s^t ess 

J ejEoo^tr. 

S J | £<2 | J^ J 1 
it i J ??-^ Sfe«l 

J a >. o o b b o" 

B-fOrtBU c5-tj 

k iv^cIV°-«S 

!* j °^'C < ob2 c " ce 
? £ i t «^i " '^ b 

t fc -rH be e be 9 o ° « 

o. b _a< -») o b j: b 

»TJC0"03 C 0* > EJ3 1 

! «£5SgJ5rl55 1 


o » 

« "t 2 " •= •" 
11 5 1 o 1 ? 

O I. c • 5 ™ 

■o O E o o 

■£ O B O a t. 

S § «w § s 
|| K " ^* 

O '3 " rH o o 

^ £ B (. t= J B 
t. *> TT O O H-> -W 

•a ^ c < n b -o 

3 B U CO !S £ B 
<2r!* 5 t "l 
g£S-grSc0'H? 

■sl" °§= ° 

Hi Ofl [" 

c-h<j-i o -c b 

■^ 3 C C O ♦> o 

a e a u o 3 

O -r> o x: bo 

rH X CO § " ** £ 

p *J o o bo-S o 

h > hj £ H 2 5 


O 
T. C B S 3 

B E S s b 

E -H B -C -S 
■P O O *> O 

o o *; a E 

| TJ Cg * O ^ .C 

fe 1 -^ = J i s 

B^|"S £ rHg 

%« bSIi.5 • 

■rl • O^ • U 

h-rt o O-n oS5 

• 9 hft 
B bO B C . <-- +J 

a o < a c o 

J 1. « o c J 

o °!c'og?°^' 
. o b o -a -n c 

o B-S c S^'g" H 
t . S^^St £ 

"•hE B B^S5 
o o O -C *j W B 

*j i. a o o 3 o 

fizgigs 

3^ B l s 2Sg 

"•jJO- >>rH a^3 

gj J r "fe c "' ,! •- (1, 
fjjc S55-5 H 

2 tJ5^?5fe£i j 

! 


3 

j 

9 
! 

! 

s 

I 






if 



CO c ' C E 

e tj = ^ «j 2 

« C r- c t 

,. £ 53 u c c 



1 c — c c c O 



£ 1 c* ° - ~' 5 i- 

■ s. • t c e> «£ c 

■ tr- c 3 & 

. C g S V 



SSS^g-gi 
E?1 -=-. S 



S^S 



\ii 



o. " o " ' 

CCFiCBO^O 



£1^U 



3 •? .56 

i 3 ? 5 t - 

si He 



:i &* 



a. »> c ■*> r 



|58 

o a. a 

t& 

£I C 



sis ° 

| ||J 

- §-<! ■ 

J8.| 

hfi 

c c ° c 

mi 



j S 



c I r jj 

sieg- 
ed II 

flit 



I a 



c — i 



&J 



CRS-64 

--The supply for use in Agency activities of 5, 000 kilograms of con- 
tained uranium-235 together with "amounts of special nuclear material which 
will match in amount the sum of all quantities of special nuclear material 
made available by all other Members of the Agency prior to July 1, 1960. " 
The United States also is committed to make available to the Agency such 
additional quantities of special nuclear materials "as may be authorized by 
the United States. " Enrichment is limited to 20 percent provided, however, 
the parties may agree to a higher enrichment for uranium to be used in 
research reactors, in material testing reactors or for research purposes. 
Note the absence of the approval by the Energy Research and Development 
Administration for supply of more highly enriched material. 

--The special nuclear material made available to the Agency will be 
used or distributed under its direction. The United States will retain such 
material until needed by the Agency and will deliver it upon request to the 
Agency or to a Member or group of Members designated by the Agency. At 
such times the parties shall agree on the compensation for such material, 
its form and composition and delivery schedule and related matters.* 

--The United States is committed to assist the Agency in obtaining 
source and reactor materials from persons within U.S. jurisdiction if the 
Agency wishes. If no commercial sources are available to the Agency on 
reasonable terms, the United States may make such material available to 
the Agency or to Members designated by it under terms to be agreed upon. 

--The United States is also committed, at the request of the Agency 
and subject to laws of the United States, to purchase, solely for peaceful 



CRS-65 

uses, special nuclear material recovered or produced from special nuclear 
material and source material as a result of Agency activities, at such prices 
and on such other terms and conditions as may be agreed. 

— The United States also has agreed that persons under U.S. jurisdic- 
tion will be permitted to make arrangements to transfer and export mate- 
rial, equipment or facilities and to perform services for the Agency or upon 
request of the Agency for a Member or group of Members in connection with 
an Agency activity. This commitment is subject to applicable laws, regu- 
lations and license requirements of the United States. 

The Agency made three guarantees that resemble those typical of other 
agreements, but are slightly different. It guarantees, to the full extent 
of its statutory powers, that: 

a. The safeguards set forth in the Agency statute shall be main- 
tained and implemented as provided in the Agency statute with re- 
spect to material, equipment or facilities, made available by the 
United States or persons under its jurisdiction for use in Agency 
activities. 

b. No material, equipment or facilities, transferred pursuant 
to this Agreement will be used for atomic weapons or for develop- 
ment of atomic weapons or for any other military purposes. 

c. Material, equipment or facilities used, transferred or re- 
transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be used or trans- 
ferred only in accordance with the Agency Statute and this Agree- 
ment. 



* Note, the first Director General of the Agency attempted to get the United 
States to supply special nuclear materials at a special low price so that the 
Agency could fund some of its operations by a markup of the price of U.S. 
materials for Agency resale. This proposal was turned down and U.S. 
policy has been for the Agency to pay the same price as any other customer. 



64-626 O - 76 - 6 



CRS-66 

The agreements with EURATOM . --The United States entered into its 
initial agreement for cooperation with the European Atomic Energy Commu- 
nity (EURATOM) in 1958. The agreement has been revised several times, 
with the latest version signed on September 20, 1972. It is based upon both 
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended and the EURATOM 
Cooperation Act of 1958.* 

Terms of the agreement for cooperation with the Community are similar 
to those of other agreements for cooperation for research and power. The 
agreement differs from these other agreements in two respects: establish- 
ment of a joint program of research and development and construction of 
several nuclear powerplants, and establishment of safeguards for the Euro- 
pean Community. 

The purpose of the joint program was twofold: to bring into operation 
nuclear powerplants with a total capacity of about 1, 000 megawatts by the 
end of 1963, and to immediately initiate a joint research and development 
program centered on the types of reactors to be used. ** 

* Public Law 85-846, 72 Stat. 1084. 

** The original agreement committed the United States and the Community 
to cooperate by establishing a joint program that would, in part, "...bring 
into operation within the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) 
large-scale powerplants using nuclear reactors of types on which research 
and development have been carried to an advanced stage in the United States, 
having a total installed capacity of approximately one million kilowatts of 
electricity by December 31, 1973 (except that two reactors may be selected 
to be in operation by December 31, 1965), and under conditions which would 
approach the competitive range of conventional energy costs in Europe. " 



CRS-67 

The cooperative program reached an early peak and by 1968 had come 
to its end. In retrospect, the agreement for cooperation provided a founda- 
tion for a joint undertaking but could not assure the impetus to reach the 
desired goals. The agreement did not produce a truly joint undertaking in 
research and development but rather two parallel national programs in which 
each Party controlled its own funds. The agreement did culminate in the 
construction in Europe of several prototype nuclear powerplants that demon- 
strated U.S. nuclear technology for both the European and domestic U.S. 
nuclear markets. It also provided useful experience in the organization and 
operating of joint boards, experience that perhaps could be useful for future 
multinational ventures such as regional fuel reprocessing plants. It may be 
worth inquiring how much of this experience from the joint U. S. -EURATOM 
program was recorded and analyzed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commis- 
sion for future reference. * 

The safeguards provisions are unusual for they provide for multi- 
national rather than national safeguards. The Community committed itself 
to establish and maintain a mutually satisfactory system of safeguards and 
control to be applied to nuclear materials, equipment and devices.** 

* A detailed account of U.S. cooperation with Euratom appears in chapter 
VIII of the report, Commercial nuclear power in Europe: the interaction of 
American diplomacy with a new technology, which was prepared for and 
issued by the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific De- 
velopments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in December 1972 
as a committee print. 

** The agreement provides for the Community to undertake the responsibi- 
lity for ". . .establishing and implementing a safeguards and control system 
designed to give maximum assurance that any material, equipment or de- 
vices made available pursuant to this Agreement and any source or special 
nuclear material derived from the use of such material, equipment and de- 
vices, shall be utilized solely for peaceful purposes. " 



CRS-68 

Safeguards for technology are not mentioned. The Community is also commit- 
ted to consult with and exchange experiences with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency with the objective of establishing a system reasonably com- 
patible with that of the Agency. In an unusual provision, the Community 
and the United States agreed upon principles to govern the establishment 
and operation of safeguards by the Community. The text of these principles 
appears in Appendix IV. The agreement is unusual too in that it includes 
no rights for United States inspection of materials and facilities and verifi- 
cation that their use complies with the agreement. The United States has 
some influence over safeguards in the U.S. commitment to provide assis- 
tance in establishing the Community's safeguards and control system and to 
provide continuing assistance in its operation. The Parties also agreed to 
frequent consultations and exchanges of visits to give assurance to both 
Parties that the Community's safeguards and control system effectively meet 
the responsibility and principles specified in the agreement, and that the 
standards of the materials accountability systems of the United States and 
the Community are kept reasonably compatible. 



CRS-69 
VI. COMMENTARY 

The examination of U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation has pro- 
vided some background for their purpose, their general content and specific 
provisions. What remains to be discussed is the accomplishments of the 
agreements and their past, present and future implications for limiting fur- 
ther proliferation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons among nations of 
the world and the possibility that terrorists or other subnational groups 
might seek to get and to use nuclear devices. 

The following discussion briefly assesses the accomplishments of the 
agreements for cooperation, their likely effect on proliferation, and the 
changing times and conditions as a factor affecting the use of agreements; 
and provides some commentary on specific provisions, or the lack thereof, 
for U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation. 

On the whole, the use of agreements for cooperation by the Department 
of State, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and 
Development Agency has fulfilled the goal of Atoms for Peace of sharing 
United States nuclear technology with the other nations. Under their use, 
U. S. exports of nuclear materials and facilities apparently have not 
been directly used to make nuclear weapons, and U. S. -furnished nuclear 
materials have been accounted for and safeguarded. On the other hand, 
the use of nuclear power has not slowed the growth in nuclear arsenals by 
diverting fissionable materials to peaceful uses. Instead, a plateau in manu- 
facture of weapons has opened up a major supply of fuel for civil nuclear 



CRS-70 

power. The U.S. agreements for cooperation have obtained for the United 
States unique concessions from other sovereign nations, particularly the 
right to send our inspectors or those of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency into an agreement country to inspect use of U. S. -supplied materials 
and equipment. 

The agreements have provided a framework for growing exports by the 
U.S. nuclear industry, and a channel for U.S. influence through our supply 
of enriched uranium by lease, sale, or contracts for enrichment services. 
On the other hand, the agreements have not been a sure way of influencing 
nations that would wish to make nuclear weapons or that would permit their 
nuclear industries to export products or technology that the United States 
considers to be undesirable. 

The times and conditions have changed substantially from 1955 when 
the agreements were authorized until today when many nations have nuclear 
power plants, some have factories that can produce nuclear materials suit- 
able for weapons, and others have industries capable of exporting nuclear 
powerplants and the technology and equipment for nuclear fuel material pro- 
duction. The times seem likely to change as much during the coming two 
decades. 

Therefore, at issue for Congress is how the agreements function today, 
how well they are likely to function for the years ahead, and what is to be 
expected of them in support of national policy to limit proliferation. 
Effects of the agreements upon proliferation 

Judging the effects of U.S. agreements for cooperation upon prolifer- 
ation is uncertain at best and disagreement by other analysts is as likely 



CRS-71 

as agreement. Nevertheless, judgments are needed so that they may be 
compared both for similarities and differences. 

On the whole, the U.S. agreements for cooperation probably have in- 
creased the long-term probability of further proliferation by helping many 
nations of the free world to acquire a nuclear industrial and technological 
base that they can use, if they wish, to produce nuclear materials needed 
for weapons and to make them. 

The agreements so far have apparently not caused proliferation by en- 
abling a nation to divert or misuse nuclear materials and equipment trans- 
ferred to it from the United States, nor have U. S. -supplied nuclear materials 
been reported stolen by terrorist or subnational groups. 

On the other hand, the U.S. agreements do not require an agreement 
nation to place all of its nuclear activities under international safeguards 
or to declare and safeguard facilities that may be made by its nationals 
based upon U.S. training and U.S. -supplied information, data and technology. 
Whether the agreements could be renogiated to require such commitments 
is an open question both as to desirability and practicability. 

Concerning the proliferation effect of various provisions of agreements 
for cooperation, Table VI is a speculative attempt to suggest the potential 
effects. It suggests that measures to discourage nations abroad from ac- 
quiring their own factories to enrich or to reprocess nuclear fuels could 
be one way to reduce the future potential for proliferation. However, for 
the United States to reshape its agreements for cooperation for this purpose 
would require decisions substantially affecting the domestic nuclear industry 



IP- 



TABLE "ST. 
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF AGREQCNT PROVISIONS ON PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 



Provision 
Exchange of information: 

Scientific 

Technological 
Training and education 
S^ply of: 

Nuclear power planta 

Nuclear fabricated fuel 

Source materials 

Non nuclear material** 

Enriched uraniua 

Enrichment planta 

Fuel reprocessing services 

Fuel reprocessing plants 
Access to special facilities 
Safeguards -U.S. 

Accounting and inspection 

Physical security 
Safeguards - IAEA 

Design review 

Reporting 

Inspection 

Limits on transfer of 
enrichment and reprocess- 
ing information 

Guarantees of no weapon 
application 

Ccmnitaent to civil use only 



Effect on Civil Use 



Industrial 

Nation 



BeveTopTnJ 
Nation 



Effect on Nuclear 
Ind-ustSaii Beveloplr 



Effect on Production of Nuclear 

Industrial! Devolving! Subnational 



L| Developing!! 
| Nation | 



Groiy 



•Heavy water, graphite 



KEY: 



+ = Positive effect (i.e. enhances use of nuclear power or Increases the probability of proliferation.) 

= Uncertain or little effect 

- = Negative effect (i.e. Inhibits the use of nuclear power, or decreases the probability of proliferation. 



CRS-73 

concerning expansion of enrichment service, low-price and reliable nuclear 
fuel reprocessing and low-price supply of special materials such as heavy 
water. Reducing the potential of other nations to acquire nuclear weapons 
materials by creating a United States or perhaps a world monopoly of supply, 
maintained by uneconomic pricing, could be effective, but would surely re- 
quire expensive subsidy. 
Agreements to agree 

Many provisions of agreements for cooperation call for or imply future 
negotiation of contracts or other arrangements and in some cases determi- 
nations or judgments. These subordinate arrangements cover detailed terms 
and conditions for supply of materials, equipment, special nuclear materi- 
als, enrichment of uranium, ceilings upon amounts of special nuclear ma- 
terials held by agreement nations, transfers to other nations, and various 
safeguards provisions. Some of the arrangements are subject to joint agree- 
ments of the Parties, some are unilateral determinations by the Energy Re- 
search and Development Administration. Table VII identifies such subordi- 
nate arrangements found in the examination of the agreements. 

Note the anomoly presented by some of these arrangements. For special 
nuclear materials, the Energy Research and Development Administration 
is authorized to permit reexport of U.S. -supplied special nuclear material, 
whereas the initial export probably required a license from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. 
Accomplishment of the agreements for cooperation 

Using the authority of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to 
support the goals for Atoms for Peace, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 



CRS-74 



Table VII. Provisions of Agreements for Cooperation that Require 
Additional Negotiations and Decisions 



The following provisions in a typical agreement for cooperation for re- 
search and power indicate the many negotiations of subordinate arrangements 
and contracts and exercises of judgment and decisions required by the Energy 
Research and Development Administration. 

Supply of materials 

Certain listed materials may be transferred for defined applications 
in such quantities and under such terms and conditions as may be 
agreed when such materials are not commercially available. 

Specialized research facilities and reactor materials testing facilities 
may be made available under such terms and conditions as may be 
agreed. 

Equipment and devices may be transferred under such terms and con- 
ditions as may be agreed. 

Supply of enriched uranium 

ERDA at its option and under terms and conditions to be agreed may 
sell enriched uranium for transfer for use as fuel in power applications. 

Under such terms and conditions as may be agreed, ERDA may trans- 
fer enriched uranium (including inter alia supply through enrichment 
services contracts) to the agreement or authorized persons under its 
jurisdiction. 

Enrichment of transferred uranium 

Some uranium transferred may be enriched to more than 20 percent 
when ERDA finds there is a technical or economic justification for such 
a transfer. 

Limitations on quantities of enriched uranium transferred 

The quantity of enriched uranium transferred for the fueling of re- 
actors or reactor experiments shall not at any time be in excess of the 
quantity thereof necessary for the loading of such reactors or reactor 
experiments plus such additional quantity as, in the opinion of the Par- 
ties, is necessary for the efficient and continuous operation of such 
reactors or reactor experiments. 



CRS-75 



Table VII (cont. ). Provisions of Agreements for Cooperation that Require 
Additional Negotiations and Decisions 

Reprocessing of irradiated U. S. materials 

U.S. nuclear fuel materials irradiated in the agreement nation may 
be altered or reprocessed only in facilities acceptable to both Parties 
upon a joint determination that safeguards may be effectively applied. 

Title to produced nuclear fuel materials 

Title to nuclear fuel materials produced by irradiation of U.S. -sup- 
plied fuel materials shall be for the account of the lessee and title to it 
shall be in the lessee unless ERDA and the lessee otherwise agree. 

Transfer of U. S. supplied items 

An agreement nation may not transfer U.S. supplied materials, in- 
cluding equipment and devices, beyond its jurisdiction except as ERDA 
may agree and then only if in the opinion of ERDA the transfer is within 
the scope of an agreement for cooperation between the United States 
and the other nation or group of nations. 

U.S. safeguards rights 

The United States has the right to review the design of any reactor 
and other equipment and devices the design of which ERDA determines 
to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards. 

The United States has the right to require the deposit in storage faci- 
lities designated by ERDA of any U. S. -supplied special nuclear ma- 
terial not in current use for civil purposes. 

U.S. safeguards rights apply to any source or special nuclear mate- 
rials used in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of, 
among other things, any other equipment or devices designated by the 
ERDA. 



CRS-76 

and the Department of State established a durable framework of agreements 
for nuclear cooperation with many nations and internationl organizations. 
The agreements enabled the Commission, its contractors, companies in the 
U.S. nuclear industry and individuals to deal directly with government or- 
ganizations and other parties in the agreement nations. The agreements 
carried a great outward flowing surge of U.S. nuclear science and techno- 
logy into the world. Initially the agreements enabled other nations to quickly 
learn the progress of U.S. development of civil nuclear power through vi- 
sits, meetings, conferences, training and some use of U.S. nuclear faci- 
lities, plus a development and demonstration program with Euratom. Now 
the web of agreements provides the U. S. nuclear industry with access to the 
free world nuclear market where it can compete for sales of nuclear power 
plants, nuclear steam supply systems and parts thereof, and nuclear fuels- - 
primarily enriched uranium from the factories of the Energy Research and 
Development Administration. In the future, the U.S. nuclear industry may 
offer fuel reprocessing services. 

It is reasonable to conclude that through the agreements for cooperation 
and the export licenses, the United States has contributed to the growth 
abroad of a nuclear industrial base in many countries, although this base 
appears limited mainly to manufacture of nuclear power reactors and as- 
sociated parts and fabricated fuel. The transfers of nuclear technologies, 
materials and equipment worked towards the goals of Atoms for Peace and 
probably provided the United States with more than a decade of influence 
over foreign development of nuclear power. Unfortunately, the success of 



CRS-77 

the agreements has served to diminish this source of influence as 
nations abroad have found other supplier nations, or have developed their 
own nuclear capabilities. 
Changing times and goals 

The agreements for cooperation authorized by the revision of the Atomic 
Energy Act in 1954 reflect the circumstances of the mid 1950s. Now, 20 
years later, the agreements are little changed but the circumstances are 
markedly different. Twenty years hence it is reasonable to expect that 
circumstances will be different still. So at this point in time it is appro- 
priate for Congress to consider both what was expected of the agreements 
in 1955 and what can and should be expected of them in 1975 and for the 
future. 

The situation 20 years ago . — Twenty years ago the architects of U.S. 
nuclear cooperation began their conceptual design of the present framework 
of cooperative agreements. At that time expanding cooperation in peaceful 
uses of atomic energy offered attractive prospects for reducing some of the 
tensions of the cold war. There was even hope, stillborn though it proved 
to be, that this cooperation could divert nuclear materials from weapons to 
civil purposes. 

In the mid 1950s the proliferation problem was the vertical one of ever- 
expanding nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. While 
it was recognized that fostering peaceful uses of atomic energy and nuclear 
power ultimately might provide more nations with the means to make their 
own nuclear weapons, the realization was more academic than real. The 



CRS-78 

United States then dominated world nuclear technology except for the Bri- 
tish drive toward use of normal uranium as fuel, and the United States 
enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the supply of enriched uranium and enrichment 
services to the free world. The safeguards rights and commitments in 
the U.S. agreements for cooperation were designed to keep the risks of 
undetected diversion or theft of nuclear materials within acceptable bounds, 
and laid the way for substantial exercise of safeguards functions by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. 

The situation today . --The outset of 1976 sees six nations that have de- 
tonated nuclear weapons or devices and many more that probably could 
do so quickly if they so chose. Now the principal bar to further prolifer- 
ation is no longer the inability to make the materials for weapons and to 
design and fabricate weapons. Rather, it is the judgment by individual na- 
tions that their production of nuclear weapons is not necessary for their 
defense or welfare and that the benefits of proliferation would be outweighed 
by the costs, efforts and possible world reaction. It is evident that a nation 
with an industrial capacity can, if it wishes, produce nuclear weapons ma- 
terials and weapons without having to steal or divert materials from today's 
nuclear powerplants. Possession of facilities to reprocess spent fuel and 
to fabricate plutonium will markedly increase their nuclear industrial base. 

Another major change of the past two decades has been the emergence 
of terrorism as a way for subnational groups to attempt to impose their 
will upon others. The increasing frequency and severity of terrorist ac- 
ions in some countries has caused some concern that terrorists might 



CRS-79 

attempt to steal nuclear materials to make and use crude weapons, or to 
release plutonium as a radiological weapon, or to so sabotage nuclear faci- 
lities as to cause dangerous releases of radioactive materials. The concern 
over terrorism has generated pressure for measures to increase physical 
security of nuclear materials and installations as well as the security of 
vital energy, communications and transportation facilities. 

The changes of the past two decades have changed the character of nu- 
clear cooperation and the prospects for proliferation. Now cooperation 
appears to be shaped more by a desire to assure national nuclear industries 
a growing share of the world nuclear market and so is moving more toward 
commercial relationships and away from the open exchange among scientists 
contemplated by agreements in 1955. Likewise the concern over prolifera- 
tion has changed from dealing with the escalating vertical proliferation of 
weapons production by the United States and the Soviet Union to preventing, 
or limiting, or delaying further horizontal proliferation of the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons among nations of the world. In 1955 nuclear power was 
seen as an alternative energy source for the future, but the United States 
was still an exporter of fuels and had little current need for nuclear power. 
In 1975, two years after the oil embargo, many nations, including the United 
States, now look to nuclear power as a way to relieve their dependence upon 
scarce oil the price of which is determined abroad by political rather than 
economic criteria. 

In terms of negotiation and administration of agreements and related 
actions, twenty years ago the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission largely do- 



CRS-80 

minated the scene. Now two agencies are actively involved with negotiation 
of agreements, one with administration of the agreements, and two more 
with action on applications for licenses to export nuclear materials and 
equipment. The respective roles of these agencies still is changing as the 
long-term effects of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 begin to emerge. 
Today the Department of State appears to have the lead responsibility 
for negotiation of agreements and seems to be exercising this responsibi- 
lity. * The Energy Research and Development Administration remains an 
active participant in negotiation and administration, backed by the strong 
intellectual and physical resources of its national laboratories. As noted 
elsewhere, its influence as a world supplier of uranium enrichment 
services has been reduced with the booking up of its enrichment plants and 
the probable wait of five years or more before the U.S. enrichment capacity 
can be substantially increased by public or private investment. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission is taking seriously its responsibilities for licensing 
the exports of nuclear materials and nuclear power reactors and their major 
parts. The Commission believes it has a de facto statutory veto power in 
those instances where it finds that the proposed export is inimical to the 
common defense and security and the public health and safety. The po- 
tential for divergent or contradictory action by the Administration and the 
Commission is real, although it is not clear whether the Administration 
itself could make an export to circumvent a denied license. 

* During the regime of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, its chairman 
acted as U. S. spokesman for nuclear matters, particularly during the long 
chairmanship of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg who was chairman from 1960 to 1971. 



CRS-81 

The situation 20 years hence . --What Congress may expect of agree- 
ments for cooperation in the years ahead depends upon what the most likely 
future appears to be and what is desired from U.S. policy and decisions. 
Assuming no major war or other events disruptive of society, it seems pru- 
dent to expect that because of dwindling world supplies of oil and natural 
gas, many nations will turn more to nuclear power and many national nuclear 
power industries will be expanded and diversified. Some plutonium probably 
will be used for nuclear fuel and the first generation of commercial breeder 
reactors will probably be in use. There will be facilities for reprocessing 
used fuels to recover plutonium. The amounts of plutonium in storage, in 
fuel fabrication plants and in transit will increase substantially. Some highly 
enriched uranium also may be present in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. All 
of these anticipated developments point to an increased probability that more 
nations will be able to make nuclear weapons if they choose to do so, and 
that subnational groups will have more places from which to try to steal 
fissionable materials. 

What is not evident is whether new facilities to produce nuclear fuels -- 
enrichment plants and fuel reprocessing plants --will be many, small and 
scattered among many nations, or whether they will be larger and fewer, 
perhaps one large plant per region; and whether such facilties will be nation- 
al enterprises or will be owned and operated by international or regional 
organizations. 



64-626 0-76-7 



CRS-82 

This projection of the future could be substantially changed should nu- 
clear weapons be used by non-weapons countries or by terrorist or other 
groups. What effects such an event would have are too conjectural to esti- 
mate here. 
Future expectations of agreements for cooperation 

What can be expected from agreements for cooperation in the fourth 
decade of the nuclear age? 

First, the framework of agreements for cooperation can be expected 
to continue and to provide the basis for future U. S. commercial nuclear 
exports, assuming that efforts by some interests in the United States to 
bring about a nuclear moratorium do not prevail. 

Second, the agreements for cooperation can be revised to provide more 
incentives for nations that have not ratified the Non Proliferation Treaty 
to do so, or at least to place all of their nuclear activities under interna- 
tional safeguards. 

Third, the agreements for cooperation can be administered to assure 
a demand for international or regional fuel reprocessing. 

Fourth, the agreements for cooperation can be revised to require safe- 
guarding of technology as well as material transfers, and to require de- 
claration and safeguarding of facilities made by the agreement nation with 
personnel trained in and technology obtained from the United States. 

Fifth, the agreements for cooperation can emphasize the importance 
of physical security for nuclear materials and facilities and require the 
meeting of specified minimum standards. 



CRS-83 

In summation, the agreements for cooperation can be used as one 
means, although not the only means, to reduce the desire of agreement na- 
tions to make nuclear weapons; to assure the world community that U.S. 
nuclear cooperation will not be so used; and to foster nuclear interdepen- 
dence rather than nuclear independence of nations. 



APPENDIX I 

to 

ANALYSIS OF AGREEMENTS 



by 

Barbara Rather, Reference Assistant 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Agreements for Research and Power 

Definitions 2 

Communication of restricted data 3 

Scope of agreements 3 

U.S. supply of enriched uranium and other SNM 5 

Amounts of materials and separative work 7 

Reprocessing, conversion, and fabrication 8 

Disposition of SNM produced from U. S. -supplied materials. . 10 

Safeguards 11 

Civil use only 11 

Safeguards 11 

IAEA safeguards 13 

Termination of IAEA safeguards 15 

Conditions for transfers of equipment and devices 16 

Responsibility for information and materials 17 

Responsibility for safe handling of materials 17 

Guarantees 17 

The Research and Power Agreements with the United Kingdom and Canada 

Definitions 19 

Scope of agreements 19 

Exchange of information 20 

Limitations on information to be exchanged 20 

Information to be exchanged 22 

Classification policies 23 

Materials and facilities for research 23 

Materials for power and other non-research uses 24 

Amounts of materials and separative work 26 

Reprocessing, conversion and fabrication 26 

Transfers of equipment and devices 28 



TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 



Page 

Transfers and exports by private individuals and organizations 28 

Safeguards 29 

IAEA safeguards 30 

Responsibility for information and materials 30 

Responsibility for safe handling of materials 30 

Guarantees 30 

Agreements for Cooperation in Research 

Definitions 31 

Cooperation and restricted data 32 

Scope 32 

U.S. supply of enriched uranium 33 

Reprocessing 35 

Disposition of SNM produced by irradiation 35 

Materials of interest 36 

Safeguards 38 

IAEA safeguards 39 

Termination of IAEA safeguards 40 

Guarantees 40 

Disclaimer of liability 41 

Expiration of agreement 41 

Agreements for Power 

India 

Information exchange 42 

Transfers 42 

Reprocessing 43 

Materials 44 

Responsibility for Information 44 

Supply by private sources 44 

Safeguards 44 

Noncompliance 47 

Guarantees 47 

Agreement with the IAEA 47 

Definitions 49 

United Kingdom 

Scope 49 

Responsibility for information and materials 49 

Materials 49 

Quantity of material transferred 50 

Cooperation by persons 51 

Safeguards 51 

Guarantees 51 

Definitions 52 



TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 

Page 

Agreements with International Organizations 

EURATOM 52 

Scope of agreement 52 

Materials to be provided 53 

Reprocessing 54 

Information exchange 55 

Liability 55 

Guarantees 55 

Safeguards 56 

Further agreements 57 

Liability 57 

Definitions 58 

International Atomic Energy Agency 57 

Definitions 58 

U.S. supply of enriched uranium 58 

Warranties 59 

Guarantees 59 



APPENDIX I. ANALYSIS OF AGREEMENTS 



Over the past twenty years, the United States Government has 
entered into bilateral agreements for cooperation in civil uses of atomic 
energy with twenty-nine nations and two international organizations. * Of 
these agreements, twenty are for cooperation in research and power, eight 
for cooperation in nuclear power. 

Another way of looking at these agreements is to sort them into cate- 
gories and then see what are the similarities and differences between agree- 
ments in each category. The agreements fall nicely into four convenient 
categories: bilateral agreements for research and power, for research 
only, for power only, and agreements with international organizations. Pro- 
viding this description and comparison is the purpose of what follows. 

On the whole, within each category of agreements, the structure of 
individual agreements is quite similar. Each agreement consists of about 
a dozen articles which set out in general terms the boundaries and con- 
ditions of the cooperation. There are, however, differences among agree- 
ments which presumably represent the outcome of individual negotiations. 

Agreements for Research and Power 
The United States has entered into Agreements for Cooperation in 
the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy for Research and Power with the twenty 
nations listed in Table 1£. A brief comparative summary of principal pro- 
vision for research and power agreements appears in Table VT. Note that 
the agreements with Canada and with the United Kingdom are treated se- 

* Under authority and conditions of section 12 3 of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 as amended. 



CRS - 2 

parately because of their status as wartime partners of the United States in 
development of the atomic bomb and their strong postwar nuclear programs. 
The principal articles of the research and power agreements are 
shown in Table I together with indications of their similarities and differences 
for 18 agreements. 

Definitions 

All of the bilaterals contain a section of definitions. These include 
definitions for: parties, atomic weapons, byproduct material, equipment 
and devices, person, reactor, restricted data, safeguards, source material, 
and special nuclear material. Of special interest are the definitions for 
"atomic weapon", "safeguards", "restricted data", and "special nuclear ma- 
terials. " All of the bilaterals use the following definition for atomic wea- 
pon: "Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive 
of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is 
a separable and divisible part of the device), the principle purpose of which 
is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a 
weapon test device. All of the bilaterals, except for Australia, Italy, South 
Africa, and Venezuela, contain the following definition of safeguards: Safe- 
guards means a system of controls designed to assure that any materials, 
equipment and devices committed to the peaceful uses of atomic energy are 
not used to further any military purpose. Restricted data means "all data 
concerning (a) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, (b) 
the production of special nuclear material, or (c) the use of special nuclear 
material in the production of energy". The definition does not include 
data which has been removed from the restricted category by declassifica- 



CRS - 3 

tion. Special nuclear materials mean (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in 
the isotype 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the 
United States or the other party determines to be special nuclear material, 
or (2) any material artifically enriched by any of the foregoing. This de- 
finition is essentially that of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954* with the added 
feature that the other party to the agreement may also define special nuclear 
materials. 

The absence of a definition of safeguards in the agreements with Aus- 
tralia, Italy, South Africa and Venezuela is hard to understand. It appears 
also that all of the agreements would be improved by adding definitions of 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and for nuclear explosive devices. 

Commmunication of restricted data 

Although the agreements provide for exchange of nuclear materials 
and equipment, all of them specify that restricted data shall not be com- 
municated. This limitation in essence limits the exchange of unclassified 
or declassified information. This distinction can be important for some 
new developments in nuclear power, such as laser separation of isotopes, 
probably would be considered as "born classified" by the United States and 
thus not available for transfer under agreements as written. 

Scope of agreements 

All of the agreements contain a specification of the fields in which 
information, other than restricted data, may be exchanged. These fields 
include: 

-The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, section 11 (aa). 



CRS - 4 

(1) Development, design, construction, operation, and use of re- 
search, materials testing, experimental, demonstration power, and 
power reactors and reactor experiments; 

(2) The use of radioactive isotopes and source material, special nu- 
clear material, and byproduct material in physical and biological re- 
search, medicine, agriculture, and industry; and 

(3) Health and safety considerations related to the foregoing. 

The Agreement with South Africa also provides that unclassified infor- 
mation on geology, exploration techniques, chemistry and technology of ex- 
tracting uranium and thorium from their ores and concentrates, purification 
and fabrication of uranium and thorium compounds and metals, including de- 
sign, construction, and operation of plants will be exchanged. 

The information exchange is to be accomplished by various means in- 
cluding reports, conferences, and visits to facilities. 

In the 13 agreements with Argentina, Austria, Brazil, China, Fin- 
land, Japan, Korea, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
Thailand, a companion article specifies mateials which may be transferred 
between the parties for defined purposes when they are not available com- 
mercially. These materials include source material, heavy water, byproduct 
material, other radioisotopes, stable isotopes, and special nuclear material 
for purposes other than fueling reactors and reactor experiments. These 
agreements also state that specialized research facilities may be made a- 
vailable for mutual use consistent with limits of space, facilities, and 
personnel. 

Equipment and devices related to the subjects of agreed information 
exchange may be transferred from one party to another under agreed terms 



CRS - 5 

and conditions, subject to limitations arising from shortages or other limi- 
tations. 

The agreements with Australia, Italy, and South Africa do not, how- 
ever, provide for the transfer of equipment and devices. 

U. S. supply of enriched uranium and other special nuclear material 

The research and power agreements all commit the United States 
to provide enriched uranium or enrichment services and, in some cases, 
other special nuclear materials. Some agreements commit the United States 
to supply normal uranium if this is not available to the other nation for 
enrichment. 

Transfers of enriched uranium are to be under agreed upon terms 
and conditions and the transferred materials are limited to research and 
power use. Suitable research uses mentioned in agreements include reactor 
experiments, and reactors for research, materials testing, experimental, 
scientific and industrial uses. The uranium supplied may be enriched up 
to twenty percent. However part of the uranium may be enriched to more 
than 20 percent if ERDA determines there is a technical or economic justifi- 
cation. The amount of enriched uranium transferred may not exceed that 
necessary to fuel the reactors or reactor experiments involved plus an addi- 
tional quatity that is determined by the parties to be necessary for the 
efficient and continuous operation. Upon the request of a recipient nation, 
ERDA may sell enriched uranium to a recipient nation under agreed terms 
and conditions. When the recipient nation is ready to contract for enrich- 
ment services, the United States assures it of equitable access with other 
purchasers to available U. S. capacity which has not already been allocated. 



CRS - 6 

The preceding provisions appear in the agreements with Austria, 
China, Japan, Korea, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Thailand. The agreements with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Finland, Italy, 
Norway and the Philippines in addition commit the United States to supply 
normal uranium for enrichment upon terms and conditions to be agreed, 
including fuel for maritime appreciations in Argentina. 

The agreement with Norway additionally provides for ERDA to trans- 
fer up to 10 kilograms of enriched uranium-233 under terms and conditions 
to be agreed to in advance. For Italy, the United States, through ERDA, 
may make available up to 8 kilograms of 90 percent enriched uranium for 
use in research reactors, materials testing reactors, and reactor experi- 
ments. Also the Italian agreement permits that government to allow its au- 
thorized users to acquire title to uranium that it has purchased from the 
United States. 

The agreements with Brazil and Argentina provide that plutonium 
may be transferred to either government or its agents for use as fuel in 
reactors and reactor experiments under terms and conditions to be agreed 
upon in advance of each transfer. In addition, the Brazilian agreement allows 
the United States to transfer responsibility for supplying special nuclear 
material or enrichment services to private enterprise under U. S. jurisdic- 
tion. 

Under the agreement with Venezuela, ERDA will transfer, as may be 
agreed, enriched uranium for use in defined applications, including research, 
experimental power, demonstration and power reactors which the Govern- 
ment of Venezuela decides to construct or operate, or authorizes private 
persons to do so. Terms and conditions and delivery schedules for each 
transfer are to be agreed upon in advance. 



CRS - 7 
Amounts of materials and separative work 

The agreements with Austria, China, Japan, Korea, Portugal, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland limit the amount of separative work 
to be performed by the United States to the amount needed to support the 
fuel cycle of a specific installed reactor capacity, (designated in each Agree- 
ment). 

The six agreements with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Finland, Nor- 
way, and the Philippines contain a formula that limits the amount of enriched 
uranium to be transferred under the agreements. The aggregate of the net 
quantity of U-235 enriched uranium transferable under the agreements may 
not exceed on amount designated in each agreement. Within that ceiling, 
transfers may be made using the following method of calculation. 

From the quantity of U-235 contained in enriched 
uranium transferred the quantity of U-235 contained 
in an equal quantity of uranium of normal isotopic 
assay is subtracted. From this amount the fol- 
lowing quantity is subtracted: 

The aggregate of the quantities of U-235 
contained in recoverable uranium originally 
either returned to the U. S. or transferred 
to another approved nation, minus the quan- 
tity of uranium of normal isotopic assay. 

The Italian agreement provides that the net amount of enriched ura- 
nium sold or leased may not exceed 7, 000 kg. of contained U-2 35. 

The agreement with Venezuela states that the net amount of U-2 35 
in enriched uranium transferred during the period of the agreement shall 
not at any time exceed 25 kilograms. This net amount shall be the gross 
quantity of contained U-23 5 in uranium transferred less the quantity of con- 
tained U-235 in recoverable uranium which has been resold or otherwise 



CRS - 8 

returned to the U. S. or transferred to any other approved nation, or group 
of nations. 

The agreements with Argentina, Brazil and Japan also limit the 
quantity of plutonium that may be transferred. The net amount transferable 
to Argentina and Brazil may not exceed 20 kilograms. The net amount trans- 
ferable to Japan may not exceed 365 kg. The net amount transferable is 
the gross quantity transferred minus the quantity which has been returned to 
the U. S. or transferred to another approved nation or group of nations. 

Reprocessing, conversion, and fabrication 

The agreements with Austria, China, Korea, Portuga, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Thailand and Venezuela provide that when the SNM received 
under an agreement requires reprocessing, or when the irradiated fuel ele- 
ments containing fuel material received from the United States need to be 
removed from a reactor or altered in form or content, the reprocessing or 
alteration shall be performed in facilities acceptable to both Parties under 
a joint determination that safeguards will be effectively applied. Special 
nuclear material produced by irradiatation of leased fuel is to be credited 
to the lessee and after reprocessing, title to this material is with the lessee 
unless ERDA and the lessee agree otherwise. 

The agreement with Spain specified that irradiated SNM of U. S. ori- 
gin may be transferred from third countries to Spain for chemical repro- 
cessing and subsequent applications in Spain or other nations. These trans- 
fers are under terms and conditions that are to be agreed to. 



CRS - 9 

The agreement with Japan provides that either Party is authorized 
to receive material for the performance of conversion and/ or fabrication 
services under agreed terms and conditions. The processed material is 
then to be returned to the territory of the nation from which it was trans- 
ferred or transferred to another nation or international organization in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of the agreement. 

Special nuclear material may be transferred to Sweden or its 
authorized persons for performance of conversion and/or fabrication ser- 
vices and for subsequent transfer to another nation or group of nations under 
terms and conditions to be agreed upon. 

The agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Finland and Japan provide 
that reprocessing or alteration of form or content may be performed in the 
recipient nation upon a joint determination by the Parties that the safeguards 
provisions in the agreement will be effectively applied. Reprocessing may 
also be performed in mutually agreed facilities. 

Under the agreement with Finland, special nuclear material may 
also be transferred to Finland for conversion and/ or fabrication services 
and then transferred to a third party. This transfer is subject to condi- 
tions that are agreed to for each transfer and other guarantees pertaining to 
transfer of title to enriched uranium by ERDA, that agency has the option 
of limiting the arrangements to undertakings described in the agreement. 

Concerning reprocessing, the agreements with Australia, Italy, Nor- 
way and the Philippines require that reprocessing be performed at the dis- 
cretion of ERDA in either ERDA facilities or those acceptable to the United 
States, on terms and conditions to be agreed upon. Unless otherwise agreed, 
the form and content of irradiated fuel elements is not to be altered after 



64-626 0-76-8 



CRS - 10 
their removal from the reactor and prior to delivery at the reprocessing 
facilities. 

Norway, under terms and conditions agreed to for each transfer, 
may receive special nuclear material for the performance of conversion and/ 
or fabrication services for subsequent transfer to a nation or group of na- 
tions with which the United States has an applicable agreement for coopera- 
tion. The United States, in event of the transfer of title of enriched uranium 
to Norway, has the option of limiting the arrangements to undertakings des- 
cribed in the agreement. 

Disposition of SNM produced from U. S. supplied materials 

All the agreements place restrictions on the transfer of materials 
produced through the use of material supplied by the United States. 

In the agreements with Austria, Japan, Korea, Portugal, South Africa, 
Sweden, and Thailand, no special nuclear material produced through the use 
of transferred material may be transferred to another nation or group of 
nations unless the recipient has an agreement for cooperation with the United 
States Government or guarantees the use of such SNM for peaceful purposes 
under safeguards acceptable to the parties. 

The agreements with Argentina, Brazil, China, Finland, Spain, 
Switzerland, and Venezuela state that no SNM produced through the use of 
transferred material may be transferred to any other nation or group of 
nations, except as ERDA may agree. 

The agreements with Australia, Italy, Norway, and the Philippines 
have similar provisions. With respect to any SNM not owned by the United 
States which is produced in reactors fueled with materials obtained from 
the United States by means other than lease which is in excess of the needs 



CRS - 11 

of the recipient nation's program for peaceful uses of atomic energy the 
United States has the following rights: 

--a first option to purchase this material at prevailing U.S. prices, 
--the right to approve the transfer of such material to any other 
nation or group of nations if the U. S. option to purchase is not 
exercised. 

Safeguards 

All of the agreements contain many provisions relating to safeguards 
as follows: 

Civil use only. -- The agreement emphasize common interest in as- 
suring that any material, equipment or devices made available to the reci- 
pient nations be used solely for civil purposes. 

Safeguards . -- The United States is to have the following rights, 
except to the extent that the safeguards rights in the agreement are suspended 
by application of IAEA safeguards: 

(a), to review the design of any reactor and other equipment and 
devices which ERDA determines to be relevant to the effective application 
of safeguards in order to assure that design and operation are for civil 
purposes and to permit the effective application of safeguards. 

(b). to require the maintenance and production of operating 
records, and to request and receive reports for the purpose of assisting 
in ensuring accountability for materials supplied. 

(c). to require that materials in the custody of the recipient nation 
are subject to all safeguards and guarantees in the agreement. 



CRS - 12 

(d). to require the deposit in storage facilities designated by ERDA 
of any special nuclear material which is not currently utilized for civil power 
in the recipient nation, or transferred pursuant to the agreement, or dis- 
posed of pursuant to an arrangement mutually acceptable to both parties. 

(e). to designate, after consultation with the recipient, personnel 
who shall have access in the recipient nation "to all places and data ne- 
cessary to account for the source and special nuclear materials to determine 
whether there is compliance with the agreement" and to make the necessary 
independent measurements. If either party so requests, the personnel so 
designated may be accompanied by personnel designated by the recipient 
nation. 

(f). to suspend or terminate the agreement and to require the return 
of any material, equipment and devices supplied in the event of non-com- 
pliance with the guarantees and the failure of the recipient nation to carry 
out the provisions of this article within a reasonable time. 

(g). to consult with the recipient nation in matters of health and 
safety. 

The agreements with Argentina, Brazil, China, and Japan include 
a U. S. commitment to direct persons designated by it to have access to the 
items in the recipient country not to reveal any industrial secrets, or con- 
fidential information to other than persons in the U.S. Government authoriz- 
ed to receive such information. 

The agreements with Portugal, South Africa, and Spain each include 
a note on nuclear explosive devices. The notes state the "long held U. S. 
understanding" that no material, subject to the agreement for cooperation 



CRS - 13 
will be used for any nuclear explosive device, regardless of how the device 
is intended to be used. 

IAEA safeguards 

The agreements with Argentina, Austria, Brazil, China, Japan, Ko- 
rea, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and Thailand provide similar 
requirements for the application of IAEA safeguards. The parties noted that 
under previous trilateral agreements the IAEA had been applying safeguards 
to materials, equipment and facilities transferred to the jurisdiction of the 
recipient nation. The Parties, recognizing the desirability of continuing 
to make use of the facilities and services of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, agreed that IAEA safeguards should continue to apply to the items 
transferred under current or superseded agreements. 

The IAEA provisions in agreements with Australia, Philippines, 
Thailand, and Venezuela are short. The Parties note that they have been 
applying IAEA safeguards to materials, equipment and facilities transferred 
to the recipient nation, and agree that IAEA safeguards should continue to 
apply to those items transferred under the agreement. 

At the time the agreements with Finland, Norway, and Switzerland 
were made, none of these nations had not trilateral agreements with the 
United States and the IAEA. As a result, these agreements provided for 
the parties to promptly request the IAEA to assume responsibility for apply- 
ing safeguards to materials and facilities subject to safeguards under the 
agreements. The agreements contemplated that the necessary arrangements 
would be effected without modification through another trilateral agreement 
to be negotiated between the Parties and the IAEA. 



CRS - 14 

The agreement with Finland provides that should Finland enter into 
an agreement with the IAEA before a trilateral agreement was agreed to 
and the IAEA's safeguards were applied to Finnish nuclear activities, the 
United States would consult with Finland and the IAEA as to the extent that 
the provisions of the agreement between Finland and the IAEA would satisfy 
U. S. safeguards requirements. If the parties did not reach agreement on a 
trilateral agreement, either party by notification could terminate the agree- 
ment between Finland and the United States. 

The agreement, between Italy and the United States affirmed a 
common interest in the establishment of an international atomic energy 
agency to foster the peaceful uses of atomic energy. If such an agency 
was created the parties agreed to: 

--Consult with each other to determine ways to modify the agreement. 
In particular, the Parties agreed to consult with each other to determine 
in what respects and to what extent they desired to arrange for the admini- 
stration by the international agency of those conditions, controls, and safe- 
guards required by the international agency in connection with similar assis- 
tance rendered to a cooperating nation under the aegis of the international 
agency. 

--In the event the Parties didnotreacha mutually satisfactory agree- 
ment following the consultation provided for in the above, either Party by 
notification could terminate the agreement. If it was terminated, the Italian 
Republic would return to the U. S. all source and special nuclear materials 
received pursuant to this agreement and its possession or in the possession 
of persons under its jurisdiction. 



CRS - 15 

Termination of IAEA safeguards 

The agreements with Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Finland, Japan, 
Norway, Spain, and Switzerland contain similar provisions for termination 
of IAEA safeguards. If an IAEA safeguards agreement should be terminated 
prior to the expiration of an agreement and the parties failed to agree 
promptly (within three months in the Brazilian Agreement) upon a resump- 
tion of IAEA safeguards, either Party could, by notification, terminate the 
Agreement ("upon adequate notice and with an accompanying statement of 
reason" in the Agreement with Argentina). Before either Party acts to 
terminate an agreement they are committed to carefully consider the econo- 
mic effects of such termination. Neither Party is to invoke termination 
until the other Party has been given sufficient advance notice to permit ar- 
rangements by the recipient nation for an alternative source of power and 
to permit adjustment by the United States of production schedules. In the 
event of termination by either Party, the recipient nation is to return to the 
United States all special nuclear material received and still in its posses- 
sion or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The U. S. Govern- 
ment is to compensate the recipient Government or the persons under its 
jurisdiction for their interest in the returned material. 

The agreements with Australia, China, Korea, Philippines, South 
Africa, Sweden, Thailand, and Venezuela provide a variation. If a trila- 
teral safeguards agreement is terminated prior to the expiration of an agree- 
ment and the Parties fail to promptly agree to a resumption of IAEA safe- 
guards, either Party may, by notification, terminate the agreement. In 
the event of termination by either party, the recipient government shall, 



CRS - 16 

at the request of the United States, return to the United States all special 
nuclear material received pursuant to the agreement and still in its posses- 
sion or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The United 
States is to compensate the other nation or persons under its jurisdiction 
for their interest in the returned materials. Under the agreement with 
Sweden, the U. S. Government will carefully consider the economic effects 
of any termination action and provide sufficient advance notice to permit ar- 
rangements by the Swedish Government for an alternative source of power. 
Conditions for transfers of equipment and devices 

All of the agreements specify conditions for the transfer of equip- 
ment and devices between the two parties. 

The 15 agreements with Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, 
China, Finland, Japan, Korea, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Thailand and Venezuela state that arrangements may be made be- 
tween the parties, or authorized persons under their jurisdiction, for the 
transfer of equipment and devices, materials other than Special Nuclear 
Materials (SNM) and for the performance of services related to these items. 
The transfers are subject to the type of exchange, the amounts and other 
conditions and limitations prescribed in the agreement. 

Arrangements may be made between eithe Party or its authorized 
persons for the transfer of special nuclear material and for the performance 
of services with respect thereto, under the provisions of the Agreement. 
This provision in the Agreement with Astria is slightly diferent. SNM or 
related services may be transferred for uses specified in the Agreement, 
provided that arrangements involving persons under the jurisdiction of the 
Republic of Austria will not be undertaken until the U.S. Government is 



CRS - 17 

notified by Austria that these pesons may undertake the necessary arrange- 
ments. 

The agreement with Italy states that private individuals and organiza- 
tions in either nation may deal directly with private entities in the other na- 
tion. Arrangements for the transfer or export of materials, equipment and 
evices, and for performance of services related thereto is subject to the 
limitations of this agreement, and the laws, regulations, and license re- 
quirements of the Parties. 
Responsibility for information and materials 

All of the agreements disclaim any responsibility for the accuracy 
and completeness of the information exhchanged. Additionally, the trans- 
ferred material, equipment, and devices transferred are not warranted. 

Responsibility for safe handling of materials 

All of the agreements provide that after delivery of materials, the 
recipient nation is responsible for their safe handling and use. When special 
nuclear material or fuel elements are leased by the United States, the 
recipient nation indemnifies and holds harmless the United States against 
any and all liability, including third party liability, for any cause arising out 
of the production, fabrication, ownership, lease possession and use of the 
materials after delivery. 
Guarantees 

All of the agreements contain identical guarantees by the recipient 
nations, which include: 

--Maintenance of safeguards 

--No transferred material, equipment, devices or special nuclear 



CRS - 18 

materials to be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or develop- 
ment of atomic weapons, or any other military purpose. 

--No transfer of supplied material, including equipment and devices, 
except as the ERDA may agree and then only if, in the opinion of ERDA, 
the transfer of the material is within the scope of the agreement. 

In many agreements the United States makes similar commitments 
concerning material, including equipment and devices, transferred to it or 
authorized persons under its jurisdiction, by purchase or otherwise, and no 
special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, in- 
cluding equipment or devices, is to be used for atomic weapons or for re- 
search on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military pur- 
pose. However there is a substitution clause under which an equivalent a- 
mount of material of the same type as transferred or produced may be sub- 
stituted by the United States. The United States is also committed in many 
agreements not to transfer material, including equipment and devices, trans- 
ferred to it, or persons under its jurisdiction, except as the other party may 
agree. These commitments are made in the agreements with Argentina, 
Australia, Bazil, Finland and Japan. In the agreements with Switzerland 
and Sweden, the U.S. guarantee is limited to equipment and devices trans- 
ferred and not to special nuclear materials. 

The Research and Power Agreements with the 
United Kingdom and Canada 

The agreements with Canada and the United Kingdom for cooperation 
in nuclear research and power differed substantially in format and detail 
of content from other agreements. In retrospect, this probably reflected the 



CRS - 19 

comparatively strong positions of both countries in nuclear technology in 
1955, and a carryover of the wartime partnership of these nations with the 
United States. 

Definitions 

Both agreements define atomic weapon by product material, classi- 
fied, equipment and devices, person, pilot plant, reactor, restructed data, 
special nuclear materials. The Canadian agreement also includes definitions 
of production facilities, utilization facilities and source materials from the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 

An atomic weapon is defined in the U.K. agreement to mean any 
device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or 
propelling the device, the principal purpose of which is for use as or for 
development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device, the 
Canadian agreement refers to the definition in the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954. 

Both agreements define classified to mean a security designation of 
"Confidential" or higher applied under the laws and regulations of either 
party to any data, information, materials, services or any other matter, and 
includes restricted data. 

Scope of agreements 

The Canadian agreement contains no statement of scope. However, 
in its preamble the parties agree to assist each other in the achievement of 
the objectives of their respective atomic energy programs to the extent such 
assistance is relevant to current or projected programs and subject to ap- 
plicable laws of the respective governments and the availability of material 



CRS - 20 

and personnel. The agreement states an express understanding that the de- 
sign, fabrication, disposition or utilization of atomic weapons are outside the 
scope of the agreement. 

The United Kingdom agreement has a specific statement of scope 
which commits the parties to assist each other in the achievement of the use 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The intent of the parties is that 
such assistance is to be rendered on a reciprocal basis. The disposition 
and utilization of atomic weapons and exchange of restricted data relating to 
the design or fabrication of atomic weapons is outside of the scope of the 
agreement. 

Exchange of information 

The agreements both give substantial attention to information not 
to be exchanged as well as that open for exchange. Classified and unclassi- 
fied information is to be exchanged between ERDA and appropriate agencies 
of the Parties with respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful 
uses, including research and development relating thereto, and problems 
of health and safety. The agreements specify fields in which classified in- 
formation is to be accomplished through various means including reports, 
conferences, and visits to facilities. 

Limitations on information to be exchanged 

The agreements, provide for some exchange of classified informa- 
tion, but only that relevant to current or projected programs may be ex- 
changed. The parties agreed not to exchange restricted data relating to de- 



CRS - 21 

sign or fabrication of atomic weapons or to exchange restricted data pri- 
marily of military significance. As for restricted data relating to develop- 
ment of submarine, ship, aircraft or package power reactors, this is not 
to be exchanged. However the agreements specify that at such time as any 
one of these military type reactors warrants application to civil uses, re- 
stricted data on that type shall be exchanged as may be agreed. 

The agreements also bar the exchange of restricted data on specific 
experimental power, demonstration power, or power reactors unless the 
reactor was currently in operation in the receiving country or was being 
considered seriously for construction by the receiving country. However 
there is to be exchanged such general information, including restricted data, 
on design and characteristics of various types of reactors as is required 
to permit evaluation, and comparison of their potential use in a nuclear power 
program. 

Each agreement also exempts exchange of privately developed and pri- 
vately owned information and information received from other Governments 
which the parties are not permitted to exchange. Finally, it is mutually 
understood and agreed that any limitations to cooperation imposed under the 
agreement would be reciprocal. 



CRS - 22 

Information to be exchanged 

The Canadian agreement provides for exchange of information on re- 
actors, * source materials, ** materials, *** health and safety, instruments, 
instrumentation and devices. However, ERDA is not to communicate re- 
stricted data pertaining to design, construction and operation of production 
plants for uranium enrichment, or separation of other isotopes. In addition, 
ERDA was not to communicate restricted data on production plants for the 
separation of deuterium until Canada should determine that construction of 
such plants was required. As an alternative to exchange of information on 
these matters, ERDA is committed to supply Canada with enriched uranium 
and, until Canada built its own heavy water plant, was committed to supply 
heavy water. 

The United Kingdom agreement is detailed in its specification of in- 
formation for exchange concerning nuclear reactors which includes reactor 

^Information on reactors included that on development, design, construe - 
tion, operation and use of research, production, experimental power, de- 
monstration power, and power reactors except those with military signi- 
ficance. 

**Source materials information included geology, exploration techniques, 
chemistry and technology of extracting uranium and thorium from their ores 
and concentrates, the chemistry, production, technology, and techniques 
of purification and fabrication of uranium and thorium compounds and me- 
tals, including design, construction and operation of plants. 

***Mate rials information included: 

(1) Physical, chemical and nuclear properties of all elements, com- 
pounds, alloys, mixtures, special nuclear materials, byproduct material, 
other radio isotopes, and stable isotopes and their behavior under various 
conditions. 

(2) Technology of production and utilization included information from 
laboratory experimentation and theory of production up to pilot plant opera- 
tions (but not including design and operation of pilot plants and full scale 
plants, except as may be agreed), of all elements, compounds, alloys, mix- 
tures, special nuclear material, byproduct material, other radioisotopes, 
and stable isotopes. 



CRS - 23 

physics, reactor engineering, properties of reactor materials, specifica- 
tion for reactor materials, reactor components and overall design and oper- 
ational techniques and performance of research experimental power, 
demonstration power, and power reactors. However detailed design, de- 
tailed drawings and applied technology for such reactors and related com- 
ponents, equipment and devices is not to be exchanged except as may be 
agreed. 

Classification policies 

Both agreements provide for maintenance of mutually agreed classifi- 
cation policies with respect to all information, materials, equipment and 
devices exchanged. The Parties are committed to continue periodic consul- 
tation with each other on the classification of atomic energy information. 

Materials and facilities for research 



The Canadian and United Kingdom agreements both provide for ex- 
change of materials and access to facilities for nuclear research. Ma- 
terials of interest in connection with the subjects of information specified 
in the agreements are to be exchanged for research purposes in such quanti- 
ties and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The agreements 
list materials including source materials, special nuclear materials, by- 
product material, other radioisotopes, and stable isotopes. As for specia- 
lized research facilities and reactor testing facilities, these are to be made 
available for mutual use upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed. 
The agreements note that such use must be consistent with limits of space, 
facilities and personnel conveniently available. The Canadian agreement 
commits ERDA not to permit access by Canadian personnel facilities which 



CRS - 24 

in ERDA's opinion are primarily of military significance. The agreement 
with the United Kingdom specifies the understanding that neither Party will 
be able to permit access by personnel of the other Party to facilities which 
are of primarily military significance. 

Military for power and other non-research uses 

Both agreements contain detailed provisions for supply of special nu- 
clear materials and other mateials for power and other non-research uses. 
The provisions are similar to those for other research and power agree- 
ments, but in more detail. The two agreements are also somewhat different. 

The Canadian agreement commits ERDA to sell, lease, or loan to 
Canada, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed, such quantities 
of enriched uranium as may be required in the Canadian power reactor pro- 
ject program. The amounts are subject to any limitations of quantities 
available for distribution by ERDA and subject to the limitations that the 
quantity of enriched uranium of weapons quality transferred to Canada shall 
not, in the opinion of ERDA, be of military significance. It is agreed that 
the enriched uranium which ERDA will sell, lease or loan will be limited 
in enrichment to a maximum of 20 , .rcent. However, ERDA may, upon 
request, and in its discretion, make part of the enriched uranium available 
at a higher enrichment when there is a technical or economic justification 
for such a transfer. 

The Canadian agreement gives ERDA a first refusal of any special 
nuclear materials derived from U.S. supplied enrichment uranium which 
Canada may desire to transfer outside of that nation. 



CRS - 25 

The United Kingdom agreement provides simply that specific ar- 
rangements may be made under which "... special nuclear material required 
for developmental purposes, including use in research and experimental re- 
actors, may be exchanged for other materials under such terms conditions 
as may be agreed." It is notable in its provisions for British processing 
of U. S. supplied irradiated special nuclear materials, upon terms and con- 
ditions to be agreed upon. The recovered materials may be converted in 
chemical form or fabricated into nuclear fuel by the United Kingdom under 
terms and conditions to be agreed. Also in connection with conversion and 
fabrication services for nuclear fuels, the United States may agree as fol- 
lows: 



64-626 O - 76 - 9 



CRS - 26 

The Canadian agreement commits ERDA to sell to Canada such 
quantities of normal uranium, and to the extent practical in such form, 
as may be required for the power reactor program in Canada, and under 
such terms and conditions as may be agreed, subject to supply and the needs 
of the U. S. program. 

The Canadian agreement commits ERDA to an understanding with 
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd covering the sale of heavy water for use in 
two experimental reactors and provides for specific future arrangements 
for the lease or sale and purchase of non- research quantities of other ma- 
terials under such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed. 

The United Kingdom agreement provided for specific arrangements, 
as may be agreed upon, for sale and purchase, under agreed terms and con- 
ditions, of materials other than special nuclear materials. As for the 
latter, the parties may make specific arrangements for exchange of special 
nuclear material for developmental purposes. 

Amounts of materials and separative work 

Neither agreement provides for or specifies limits for separative 
work. This omission is not surprising in that both countries have focused 
their civil nuclear power programs on use of natural uranium for fuel. The 
Canadian agreement has no specified ceiling for U. S. supply of enriched 
uranium while that for the United Kingdom specifies a limit of 2,400 kilo- 
grams of contained uranium -2 35. 

Reprocessing, conversion and fabrication 

Both agreements cover reprocessing of irradiated fuels and conver- 
sion and fabrication involving U.S. supplied materials. 



CRS - 27 

The Canadian agreement implies reprocessing in its provision that 
Canada will give ERDA a first refusal of any special nuclear materials 
produced from the irradiation of U. S. supplied enriched uranium which the 
Government of Canada may desire to transfer outside of Canada. The 
United Kingdom agreement provides that irradiated special nuclear ma- 
terials of U. S. origin may be transferred, under such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed, to the United Kingdom for chemical reprocessing. 

As for conversion and fabrication services, the Canadian agreement 
permits ERDA to transfer to Canada * under such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed, special nuclear material for ". . . performance in Canada 
of conversion or fabrication services, or both . . . " and the subsequent 
return to the United States or transfer to another nation or group of nations 
with which the United States has an agreement for cooperation. The agree- 
ment with the United Kingdom specifies that under such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed, the United Kingdom also may convert or fabricate or both 
transferred materials. In connection with such conversion and fabrication 
services, the United States may agree, 

(1) to transfer to the United Kingdom uranium including its com- 
pounds in such amounts and at such enrichment in the isotope 
U-235 as when blended with the reprocessed uranium will per- 
mit the fabrication of replacement fuel; 



*These materials may be transferred to the two Canadian crown corpora- 
tions Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. and Eldorado Mining and Refining Ltd. 



CRS - 28 

(2) to transfer to the United Kingdom uranium including its com- 
pounds in such amounts and at such enrichment in the isotope 
U-235 as may be required for replacement fuel and to accept 
the reprocessed uranium as a credit against the transfer; 

(3) to permit the blending of the reprocessed uranium with United 
Kingdom material; and 

(4) to permit the re-enrichment of the reprocessed uranium in 
United Kingdom facilities. 

Upon completion of any of these services, the material may be transferred 
to another nation or group of nations, or be retained in the United Kingdom 
for uses within the terms of the agreements. Also concerning conversion and 
fabrications services, the agreement provides for transfers, on terms and 
conditions as may be agreed, of special nuclear material for performance 
of these services in the recipient country. 

Transfers of equipment and devices 

Both agreements provide for transfer of equipment and devices, upon 
such terms and conditions as may be agreed, subject to a ban on transfers 
for military purposes. Each agreement recognizes that such transfers are 
subject to limitations which may arise from shortages of supplies or other 
circumstances. 

Transfers and exports by private individuals and organizations 

Both agreements establish a framework for private individuals and 
organizations to deal directly with their counterparts in the other country. 
The permitted transfers and exports include equipment and devices, and per- 
formance of services. The Canadian agreement excludes such transactions 



CRS - 29 

that in ERDA's opinion are primarily of military significance, makes the 
transaction subject to laws, regulations and license requirements of both 
countries, and make the transactions subject to approval of the government 
". . . to which the person is subject when the materials or service are clas- 
sified or when the furnishing of such materials and services requires the 
communication of classified information. " 

The United Kingdom agreement includes fewer restrictions. It li- 
mits transfer and export arrangements between private individuals or or- 
ganizations which involve any classified information. Transactions are per- 
mitted only when any classified information falls into any of three fields* 
and are subject to: 

(1) a ban on transfers or exports "primarily of a military character. " 

(2) applicable laws, regulation and license requirements. 

(3) "approval of the party to the jurisdiction of which the person 
making the arrangement is subject if the materials or services 
are classified or if the furnishing of such materials or services 
requires the communication of classified information. " 

Safeguards 

Neither agreement contains provisions for safeguarding U.S. sup- 
plied nuclear materials comparable to those of other agreements for re- 
*The three fields are: 

(1) the subjects of information exchange specified in the agreement. 

(2) the development, design, construction, operation and use of re- 

search, experimental power, demonstration power, and power 
reactors. 

(3) the development, design, manufacture and use of equipment and 
devices of use in connection with permissible fields for in- 
formation exchange. 



CRS - 30 
search and power. There are no U.S. inspection rights and no commitment 
for supplying information on materials quantities. However the guarantee 
provisions of each agreement commit the parties to safeguard classified 
transfers, where the word "safeguard" appears to mean physical protection 
rather than the meaning in other agreements. 

IAEA safeguards 

Neither agreement provides for the IAEA to apply safeguards. 

Responsibility for information and materials 

Both agreements contain the same provisions for responsibility for 
information and materials as appears in the other agreements for research 
and power. 

Responsibility for safe handling of materials 

Neither agreement contains the provision for safe handling of ma- 
terials that appears in other agreements for research and power. 

Guarantees 



Both agreements provide guarantees by the parties to safeguard 
transferred classified material, equipment, devices and classified informa- 
tion; not to use transferred items for atomic weapons, or research and de- 
velopment of atomic weapons, or any other military use; and not to transfer 
items to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the receiving 
country. 

The Canadian agreement ties the first guarantee to security safe- 
guards and standards prescribed by the separate security arrangements be- 
tween the AEC and the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada. The United 



CRS - 31 

Kingdom agreement states that this safeguarding is to be in accordance with 
applicable security arrangements between ERDA and the UK Atomic Energy 
Authority. 

The transfer of U. S. supplied items by Canada or the United King- 
dom to another country requires the written consent of ERDA. The agree- 
ments note that such consent will be given only if the transfer is within the 
scope of an agreement for cooperation between the United States and the 
other nation, or group of nations. 

The Canadian agreement includes two separate specific guarantees 
by the United States. The first is for the United States to maintain security 
safeguards and standards for all Canadian supplied classified information 
and materials, including equipment and devices. The second commits the 
United States not to transfer items from Canada to unauthorized persons or 
beyond U. S. jurisdiction except as to the government of Canada may agree. 

Agreements for Cooperation in Research 

The United States has entered into Cooperative Agreements for Re- 
search for Civil Uses of Atomic Energy with Colombia, Greece, Indonesia, 
Iran, Ireland, Israel, Turkey and the Republic of Viet -Nam. * Many of the 
provisions of these Agreements are similar to the Research and Power 
Agreements discussed previously. 

Definitions 

All of the agreements include definitions for comission, equipment 
and devices, research reactor, restricted data, atomic weapon, and special 

*The Vietnamese Agreement was suspended and is not discussed in this 
report. 



CRS - 32 

nuclear material. In addition, the agreements with Indonesia, Ireland and 
Colombia include definitions for parties, byproduct material, and person. 
The agreements with Ireland and Indonesia also define safeguards. All de- 
finitions are identical to those in the research and power agreements. 

Cooperation and Restricted Data 

Concerning cooperation and Restricted Data, the Agreements with 
Ireland and Indonesia are identical. In them, the parties agree to cooperate 
in the achievement of the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes sub- 
ject to the provisions of the Agreement, the availability of personnel and ma- 
terial, and the applicable laws, regulations, and license requirements in 
force in their respective countries. Restricted data and information that the 
parties are not permitted to communicate are outside the scope of this 
agreement. 

The Agreements with Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Colombia state only 
that restricted data shall not be communicated under the Agreement. 

The Agreement with Greece does not mention restricted data. 

Scope 

Under the agreements with Colombia, Indonesia, Ireland, and Tur- 
key, the areas in which information will be exchanged are the same as the 
research areas in the research and power agreements. 

The agreements with Greece, Iran, and Israel outline the following 
areas as suitable for cooperation: 

-design, construction, and operation of research reactors and their 
use as research, development, and engineering tools and in me- 
dical therapy. 



CRS - 33 

-health and safety problems related to the operation and use of re- 
search reactors. 

-the use of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological research, 
medical therapy, agriculture, and industry. 

U. S. supply of enriched uranium 

The agreements with Colombia, Israel, and Turkey are almost iden- 
tical with respect to the enriched uranium to be transferred. They provide 
that ERDA will sell or lease, as may be agreed, uranium enriched up to 
20% except as otherwise provided. This U-235 will be provided for fueling 
defined research reactors, materials testing reactors and reactor experi- 
ments. The recipient nation or persons under its jurisdiction will consult 
with ERDA about building the reactors. The net amount of uranium sold or 
leased during the period of the agreement, shall not at any time exceed 
a specified amount which shall be the gross quantity of such contained U-235 
in uranium sold or leased to the other Party during the period of the agree- 
ment less the quantity of such contained U-235 in recoverable uranium which 
has been resold or returned to the United States or transferred to another 
nation or group of nations with U. S. approval. 

The amount of enriched U-23 5 transferred to the other Party by the 
United States may not exceed the quantity necessary for the full loading of 
each defined reactor project plus an additional quantity, which in the opinion 
of ERDA is necessary for the efficient and continuous operation of the re- 
actors. 

ERDA may upon request and in its discretion, make all or a por- 
tion of the foregoing special nuclear material available as uranium enriched 
to more than 20% when there is a technical or economic justification. 



CRS - 34 

Under the agreements with Ireland and Indonesia ERDA may provide 
the Parties or persons under their jurisdiction with enriched uranium for 
use as fuel in research applications. Contracts setting forth the terms, con- 
ditions, and delivery schedule of each transfer are to be agreed upon in 
advance. The net amount of U-235 transferred is not at any time to exceed 
twenty -five kilograms for each nation. The net amount will be determined 
in the same fashion as for Colombia, and Israel, and is not to exceed the 
fuel loading plus some additional materials. 

The enriched uranium may contain up to twenty percent U-235. All 
or a portion of this SNM may be made available as uranium enriched more 
than twenty percent when ERDA finds there is a technical or economic justi- 
fication for such a transfer for use in research reactors, each capable of 
operating with a fuel load not to exceed eight kilograms of contained U-235. 

The Agreements with Iran and Greece state that ERDA will transfer 
enriched uranium to the other party or its authorized persons for use in 
defined research applications. Contracts setting forth the terms, conditions, 
and delivery schedule will be agreed upon in advance. The quantity of urani- 
um -2 3 5 shall not at any time exceed six kilograms of contained U-235 in 
enriched uranium plus such additional quantity as is necessary to permit 
the efficient operation of the reactors while replaced fuel elements are cool- 
ing or while fuel elements are in transit. The enriched uranium supply 
may contain up to twenty percent U-235. All or a portion of it may be 
made available as uranium enriched to more than 20% when ERDA finds there 
is a technical or economic justification for such a transfer for use in re- 
search reactors. 



CRS - 35 

Reprocessing 

All of the agreements provide that when the source or special nu- 
clear material received from the United States requires reprocessing, it 
is to be performed at the discretion of ERDA either in ERDA facilities or 
facilities acceptable to ERDA on terms and conditions to be later agreed. 
Except as otherwise agreed, the form and content of any irradiated fuel is 
not to be altered after its removal from the reactor and prior to delivery to 
ERDA or the other accepted facilities. 

Disposition of SNM produced by irradiation 

Under the agreements with Colombia, Greece, Ireland, Israel, and 
Turkey, special nuclear material produced from the irradiation of fuel leased 
from the United States is for the account of the other Party. After 
reprocessing it, it is to be returned to the other Party at which time title 
will be transferred to that Government, unless the United States exercises 
its option to retain the material while crediting the other nation for so much 
of the material as is in excess of the need of the other nation for peaceful 
uses of atomic energy. 

Concerning special nuclear material not subject to the above options 
but which is produced from reactors fueled with U. S. material and is in 
excess of the need of the other Party's peaceful atomic program, the United 
States has the first option to purchase such excess material at prevailing 
United States prices. The United States also has the right to transfer such 
material to any other nation or international organization in the event the 
purchase option is not exercised. 



CRS - 36 

Under the Agreement with Indonesia and Iran, special nuclear ma- 
terial produced as a result of irradiation processes in fuel leased by ERDA 
is for the account of the lessee and, after reprocessing, is to be returned 
to the lessee at which time title to such material is transferred "unless the 
Commission and the lessee otherwise agree. " 

No special nuclear material produced through the use of material 
transferred to the Government of Iran or its authorized persons under the 
Agreement is to be transferred to any other nation or group of nations, 
except as ERDA may agree. 

Materials of interest 

The research agreements generally provide for the United States to 
supply special non-nuclear materials for construction and operation of re- 
search reactors. These provisions have decreased in importance since the 
negotiation of most of the research agreements for the initial flurry of con- 
struction of research reactors has passed and few new ones are being built. 
In addition, most of the materials required for continued operation of such 
reactors other than fuel are readily available in the world market. The 
provisions for supplpf materials nonetheless have a residual value for 
those occasional requirements for unusual materials available from ERDA 
laboratories but not from commercial sources. 

The Israel and Turkish Agreements provided for ERDA to sell or 
lease to the other Party, or its authorized persons, such reactor materials 
other than special nuclear material which were not obtainable on the com- 
mercial market and which were required in the construction and operation 
of research reactors. The sale or lease of these materials were on terms 



CRS - 37 

as to be agreed. Materials of interest in connection with defined research 
projects relating to peaceful uses of atomic energy included source ma- 
terials, special nuclear materials, by-product materials, other radioiso- 
topes, and stable isotopes. There were to be sold or transferred to the 
other Party for research purposes other than fueling reactors and reactor 
experiments in such quantities and under such terms and conditions as might 
be agreed when they are not available commercially. 

The Agreements with Iran, Colombia, and Greece have different pro- 
visions concerning materials of interest. 

The Agreement with Iran provides that materials of interest in con- 
nection with defined research projects related to the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy , including source material, special nuclear material, byproduct ma- 
terial, other radioisotopes, and stable isotopes, will be exchanged for re- 
search purposes in such quantities and under such terms and conditions as 
may be agreed when such materials are not available commercially. 

The Colombian agreement is similar to that with Iran except that 
it also provides for materials of interest to be transferred to persons under 
the jurisdiction of Columbia. 

The Agreement with Greece states that ERDA will sell or lease 
required reactor materials other than SNM which are not available commer- 
cially, through appropriate means to the Government of Greece or authorized 
persons under its jurisdiction. The sale or lease of these materials will 
be on terms as may be agreed. These materials include source materials, 
special nuclear materials, byproduct material, other radioisotopes and 
stable isotopes. In no case may the SNM at any one time be in excess 
of 100 grams of contained U-235, 10 grams of U-233, 250 grams of plutonium 



CRS - 38 

in the form of fabricated foils and sources, and 10 grams of plutonium in 
other forms. 

The provisons for Ireland and Indonesia are the same as provided 
in the research and power agreements with Argentina, above. 

Safeguards 

The safeguards provisions in the research agreements with Ireland, 
Colombia, Iran, and Greece are the same as the safeguards provisions in 
the Agreements for Cooperation in Research and Power. 

In the Agreement with Turkey, that government agrees to maintain: 

-such safeguards as are necessary to assure that the enriched urani- 
um leased from ERDA will be used solely for the purposes of the 
agreement and to assure the safekeeping of the material. 

-such safeguards as are necessary to assure that all other reactor 
materials, including equipment and devices, purchased in the U. S. 
under the agreement by the Turkish Government or authorized per- 
sons under its jurisdiction, shall be used solely for the design, 
construction, and operation of research reactors which the Turkish 
Government decides to construct and operate, and for research con- 
nected with them, except as may be otherwise agreed. 

-records relating to the power levels of operation and burnup of re- 
actor fuels and to make annual reports on these subjects. If ERDA 
requests, the Turkish Republic will permit ERDA representative to 
observe from time to time the condition and use of any leased ma- 
terials, and to observe the performance of the reactor in which the 
material is used. 



CRS - 39 

IAEA Safeguards 

The agreements with Iran and Indonesia note their trilateral Agree- 
ments with the IAEA for application of IAEA safeguards, to materials, 
equipment and facilities transferred to the recipient Nation. The Parties 
agree that Agency safeguards, as provided in the trilateral agreement, and 
as it may be amended or supplanted by a new trilateral, shall continue to 
apply to such materials, equipment and facilities transferred under this 
agreement. Safeguards rights accorded to the U. S. Government by the 
agreements are suspended during the time and to the extent that Agency 
safeguards apply. 

In the agrement with Israel, Colombia, Greece and Ireland, the 
Parties recognize the desirability of making use of IAEA facilities and ser- 
vices and agree that prior to the transfer to the recipient of any materials 
or facilities subject to safeguards under this agreement, the Agency will be 
requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to such materials 
and facilities. The Parties contemplate that the necessary arrangement can 
be effected without modification of the agreements through an agreement to 
be negotiated among the Parties and the Agency which could include pro- 
visions for suspension of the safeguards rights accorded to the U. S. Govern- 
ment during the time and to the extent that the IAEA safeguards apply. In 
the event that the Parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on 
the terms of the trilateral arrangement, either Party may, by notification, 
terminate the Agreement. 

The agreement with Turkey states that the application of safeguards 
to materials and facilities subject to safeguards under this Agreement will 
be carried out in accordance with the multilateral safeguards transfer agree- 



CRS - 40 

ment signed by Turkey, the U. S. , and the IAEA as may be amended, or 
in accordance with a safeguards agreement between the Turkish Republic 
and the IAEA under Article III of the NPT. The safeguards rights accorded 
the U. S. Government under this Agreement we suspended during the time 
and to the extent that the United States agrees that the need to exercise such 
rights is satisfied by an IAEA safeguards agreement. 

Termination of IAEA s afeguards 

All the agreements except the Turkish Agreement provide the same 
termination provisions. In the event that the trilateral should be terminated 
prior to the expiration of the Agreement and the Parties should fail to 
promptly agree upon a resumption of Agency safeguards, either Party may, 
by notification, terminate the agreement. In the event of termination by 
either Party, the recipient nation shall, at the request of the United States, 
return to it all special nuclear material received and still in the recipient's 
possession or the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The United 
States will compensate the recipient nation or persons under its jurisdiction 
for their interest in such material at the ERDA schedule of prices then in 
effect. The Turkish Agreement has no termination provisions. 

Guarantees 

In all of the Research agreements, only the recipient nations make 
guarantees. The guarantees made by Ireland, Indonesia, Greece, and Iran 
are identical to the guarantees in the research and power agreements. 

Israel, Colombia, and Turkey guarantee that the safeguards provided 
in the agreement will be maintained. Further they guarantee that no ma- 
terial, including equipment and devices, transferred to the authorized 



CRS - 41 

persons, by lease, sale, or otherwise, will be used for atomic weapons or 
for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military 
purposes. Further, no such material, including equipment and devices, will 
be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond their jurisdiction except as 
ERDA may agree. The transfer will be agreed to only if, in the opinion of 
ERDA, it falls within the scope of an agreement for cooperation between the 
U. S. and the other nation. 

Disclaimer of liability 

All of the agreements contain a section in which the U. S. disclaims 
liability for the use of material and other items which it supplies under 
this agreement. 

Expiration of Agreement 

The agreements with Colombia, Greece, Iran, Ireland, Israel and 
Turkey state that upon expiration of the agreement or any extension thereof 
the recipient nation will deliver all fuel elements containing reactor fuels 
and reactor materials leased by ERDA to a site in the United States designat- 
ed by ERDA. The expense of the delivery will be borne by the recipient 
nation and made under "appropriate safeguards against radiation hazards. " 

The Agreement with Indonesia has no such provision. 

Agreements for Power 

The United States has negotiated only two agreements specifically 
for nuclear power: one with India, the other with the United Kingdom. The 
provisions of each are discussed separately because of the difference between 



64-626 O- 76 - 10 



CRS - 42 

the nuclear status of these nations. India had high hopes that nuclear power 
would be an important source of energy for its industrialization and, at that 
time, did not possess nuclear explosives. The United Kingdom, on the other 
hand, had a well developed nuclear technology using gas cooled power re- 
actors, fueled with normal uranium, that were not proving as attractive 
in the world market as the British had hoped, and so alternatives had to 
be considered. The United Kingdom had nuclear weapons well before it con- 
cluded the power agreement with the United States. 

India 

Information exchange - Unclassified information concerning the de- 
velopment design, construction, operation, and use of the Tarapur Atomic 
Power Station will be exchanged between the Parties. Research and develop- 
ment information on problems of health and safety relating to this Station 
will also be exchanged. 

Transfers - During the period of the Agreement, the U. S. (ERDA) 
will sell enriched uranium to the Indian Government for use in the Tarapur 
Station. The Tarapur Station will be operated only on special nuclear ma- 
terial made available by the U. S. ERDA or special nuclear material pro- 
duced therefrom. (This is the only Agreement for Cooperation containing 
this provision. ) The enriched uranium will not contain more than twenty 
percent U-235and will be made available in accordance with the terms, con- 
ditions, and delivery schedule set forth in a contract to be made between the 
Parties. The net amount of U-235 contained in the enriched uranium sold 
by the U. S. shall not exceed 14, 500 kilograms. This amount has been agreed 
upon by the Parties based on estimated fueling requirement. This net 



CRS - 43 

amount of U-235 shall be the gross quantity of U-235 contained in the en- 
riched uranium sold to the Government of India minus the quantity of U-235 
contained in recoverable uranium resold or returned to the U. S. or trans- 
ferred to another other nation, group of nations, or international organiza- 
tion with U. S. approval. (If the construction of the Tarapur Station had not 
begun by June 30, 1965 the U.S. would not have been required, unless it 
agreed otherwise, to sell enriched uranium for fueling the Tarapur Station. ) 
The quantity of enriched uranium sold by the United States and held by the 
Indian Government may not at any time be in excess of the quantity neces- 
sary for the full loading of the Station plus an additional amount for efficient 
and continuous operation of the Station. The Government of India will re- 
tain title to any enriched uranium purchased from the U. S. Commission. 
Reprocessing . When the special nuclear material utilized in the 
Tarapur Station requires reprocessing, it may be performed in Indian fa- 
cilities upon a joint determination of the Parties that the provisions of this 
Agreement may be effectively applied, or in other mutually agreed facilities. 
The form and content of the irradiated fuel elements removed from the re- 
actors is not to be altered before delivery to the reprocessing facility. 
Concerning any special nuclear material produced in the Tarapur Station 
which is in excess of the needs of India's peaceful nuclear program, the 
U.S. shall have the first option to purchase this material at currently effective 
U. S. domestic prices. If this option is not exercised, the Indian Govern- 
ment, with the approval of the U. S. Government, may transfer the excess 
material to any other nation, group of nations, or international organization. 
The Indian Government will be responsible for the safe handling and use of 
the materials transferred. 



CRS - 44 

Materials -Materials, other than source materials or specialnuclear 
materials needed for fuel, which are required for the Station but which 
are not available commercially, will be transferred by the U. S. Government 
to the Indian Government on terms and conditions, and in amounts as may 
be mutually agreed. 

Responsibility for Information - The Parties disclaim responsibility 
for the accuracy, completeness, and suitability of information, materials, 
equipment and devices transferred under the Agreement. 

Supply by private sources - The U. S. will permit persons under its 
jurisdiction to transfer and export materials, equipment and devices, other 
than source or special nuclear materials to, and perform services for, the 
Indian Government. Persons under the jurisdiction of the Indian Government 
are authorized to receive these items, subject to applicable laws, etc. in 
both nations. 

Safeguards - Both Parties emphasize their common interest in assur- 
ing that the items transferred for use in the Tarapur Station be used solely 
for peaceful purposes. The fact that the Tarapur Station will be operated 
only on special nuclear material furnished by the U. S. and special nuclear 
material produced therefrom was reiterated in this article. 

Both Parties have reviewed the design of the Tarapur Station and 
may review any significant modifications to it. The Parties may also re- 
view the design of other facilities which will use, fabricate or process any 
special nuclear material made available pursuant to this Agreement or pro- 
duced in the Tarapur Station. Such a review will not be required if the 
Indian Government places an agreed upon equivalent amount of the same type 



CRS - 45 
of SNM, under the scope of this Agreement, under mutually acceptable mea- 
surement arrangements. 

An agreed upon system of records and reports shall be established 
as described below. 

A. With respect to records, information covering the following will 
be included: 

1. receipts of all nuclear materials, 

2. internal movements of all nuclear materials, 

3. any removal of nuclear materials, including shipments, known 
losses, and unaccounted for quantities, 

4. inventories of all nuclear materials on hand at the end of 
each accounting period, showing form, quantity, and location, 
and 

5. reactor -operating data necessary for determining and re- 
porting on the production and consumption of any nuclear 
materials and the use of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. 

B. With respect to reports, information covering the following will 
be included: 

1. all receipts and removals of nuclear materials, 

2. any production and consumption of nuclear materials, 

3. any known losses and unaccounted-for nuclear materials, 

4. all inventories of nuclear materials, and 

5. the operation of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, includ- 
ing unusual incidents; and significant modifications made or 
to be made in the plant or in the fueling program. 



CRS - 46 

Routine reports covering this information are to be submitted to both 
nations monthly. Any losses of nuclear materials or unusual incidents will 
be reported as soon as the incident has been discovered. If any special nu- 
clear material transferred or produced under this agreement is placed in 
any facilities in India, other than Tarapur, the safeguards and reporting 
system outlined in this Agreement will apply. In the event of unusual 
incidents, special reports may be requested, including amplifications and 
elucidations which each party considers relevant. 

Surplus special nuclear material either transferred to Tarapur or 
produced in this reactor, will be stored at the Tarapur Station unless other- 
wise agreed. 

There will be consultations and periodic exchanges of visits between 
the Parties to assure that the objectives set forth in this Agreement con- 
cerning transfers are being observed. Personnel designated by the United 
States in consultation with India and personnel designated by India shall have 
full access to the Tarapur Station and to conversion, fabrication and chemi- 
cal processing facilities in India, when special nuclear material transferred 
to India for the Tarapur Station is located at such facilities, and at other 
relevant times. Personnel so designated will also be afforded access to 
other places, data, and persons for the accomplishment of those objectives. 
The designated personnel may make independent measurements as either 
Party considers necessary. The United States will keep such access to a 
minimum, consistent with the need for effective verification. 

The Government of India obtained an unusual right to remove quanti- 
ties of U. S. supplied SNM from the scope of the agreement and to substitute 
equivalent material. The agreement provides that: 



CRS - 47 

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement, the 

Government of India shall have the right, upon prior notice to the 
Government of the United States, to remove from the scope of this 
Agreement quantities of special nuclear material provided it has, pur- 
suant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, placed a- 
greed equivalent quantities of the same type of special nuclear ma- 
terial under the scope of this agreement. 

Noncompliance -In the event of noncompliance with the safeguards or 
guarantees in this Agreement, and the subsequent failure of the Indian Go- 
vernment to fulfill the guarantees and safeguards within a reasonable time, 
the U. S. Government has the right to suspend or terminate this Agreement 
and to require the return of any special nuclear material equipment and de- 
vices transferred and safeguarded under this Agreement. 

Guarantees - The Indian Government guarantees that no material, 
equipment or device transferred to it or its authorized persons will be used 
for atomic weapons, for research or development of atomic weapons, or 
for any other military purpose. Further, India guarantees that no material, 
equipment or device will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond 
its jurisidction except as the U. S. and India agree. If the Parties agree 
to transfer such material the U. S. Commission must determine whether such 
transfer falls within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the 
U. S. and the other nation, group of nations or international organization. 

The U. S. guarantees that no special nuclear material produced at the 
Tarapur Station and acquired by it, or an equivalent amount of the same 
type substituted therefore, shall be used for atomic weapons or for r & d 
on atomic weapons or for any other military purpose. 

Agreement with the IAEA - Recognizing the desirability of making use 
of the facilities and services of the IAEA, the Parties agree in principle that 
at a suitable time, the IAEA would be requested to enter into a trilateral 



CRS - 48 

agreement with the Parties for the implementation of the safeguards pro- 
visions of this Agreement. The United States was prepared, in principle, 
to include appropriate provisions in the trilateral for the application of 
Agency safeguards for SNM produced in the Tarapur Station, as may be 
received in the U. S. , or equivalent material substituted therefor. 

In addition, after the IAEA adopted a system of safeguards for re- 
actors the size of the Tarapur Sation, the Parties agreed to consult to de- 
termine if this system would be consistent with the safeguards provisions of 
the agreement. If so. the Parties would request the Agency to enter into a 
trilateral agreement. The Indian Government could specify that the trilateral 
agreement would not be implemented until the Station reached reliable full- 
power operation. 

In the event the Parties did not reach a mutually satisfactory agree- 
ment on the terms of a trilateral agreement, either Party may, by notifica- 
tion, terminate this bilateral agreement. Before either Party took steps 
to terminate, the Parties would carefully consider the economic effects. As 
for long term operations, neither Party will invoke its termination rights 
until the other Party has been given sufficient advance notice to permit ar- 
rangements by India for an alternative source of power or to permit adjust- 
ment of U. S. production schedules. The United States agreed not to invoke 
its termination rights unless there has been widespread acceptance, by those 
nations with whom it has bilateral agreements, of the implementation of 
IAEA safeguards or provisions similar to those in this Agreement. In the 
event of termination by either Party, the Indian Government, at the request 
of the U.S. Government, shall return to the U.S. all special nuclear ma- 
terials received pursuant to this Agreement and in its possession or the 



CRS - 49 

possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The U. S. Government will 
then compensate India for the material at curn nt domestic prices. 

Definition - The following terms are defined in the Agreement: U. S. 
Commission, Tarapur Atomic Power Station, equipment and devices, per- 
sons, reactor, atomic weapon, special nuclear material, source material, 
parties, and reliable full power operation. 

The United Kingdom - The agreement for nuclear power cooperation with 
the United Kingdom is shorter and less detailed than that with India. Its 
principal provisions follows. 

Scope - The Parties agreed to assist each other in furthering the use 
of atomic energy for civil power applications, including merchant marine 
propulsion, subject to the availability of personnel and material, applicable 
laws, directives, regulations and license requirements in force in their re- 
spective countries. The assistance is to be on a reciprocal basis. 

Restricted data and privately owned information are not to be com- 
municated under the Agreement. The Parties are to exchange general in- 
formation on the development of atomic energy for civil power applications. 
Detailed and applied information in this field are to be exchanged to such 
an extent and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed. 

Responsibility for information and materials - The application or use 
of any exchanged information or materials is the responsibility of the receiv- 
ing Party. 

Materials - ERDA is to sell agreed upon quantities of enriched U-235 
for fueling reactors in the U.K. civil nuclear power programs, including 
programs for merchant marine propulsion. Terms and conditions of these 
sales are to be agreed upon. 



CRS - 50 

After December 31, 1968, the United States is committed to enter 
into contracts for producing and /or enriching, special nuclear material for 
the account of the U.K. for specified uses and subject to terms and condi- 
tions established by ERDA. 

Contracts specifying quantities, enrichments, delivery schedules and 
other terms and conditions of supply or service are to be executed on a 
timely basis between the ERDA and the U. K. Authority. 

The enriched uranium supplied may contain up to twenty percent U- 
235. If there is a technical or economic justification, ERDA may supply 
material containing more than 20% U-235. 

Quantity of Material Transferred - The adjusted net quantity of en- 
riched U-235 transferred from the U.S. to the U.K. during the period of 
this Agreement may not exceed 8000 kilograms in the aggregate. The fol- 
lowing will be used to calculate this quantity: 
From: 

(1) The quantity of U-235 contained in enriched uranium transferred 

under said Articles, minus 

(2) The quantity of U-235 contained in an equal quantity of uranium 
of normal isotopic assay, 

Subtract: 

(3) The aggregate of the quantities of U-235 contained in recoverable 
uranium of United States origin either transferred to the United 
States or to any other nation or group of nations with the appro- 
val of the United States pursuant to this Agreement, minus 

(4) The quantity of U-235 contained in an equal quantity of uranium 
of uranium of normal isotopic assay. 



CRS - 51 

Cooperation by Persons - Arrangements may be made between ei- 
ther Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized per- 
sons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for the transfer of materials, 
etc. subject to limitations in this Agreement. 

Safeguards - The Parties agreed to request the IAEA to assume re- 
sponsibility for applying safeguards to materials transferred. 

In the event the Parties did not reach a mutually satisfactory agree- 
ment on the trilateral, either Party by notification, could terminate the 
Agreement. In the event of termination, the United Kingdom would at the 
United States' request, return all special nuclear material received and still 
in its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The 
United States would compensate the United Kingdom for its interest in these 
material at current domestic prices. 

Guarantees - Both Parties guaranteed that: 

No material transferred pursuant to this Agreement will be used for 
atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or 
for any other military purpose. 

No material transferred will be transferred to unauthorized persons 
or beyond the jurisdiction of either receiving Party without the written con- 
sent of the transferring Party. U.S. consent will not be given unless the 
transfer is within the scope of an Agreement for cooperation. 

No special nuclear material produced through the use of any material 
transferred pursuant to this agreement may be used for atomic weapons or 
for research on development of atomic weapons or for any other military 
purpose. Further, they may not be transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Party in which they were produced. 



CRS - 52 

Definitions - Definitions for Authority, Commission, person, re- 
stricted data, and special nuclear material, are included in the Agreement. 

Agreements with International Organizations 
The United States has agreements for cooperation with the two prin- 
cipal international organizations for nuclear energy. One is with Euratom 
which is part of the European Economic Community, the other is with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. The major provisions of these agree- 
ments follow. 

Euratom 

Scope of agreement - The preamble to the agreement sets out the 
scope of the cooperation. The United States and Euratom agreed to cooper- 
ate by establishing a joint program to bring into operation within EURATOM 
nuclear power plants having a total installed capacity of approximately one 
million kilowatts of electricity by December 31, 1963 (except that two re- 
actors may be selected to be in operation by December 31, 1965) and to 
initiate a joint research and development program on these types of re- 
actors. 

Under the joint program, reactor projects were to be proposed, con- 
structed, and operated by private or governmental organizations in the Com- 
munity which are engaged in the power industry or in the nuclear energy 
field. Projects would be selected in accordance with technical standards, 
criteria (including radiation protection and reactor safety) and procedures 
developed by the then AEC (now ERDA) and EURATOM. In evaluating and 



CRS - 53 

selecting reactor projects, the technical and economic features were to 
be considered and approved by both Parties while other features were to 
be considered and approved by the EURATOM. 

The total capital cost, exclusive of fuel inventory of the nuclear power 
plants to be constructed under the program was estimated not to exceed the 
equivalent of $350 million to be financed by the U. S. and Euratom. The 
U.S. offered guarantees designed to limit financial risks associated with the 
fuel cycle. 

The reactor R&D program aimed primarily at improving reactor 
performance, lowering fuel cycle costs, and developing plutonium recycle. 

Materials to be provided - The U. S. agreed to sell or lease up to 
30,000 kilograms of Uranium enriched in U-235, for joint projects as the 
Euratom Community requests. This net amount was to be the gross quan- 
tity of contained U-235 in uranium sold of leased to the Community less 
the quantity of contained U-235 in recoverable uranium resold or returned to 
the U. S. , or transferred to another nation or group of nations with U. S. ap- 
proval. By agreement, the United States could also sell additional quanti- 
ties of SNM to the Community. Any lease of SNM by the U.S. Commission 
could be converted to a sale of material upon Euratom request, if such a 
sale was consistent with U. S. laws and policy. Details of the leasing ar- 
rangements are included in the Agreement. 

The uranium supplied for use in power reactors may be enriched to 
20% U-235. Upon request and at its discretion, the United States could 
supply part of the enriched uranium as material enriched up to 90% for use 



CRS - 54 

in material testing reactors and research reactors, each capable of operat- 
ing with a fuel load not exceeding 8 kilograms of contained U-235. 

The agreement specified that contracts for sale or lease of SNM by 
the then AEC (now ERDA) would be between the AEC (ERDA) and the 
Euratom Supply Agency. The agreement included about a page of conditions 
for these contracts. Title to leased SNM would remain in the United States 
which would have "power and authority" over this material within the Com- 
munity. Euratom could distribute transferred SNM to authorized users in the 
Community. Title to SNM produced in nuclear fuel sold by or leased from 
the United States remains in the Community. 

Reprocessing - The U. S. agreed to reprocess spent fuel which the 
Community purchased from the U. S. When any source or special nuclear 
material leased from the U. S. requires reprocessing, it is to be performed 
at the discretion of ERDA by the United States or in other acceptable facili- 
ties. As otherwise agreed, the form and content of irradiated fuel elements 
may not be altered after their removal from reactors and prior to delivery 
at ERDA or other facilities. SNM or other material recovered from ma- 
terial returned to the United States for reprocessing will be returned to the 
Community, unless otherwise agreed. The United States will give prior notice 
if its facilities are not available to reprocess Euratom fuel. 

Euratom has a first option to purchase SNM produced in reactors 
fueled with material obtained from the United States under this Agreement 
which is in excess of the Community's needs. If this option is not exercised 
by Euratom, the United States is prepared to purchase the material at cur- 
rent domestic prices. 



CRS - 55 

Commitments to purchase of plutonium produced in any reactor con- 
structed under the Joint Program were not to extend beyond a period of 
ten years of operation or December 31, 1973 or December 31, 1975 for cer- 
tain reactors, unless extended by negotiation. 

The U. S. Commission agreed to assist Euratom in obtaining reactor 
materials other than SNM from private U. S. organizations. 

Persons under U. S. jurisdiction may make arrangements to transfer 
materials to authorized persons under EURATOM jurisdiction. 

Information Exchange - All non-patentable information developed in 
connection with the R&D program will be delivered to all Parties for their 
use without further obligation. 

ERDA and EURATOM will also exchange unclassified information on 
peaceful use of atomic energy, including technical advice in the design and 
construction of future reprocessing plants which the Community may decide 
to design and construct or sponsor. 

The application or use of any information transferred is the respon- 
sibility of the recipient. 

Liability - The Euratom Commission will seek to develop and secure 
the adoption, at the earliest date practical, of suitable measures to provide 
adequate financial protection against third party liability. 

Guarantees - The Community guarantees that no material, equipment 
and devices transferred pursuant to the Agreement will be used for atomic 
weapons, research and development of atomic weapons, or any other mili- 
tary purpose. 

No material is to be transferred to unauthorized persons unless the 
U. S. agrees and it falls within an Agreement for Cooperation. 



CRS - 56 

No source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, 
or produced as a result of the use of materials, equipment and devices trans- 
ferred under this Agreement are to be used for atomic weapons, research 
and development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purposes. 

Safeguards - The Community undertook the responsibility for esta- 
blishing and implementing a safeguards and control system designed to give 
maximum assurance that any material, equipment or devices made available 
pursuant to this Agreement, and any source or special nuclear material de- 
rived from the use of such material, equipment and devices, are utilized 
solely for peaceful purposes. The Community agreed to consult with the 
IAEA in establishing and implementing its safeguards and control system. 
EURATOM agreed to: 

1) Examine the design of equipment, devices and facilities, including 
nuclear reactors, to assure that they will not further any military 

purpose and that they will permit effective application of safe- 
guards, if such equipment, devices and facilities: 
-are made available pursuant to this Agreement; 
-use, process, or fabricate materials relevant to safeguards which 

are received from the United States; 
-use any special nuclear material produced as the result of the use 

of equipment or material received from the United States; 

2) Require the maintenance and production of operating records to 
assure the accountability of special nuclear materials; 

3) Require that progress reports be prepared and delivered to 
EURATOM on projects utilizing material received from the United 
States; 



CRS - 57 

4) Establish and require the deposit and storage under continuing 
safeguards, in Euratom facilities of special nuclear material not 
currently being utilized for peaceful purposes in the Community 
or otherwise transferred. 

5) Establish an inspection organization which will have access at all 
times to relevant persons, places and data necessary to assure 

accounting of material. The inspection organization will also be 
in a position to make necessary independent measurements. 

The United States, as the Community may request, agreed to assist in es- 
tablishing the safeguards and control system. There are to be frequent 
consultations between the Parties to assure that the Community's safeguards 
system effectively meets the principles. 

The Parties agreed to consult from time to time to determine whe- 
ther there are any areas with regard to safeguards and control and matters 
of health and safety in which the IAEA might assist. 

Further Agreements - The Parties anticipated further cooperation 
agreements. Member States of EURATOM which have concluded agree- 
ments with third countries for cooperation in nuclear energy prior to the 
date of entry into force of this Treaty agreed to enter into obligations under 
those agreements by the Community. 

Existing agreements between EURATOM members and the United 
States were not to be modified by the joint program, although modification 
could be made by joint agreement. 



64-626 O - 76 - 11 



CRS - 58 

Liability - Eur atom agreed to indemnify and safe harmless the United 
States against damages or third party liability arising from the joint pro- 
gram. 

Definitions - Definitions for Person, special nuclear material, source 
material, parties, and Euratom supply agency are included. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency 

Definitions 

The following terms are defined in the agreement with the IAEA: 
agency, United States, Parties, agency statute, person, reactor material, 
source material, special nuclear material, and agency activity. 

U. S. supply of enriched uranium 

The U. S. agreed to make available 5, 000 kilograms of contained U- 
235 to the Agency for its activities pursuant to the Agency Statute. The 
U. S. also agreed to provide amounts of SNM to match the sum of all quan- 
tities of SNM made available by all other Members of the Agency prior to 
July 1, 1960. Additional amounts may also be supplied. The uranium sup- 
plied may be enriched up to 20% U-235 unless the parties agree to a higher 
enrichment for uranium used in research reactors, material testing re- 
actors or for research purposes. 

The SNM made available to the Agency is to be used at the Agency's 
direction and distributed by the Agency in accordance with its Statute, rules 
and regulations. When requested by the Agency, the U. S. is to deliver 
the material to the Agency or to a Member or group of members designated 
by the Agency. Form, composition, delivery, etc., are to be agreed upon. 



CRS - 59 

The United States agreed to assist the Agency in obtaining source and 
reactor materials from persons in the U. S. , if the Agency wishes. If no com- 
mercial sources are available to the Agency on reasonable terms, the United 
States may make such material available to the Agency. 

The United States may, at the Agency's request and subject to U.S. 
laws and the Agency Statute, purchase special nuclear material recovered or 
produced from special nuclear material and source material as a result of 
Agency activities. These are to be used solely for peaceful applications. 
Prices, terms, and conditions for these materials will be agreed upon. 

Warranties 



The use of any materials made available under the Agreement is 
the responsibility of the IAEA. All leasing agreements are to contain a pro- 
vision relieving the lessor of liability. 

Subject to applicable laws persons under the jurisdiction of the 
United States will be permitted to arrange to transfer and export, material, 
equipment and facilities and person needed services for the Agency, a Mem- 
ber or group of Members. 

Guarantees 



The Agency guarantees that: 

(1) Safeguards set forth in the Agency Statute will be maintained and 
implemented with respect to the items made available by the 
United States for Agency activities; 

(2) No material, equipment or facilities transferred pursuant to the 
Agreement will be used for atomic weapons, research and deve- 
lopment of atomic weapons, or any military purposes. 



CRS - 60 

(3) Items used transferred or re-transferred pursuant to this Agree- 
ment are to be used or transferred only in accordance with the 
Agency Statute and this Agreement. 



APPENDIX II 

COMPARATIVE TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION FOR: 
RESEARCH AND POWER ( PORTUGAL) 
RESEARCH ONLY (INDONESIA) 
POWER ONLY ( UNITED KINGDOM) 



APPENDIX II. COMPARATIVE TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Definitions 1 

Scope 3 

Exchange of information (Restricted Data) 4 

Exchange of information (private information) 5 

Exchange of information (subjects) 6 

Transfer of materials and access to facilities 7 

Responsibility of receiving party 8 

Cooperation between persons 9 

Materials for civil power applications 10 

Supply of SNM and other fissionable material 11 

Enrichment ofuranium supplied 12 

Limitations on quantity of enriched uranium 13 

Reprocessing of fuel and alteration of fuel elements 14 

Produced SNM — title and transfer 15 

Receivers responsibility and indemnification 16 

Limits on separative work 17 

Guarantees 18 

Commitment to civil use 19 

U.S. rights 20 

IAEA safeguards 22 

Entry into force, term 23 



a) . 
I 



« & ill iHiiisi* 

s «, ail fi^ifclSlaS' 

1 1 ni mkm 

1 1 || mum 

i w ii|ini!| 

I Ml s>H*5iji 





MJiMililnlliii 



'Friii ? llIF!i 



ill 
it? 



-• 5 

i ? 

■ 5 « : s 

. i H 

!Mi|i 

5 * j • ! ! 

-• 1 1 • } } 
H; II 



2 2 
? s s : 

I IS! 

1 ! 1 1 f 

Ml 

Hill 

Hiis 



- S I 3 

I \ ! 1 n 1 1 



t 8 



i s 2 

! M 



6 3 



« 3 ? 

|i] 

Is* 



1 i i 

Hi 






a » ? 



i»!|!!t- 



?!i!i 

IMS 






i! 

1 5 ! | 



ill 






a * 
I | 
I f 



3 ; 

i ! 

: I 

I i 

i. i 

. . 

I : 

I ! 

1 * 



in 



3 5 



j I J 3 i 

iff;* 

= i i ■ i 



1 






i I®: I 
ii I l 



§ 



* 



3 i 

il 

i i 
2 s 



hid 



i i 



M 



1 1 



h 

j 2 

1 1 

8 a 

! S 

i I 

5 I 

i ! 
i * 

i i 



il!l! 



S 3 2 



: ° 

2 ? 
•Ii 

i : I 
I j j 



I 



I! 



1 • 

. ; 



» 3 t 11 

in in 

I S ? 



I . 



. j < ; s , • 

■ mlilh 

I °. ; £ s ' 
s t I I 1 I s 

" ! Ill . 3 



i ? !!r 



2 3 



? s 
a i 

1 1 



II I 



f f . 
l a a 



I i '. I 



6 . a 

! 1 1 i 



i;M 



III 

!?} 

3 f 3 



i,!r 



2 i I J - £ 3 

I * | ! I ! « 

! 1 1 ! s 

i ii:l 

« 1 1 3 j } ] 

! jjiJlj 

I J ! i 1 ° S 

'lis? . f s « . 8 

l' ! | hip'. 
- I 2 - ' S - • i . 



i : , 



IllSJ^ 



: I I 









& 



i 1 " 2 

sis-: 

t % ! S | S | , 

i | i s « i 5 5 
f | s a l J i I 

i 1 I » 1 I | I 



I i 



I : * 



i 1 



a istji.ii 

\ 5 1 8 5 » 5 I I 

i J:j ! T| 3 'a: l 

* s a 8 s •- ^ « 



H 

5 1 1 

2 f I 



HP 
it}] 

1 3 i i 

3 lis |» ? 

\ U\\ Mi 

* !?i I' ' 

I i h h ? 1 

! mj.f *! 

<g Mr, ill 



ijfrJi 

lilfi 
Urn 

iflif 

mm 

3-ia-g.ag 



•Ml 

inn 

|,J f l 

ill? 

\\ hi 
III i 

? : -. 3 - 



nii 



ft! 
5 

3 

<$ 

a 
i 



I J i « 

mi 

B i J m 
a J * i I f 
ll'ifl 

I 1 a ': i 

s I it * 
f I f f J 



if? 

If 
111 



§ H iJ* 



<5 



lult 

85 flil 



I 



k i 

« 






m 

!! i 
21! 

! ° ° 






A 

l! 



1 1 1 1 1 
I j I ' I 

? J i « r ! 
ill? 

I I 3 I 



Ii' 



5 3 5 • 2 

* s a s J 



v> 



111 

m 
lh 

Sill 
HI 

Ill 






il 
I! 

2l " 



I 







5 S 

i J 

I * 



< 



j.!S 
f I i-| 

331.8 

Jill 

in 8 

tit 

Si g;* 

1^1 



s s 

ill 
iiti 



c 1 . 



- £ 



3» 



5 

si 3 



KM 

' ! 1 



i • 

- 3 
S S 

u 



'lii 1 

111 



8 3 S 

£ a 8 
1 1 1 
> 3 > 

ii = 

I g " 

M 



g i 

! I 



in 

? - i 
1 1 & 

3 1: 



f! 



! I. 

iHjI 

ImIj 

1 » 1 s « 
fill] 

I * 5 1 ? 

n! ! ! * i 



, I * 

i 1 3 

I ;] 

3 = i | 

as: 8 

Hi! 



« I 



§ 8 



Mil 
i i 



§ 5 

l ? i 



i\\\\\ 



I 



ii 



1 J 

? : 



j i 



w 



HJ1I 

mm 



Is a £*I 

i I e -8 I 3 

£l?jJ?a 

5! -mil 



til*J 



! 
I 



$ 



lis 
I : ! 



5 
0^5 



fj 

« 3 » 

I * j 3 ! 

I 1 ! 
111 j| 



h 



I » 



H 

3 1 g 

111 

! * 5 

a I ! 



1 



Ml! 1 ! 

;i< i! 

I * f * J J j i 

I J 1 ! 1 1 1 

tn h i 
3 % . 1 i i M j 
!!]||i|«| 

till! I 

* \ ! ! J 1 1 1 

I J } V J I 1 



irfPlt 

WPJ! 

fill 






III" 



"lliiilij 

ISlillll 

JJJlJIll 




1 1 

r s 



• r 5 



s * 

1 I 

S 5 

I : 



I 



i 

s s 

5 S 

I 5 



H 

fc a I 1 
■ a ■ | 

i i J I 



il 



e s 






i : 



s 3 s 



* i i 



s i ! 3 



if j i 



64-626 O - 76 - 12 



8.J 

& Is'gl.l 

JS5l|jg 

^ Si I 



II 1 
1.8 i I 

f li 
III- 



nIIi! 




limn 

Hlflflll 
ll II f 



ji»w iiuiilli 



JJJ4§ CJJ 



5 TJ 

s 5 



j t 



Mi 

a If 

51 5 ! 



g ^ : 

S f B 

• : | 



! 

ii:t|i 

! iM i * 

■ iiJM 



5 & 

I S 



!}{ 



In 



t i s 

lalS 



U 



2 3 * sf 

f if 2|i ! 

i s ■ 1 1 s * i a 



a 5 : 



4J 



5 1 



! J 1 . a 

i I - S -: 



3 



§ i f i , 

!■] ■ill 



5 I 

S S 

. 5 
I a 

" i 

i 
i 

r 

: 

I 

J 

I 
I 



5 i 



Iff jH 



Si 
III 



3 1 5 

hi 



li ll! 



lifil 



8 I i i * s ? 

iJ|Jl*i 



ill 



I ! 

I i 



I ! 



? 5 



liiil "MM 






5 



" 2 £ o 
jilt 

silt 



' i 



n; 

i - 1 

f 5 S 



■ 6 I 

? I . , 



: 5 






m 

111 ! 



li 
II 

n 



s - 1 

3 | 



ftps 

9 8 | t . 

S X 5 S 5 

ill 



IS >« 
s ■ I * 

I J J I 



r f ! s i 
* * i i j 



fill 



iJifli 



lilM: 

:sfJ! 



Ej Sl 
Hi 

! ■ | 8 J 

2 » ! i ? 



i s ' J 



■< it I 




glflj I f 111! f 

lii 1 !! ill] i||'f]j 

lliiH ill! ijlan 

fill!! ii ii piiiil 

flffll H-H Uikll 



I 



I 






i 



& s J ' 



§ s 



2 3 
? 

a ° 5 1 



Hi! fj 



OS 



» 5 



8 u 

I 2 H , I 

: : s o ? 



e ! 



■ I 



i 1 1 ; 3 



; s. jj 

i ; : 

a | *. 

I 1 I 



111 

r a : ^ 



s i 

I I 

I : 



- I 5 

H hi! 

i Si! 

Mil 

5 s : I ! • 
Mi* « s 



J 8 



i 1 



J I 



: s s x 

8 3 | . 



t : s 
If* 

' s i \ 
! 1 i 

i i J 



V ! : 2 I 



fti 



J 



i 



r ! 1 . 1 1 i ! i = 
Iitilillj; 

Minn i! 



S 9 

e . 

j a 



l] I 



% ~. § & 



1 3 

iSlmlj! 
■-■35511 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 



S s 



1 3 | | 

1 3 5 S 



i a 5 

lit 

ill 

2 I f 

I s 1 
a a s 



III 

1 " 2 

£ I S 

1 5 1 

S § 5 
* ■ a 



° 2 I 






3 & 



I ; 2 

S S ~ 



flfi! 3 l& J siilM 

« ? * c £ : ' i : : i § i f § 

1 1 J i J 3 J i ? I f I * 1 « i 

3 | | | : 1 1 i : s 5 8 | r : 

j! I 1 U III } 

I 2 I ! ! I % s I I 1 ! s 2 



! I 

i i 

• i 

* 2 

3 S 



! ■ 



! ! 



i .' 1 1 1 ] ! 

M 'lit 

?' ill 

-:! I!;S 

I 1 

I I 



i 8 % 



h nam WB1 1 
i| IliliifliSili 1 














° 8 
I I 



i 



Hi 



a? I 

li 



l 3 5 



!I 



Si 



1 1 

i i 

1 1 

ill 
II f 



8 

1 » . i i 

W\l\\ 

ill!} 5 

u 1 



8 5 | 



3 S 

ill 

s ! 



I J «! ! i • i 






: i 1 1 1 1 •. : s 

« * a - i s s 2 : 









>- 






J 






7 






O 






« 






<u 






3 






£ 








!.!.»* 






1 1 : : a 






; i | ; .■ 






s 1 ' i ! 






s - ° 5 : 

% i £ £ ? 

: 1 1 • " 




3 


• iMJli 




2 


s: * i : 1 1 






± 

3 


Ijfjlj 




1 


'jjljf 




dS 


falls 






r 1 a 






* ! ! 2 ! 




<) 


in n 




(i 






3 


z % i : - 1 




(C 


ill si 

» ; ! J i { 







till II 




2 

4 


tit r 1 

: t i * : 




1 


ill i! . 




O 


I I J S I I 






£ ! i ! | *, 




i 


^1? h:* 

§ 1 S 2 ° 





I 



I I 



s I 



I 8 5 



HUH 
I * * II 

flfil 

i - , 3 s 
111 



mi 



?ii 



II 



fii 

: * I 

* ? c 

? 3 | 

| 



If | II i 

8 * * „- 



r I 



i 2 
I l 
I 1 

I : 
it 



s Is | 2 

I : 5 i J 



I- 



!! 

J 3 
I ] 
1 i 

f 5 

I I I 
I 3 I 

? 8 



3 ! 



5 : 



I I * 

* 3 2 

3 • I 

i i 

in 



in 

« -• 3 

mi 
i 

a 5 » 



n 

i? 

3 2 



1 - 

ii 



f; 

i i s 

• 1 1 

sal 

Ii! 

ill 
jii j 

* ! * I 

I i 



ill 



5 : 



■ | 

? i 



il 



i : 

? 3 



8 I j 
IP 

~. 3 



i 

1 1 i 

! 5 5 

j[; 

S 3 I 

i 3 1 
lii 



fun 



I * 




3 2 



8 | 

ii 



| 3 

3 3 
~ ; J 

I 3 s 

!! 

. & 

3 ' 



!'M 



j ! 



- 8 






j 

ii 



35 



i 






O 



* 



s 



1 1 



a! 

-U 

S s a 

n! 



rf 



11 



! ! 

I 5 2. 

!|! 

sis 



! ! 
* I 

1 : 

° s 
j s 

2 S 

s i 



J 1 

s 3 s 



• - - 

II 

•= . 1 
2 : s 

ill 
: - ! 



I I 



il! 



o I 

I 



i 5 s 



Ii 
li 

J 2 i 



3 i 5 
Hi 



in 

2 * 5 



1 5 l Z 

Mi? 

3 1! 



ill 



I 



is 

!! 



i ? 



M« 



! ! ! 1 = I i l 

Mil! I 

• ? 1 3 S ' 1 



• I 



if 
It. 
■ l-l 

f 1 a 



}li» 



o 1 

i i 

1 1 



« \ I 
1 \ 



i i i 



hsh 



Iff 

III 

1 ! 



mi 

5 : « s 

Ii = 



.SI 11 I . |1 

I 1 S 1 I 1 3 

5 I J = \ I I 

= I \ * 1 1 * . ! i 

ii 



ii 

! i 

3 S 

3 1 



° i 
t - 
2 1 
I ^ 

i 3 



It!!: 



2 3 3 

» 2 ? 



I I 



* i : 

iPH 

is I i 



llMMifllli 

i S !l«li"ll3 

1 4 j I : o 1 I * 



■ i 



Ii!!!! 



!! 



! 



J 8 

| * I 

I • f 

3 1 5 

fl 

ii 8 

I I 



2 5 
Ii 

s 

i 1 1 

; I I 

I]} 
! 




o 

5 

i 

5 



U i 1 1 « i i ; : f 

: - s ? ! I s i 



11,1 

2 I ° 



i llil t 



i * r- 1 * £ i 1 1 ! 



s I 






* 1 



s ? r, s ? J? s 



% >. 

3 S 



i 5 

! I 

? e 



2 * 

3 I a 



3 ? J 

I : I 

P II 

1 * . 
t * 3 

hi 



»! i 

a s « 

HI 

Mil 

Hi! 



I i-i 



5 * 5 

- S o 

5 ? - 



. « 3 

S 1 3 

I a s 

3 2 1 

J 8 I 

i 1 ! 



s .• i 3 



,T.|||i 



s 5 
•II 

5 „ 5 

j ! I 

? * 1 



a s s 

i 2 : 



s i i 1 i . 

i ; ; - : 5 

js j 15? 

fs 1 I 5 i 



■ ? 

3 : s 
I 5 3 



5 I 



;*m 



i 



s: 



. 3 1 

I ? 8 

. i. i 

° : 



5 J 



= 1 

! 1 



i i 

!! 



! ? s ? I 3 s J J ? | 



3 i : 



? I 



s r 



I a \ 1 I : * J S 



r 2 



I s 

l i 



2 1 



I i 



Si 
I] 
i 



ii 



n 

l! 

1: 



* ' s 

I i s 

» i i 



Hi 



- 5 , . u « 

i a i 5 J | 

iHllmll 

i I r 

I 5 ; s s § a f 8 

. ? - 5 



Ills 1 1 

i I ! ! i i 



s 2 ! s 5 I I 

s - : s ? i : 

I I * J - f .1 

5 : I 5 I § s 

Mi! 



? 5 * 



a : 

3 3 

| ! 

? i 



i 3 
i • 



1 1 

I 3 

i 8 



i 2 

I i 

l 5 



is:? 



s . § 

i r ! 



APPENDIX III 
Selected Chronology of International Activities of the AEC 



Source: AEC Annual Reports to Congress, 1955-1974 

The annual reports of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission following 
the revision of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 included brief highlights of 
international activities. There follows a chronology of selected items from 
these reports. 
1955 

--Twenty-seven nations entered into agreements for cooperation with 
the U. S. in developing the civil uses of atomic energy. 

--The President enlarged the scope of Atoms for Peace Program by 
advocating the construction and demonstration of a nuclear- powered mer- 
chant ship. 

--The President proffered financial aid to other nations in the construc- 
tion of research reactors, and training and technological aid in the develop- 
ment of power reactors by friendly nations. 

--The United Nations International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Ato- 
mic Energy was held in Geneva. The Conference was originally proposed 
by the U.S. 

--The Commission opened a course for scientists and engineers from 
other nations in reactor engineering. 

--The Commission continued support of libraries of unclassified atomic 
energy publications in other nations, a program which was begun in late 1954. 



CRS-2 

1956 



— The United States participated in a conference to consider the basic 
charter of the IAEA at United Nations headquarters. The Conference adopted 
the statute of the IAEA. 

--A total of 41 agreements for cooperation were completed with 39 na- 
tions. 

--The first financial commitments under the President's plan for re- 
search assistance were made to reactor projects in Brazil, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Spain. 

— The number of technical libraries approved for presentation to other 
countries was increased to 42 plus three to international agencies. 

— Through 1956, the Commission had approved sale of 129 tons of heavy 
water to Australia, France, India, Italy, Switzerland and in the United 
States for use in peaceful programs. 

— The Commission continued support of libraries and training in other 
nations. 

— The Commission and the Export-Import Bank agreed to joint action 
to provide assistance for the construction of nuclear powerplants and for re- 
search reactor projects in nations which had entered into agreements for co- 
operation with the United States. 

— The United States participated in the July United Nations Disarma- 
ment Commission meeting. 



CRS-3 
1957 



--At the end of the year, six reactors made in the United States were 
in operation in other countries, and licenses to export 16 others from the 
United States had been issued; nine new agreements for research and power 
and one for research became effective, five agreements were amended. 

--Continued financial assistance was given to reactor projects in other 
nations. 

--Training and assistance activities to American States continued. 
Work continued on the establishment of a Spanish language training center 
in atomic energy at University of Puerto Rico. 

--The United States held its fifth course of the International School of 
Nuclear Science and Engineering. 

— Eighty nations signed the IAEA statute and 59 nations became charter 
members. 

--The European Atomic Energy Community was established. 

--The Commission was a cosponsor or supported 10 international con- 
ferences in nuclear science and technology. 

--The International Atomic Energy Agency was formally inaugurated in 
Vienna, Austria on October 1. 

1958 

— President Eisenhower submitted to Congress and asked for early ap- 
proval of an international agreement with EURATOM for a cooperative pro- 
gram on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 



64-626 O - 76 - 13 



CRS-4 

--The European Nuclear Energy Agency was officially established Feb- 
ruary 1, within the framework of the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation. 

--The Commission announced liberalization of conditions under which 
uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in U-235 could be made available 
to friendly nations under agreements for cooperation. 

--Letters of commitment for $350, 000 each for research reactor pro- 
jects had been made to 16 countries, nine of them during 1958. 

--More than 8. 5 kilograms of U-235 were shipped to foreign countries. 

--The Second United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy was held. 

1959 

--Exchange visits were made between leading figures in atomic energy 
activities in the Soviet Union and the United States. 

--Discussions continued among the United Kingdom, the United States 
and the Soviet Union on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. 

--The number of member states of the IAEA increased to 70. General 
principles of the application of safeguards were provisionally approved by 
the Board of Governors. 

--Closer ties were established with the Organization for European Eco- 
nomic Cooperation. 

--Two new agreements for cooperation were signed. 



CRS-5 

--The Commission established a policy of leasing nuclear material to 
foreign countries either through the IAEA or agreements for cooperation. 

--The Commission established a staff to handle safeguards activities 
under agreements for cooperation and to assist in the establishment of an 
effective worldwide safeguards system through the IAEA. 

--Training opportunities were expanded for foreign personnel at United 
States colleges. 

--An Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission was established as a 
center for consultation and to facilitate cooperation. 

1960 

--The Fourth General Conference of the IAEA, held in September and 
October, accepted principles and procedures to serve as the foundation for 
an international safeguards system against diversion of SNM and equipment 
from peaceful uses. 

— The Joint reactor program of Euratom and the United States entered 
its second phase with preparation to issue an invitation for proposals for 
power reactors to be completed by the end of 1965. 

--The Commission enlarged its participation in OEEC activities. 

--Three new agreements for cooperation became effective. 

— Eight new reactors manufactured in the United States went into oper- 
ation in foreign nations, making a total of 27 reactors in foreign nations. 
An additional 17 were being built abroad by U. S. companies and seven more 
were being planned for construction. 



CRS-6 

— Three additional grants for research reactors were approved, bring- 
ing the total number committed since the establishment of the program in 
1966 to 22 reactors, with a total value of $7. 55 million. 

— Commission inspectors conducted safeguards inspections of 33 faci- 
lities in 12 foreign countries and the City of West Berlin. 

— Commission support of technical libraries continued, bringing to 85 
the total number of libraries presented to 58 foreign countries and five inter- 
national or regional organizations. 

--The United States and several agreement nations announced their wil- 
lingness to transfer to IAEA administration of safeguards for U. S. -supplied 
nuclear materials. 

1961 

— The Commission recommended to the President and received approval 
for increasing the supply of enriched uranium for peaceful uses abroad from 
50, 000 kilograms to 65, 000 kilograms of contained U-235. 

— The United States contributed $2. 5 million to seven nations to help 
with nuclear research reactors and equipment. 

— The IAEA Board of Governors approved a set of guidelines for Agency 
safeguards and put them into effect, subject to review after two years. 

— The Commission approved the basic United States negotiating position 
for its offer to place four of its reactor facilities under IAEA safeguards. 

•-The United States participated in 24 international conferences and spon- 
sored several exhibits. 



CRS-7 

1962 

--U. S. -financed research and development contracts approved by the 
United States -EURATOM Joint Research and Development Board totaled 
34 projects costing $9. 57 million. 

--The United States signed its first long-term fuel sales contract with 
EURATOM. (20 years. ) 

— The State Department convened an Advisory Committee to Review the 
Policy of the United States toward the IAEA under the chairmanship of Am- 
bassador Henry D. Smyth. 

--The first and second tests of IAEA safeguards inspection procedures 
within the United States were carried out in June and November when two 
Agency representatives visited U.S. reactors which were made available for 
this purpose. 

— Amendments to 14 U.S. agreements for cooperation were concluded. 

— Through 1962, the Commission had made 18 reactor grants, totaling 
$6. 3 million, and had commitments for eight others. 

1963 

--The United States and India concluded an agreement under which the 
United States will cooperate in the construction of the Tarapur nuclear power 
reactor station. 

--The United States, Japan, and the IAEA concluded a trilateral agree- 
ment under which the Agency assumed responsibility for administering safe- 
guards for U.S. -supplied materials and equipment in Japan. This was the 
first agreement of this kind. 



CRS-8 

--The IAEA Board of Governors provisionally approved a system of 
safeguards for reactors larger than 100 thermal megawatts. This system 
was endorsed by the Seventh General Conference of the IAEA. 

--The first shipment of irradiated reactor fuel was returned from Swe- 
den. 

--Through 1965 the Commission made 20 reactor grants totalling $7 
million and had commitments for six others to be paid upon completion of 
the reactors. 

--A U.S. delegation toured Soviet peaceful atomic energy installations. 

--The Commission program for participation in, and financial support 
of, selected international conferences on atomic energy included 11 IAEA 
conferences, 4 sponsored by other international organizations, and 20 held 
under the auspices of U.S. organizations. 

1964 

--Through 1964 the Commission distributed abroad special nuclear and 
other materials with a total value of $117. 5 million. Of these, sales ac- 
counted for $66.9 million; lease, $31.7 million; and deferred payment ar- 
rangements, $18. 9 million. 

--President Johnson signed into law on August 26, an amendment to the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 providing for private ownership of special nu- 
clear materials. 

--Approximately 280 exports and 20 imports of special nuclear mate- 
rials were made. There were 12 shipments of irradiated fuel elements 
from research reactors in Sweden and Canada to the United States. 



CRS-9 

--The IAEA Board of Governors unanimously voted to apply a system 
of safeguards for reactors with a power rating greater than 100 thermal 
megawatts. 

--Ten trilateral agreements were signed for the IAEA administration 
of safeguards to replace those previously administered by the United States. 

--The Third United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy was held. 

--The Yankee Atomic Electric Co. reactor at Rowe, Mass. was placed 
under IAEA safeguards and the first inspection was carried out in November. 

1965 

--More than 21 of the nations with which the United States had agree- 
ments for cooperation agreed to the administration by the IAEA of safeguards 
over U.S. -supplied nuclear materials and equipment. 

--Three power reactors fueled with enriched uranium were contracted 
for by other countries for a total of 15 power reactors, built, under con- 
struction, or planned abroad using U. S. -produced enriched uranium. 

--The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy submitted a 
report to the White House Conference on International Cooperation. 

--The Ninth General Conference of the IAEA gave final approval to a 
simplified and strengthened safeguards system. 

--At the end of 1965, 22 of 26 grants for research reactors made be- 
tween 1956 and 1962 were made. 

--The Commission authorized the formation of a Technical Advisory 
Panel on Peaceful Use Safeguards to advise the Commission on technical 



CRS-10 

matters relating to the development and implementation of improved safe- 
guards procedures. 

— At the close of 1965 some 30 shipments of spent reactor fuel from 
abroad had been sent to the Commission's Savannah River Plant and the 
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. 

— By mid- 1965 the Commission had distributed abroad through sale, 
lease and deferred payment sales, special nuclear and other materials with 
an approximate value of $141. 7 million. 

1966 

--IAEA safeguards were extended to cover processing plants, a move 
that was proposed and strongly supported by the United States. 

— The United States offered at the eighteen- nation Disarmament Con- 
ference in Geneva, in cooperation with Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., to 
make the NFS plant for chemical processing of irradiated fuel available 
to the IAEA to develop and test safeguards techniques and to gain experience 
and training for Agency safeguards inspectors. 

— The Commission issued criteria for the supply of uranium enrichment 
services to foreign customers. These criteria included: assurance of long- 
term availability at stable prices of enriched uranium; and non-discrimina- 
tory terms and conditions of supply to be as nearly as possible identical 
between foreign and domestic customers. 

--During 1966 there were 21 shipments of spent fuel to the United States 
for other nations. 



CRS-11 

--As of mid- 1966 the AEC had distributed abroad through sale, lease 
and deferred payment sales, special nuclear and other materials worth about 
$214.4 million. 

1967 

--The 11th General Conference of the IAEA considered the United States' 
suggestion for the extension of the IAEA safeguards system to fuel fabri- 
cation plants. 

--The Commission noted the heightened interest in peaceful nuclear ener- 
gy by Latin American countries. 

--President Johnson announced that when safeguards are applied under a 
nonproliferation treaty for nuclear weapons ". . .the United States will permit 
the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear 
activities in the United States- -excluding only those with direct national se- 
curity significance. . . " (December 2. ) 

— Two liaison meetings with EURATOM officials were held on safe- 
guards procedures relating to fuel fabrication, especially plants fabricating 
fuel elements from plutonium and highly enriched uranium. 

— The Commission signed its first contract to provide uranium toll en- 
richment services for a reactor in a foreign country. (Sweden. ) 

--Thirty-one shipments of spent research reactor fuel were made to 
the United States for processing. 

--As of mid- 196 7, the AEC had distributed aborad through sale, lease, 
and deferred payment sales, special nuclear and other materials worth about 
$266.4 million. 



CRS-12 

1968 

--The Non Proliferation Treaty was opened for signature, 80 nations 
signed it. 

--IAEA safeguards system was extended to cover fuel conversion and 
fabrication plants. 

--The Commission adopted a new policy to deliver enriched uranium 
as long as five years in advance of the time of actual need. 

--As of mid- 1968, the Commission had distributed abroad through sale 
and lease, and deferred payment sales, special nuclear and other materials 
worth about $313. 3 million. 

--The Commission negotiated the sale of 850 tons of heavy water, worth 
$42 million for use in Canada, Germany, and Sweden. 

--There were 13 shipments of highly enriched research fuel to the 
United States for reprocessing. 

1969 

— Toll enrichment became the preferred method of supplying enriched 
uranium for reactors abroad. 

--Approximately 40 foreign exchange arrangements for information on 
nuclear science and technology continued. 

--A new series of workshops for foreign nationals was held at the Ar- 
gonne National Laboratory. 

--As of mid-1969, the Commission had distributed abroad through sale, 
lease and deferred payment sales, special nuclear material and other 



CRS-13 

materials worth about $360. 9 million. The sale of 667 tons of heavy water 
valued at $35. 4 million was also negotiated. 

--12 shipments of spent fuel were received from foreign countries for 
reprocessing. 

--The United States and the Soviet Union signed their ratified copies of 
the NPT. (November 24. ) 

--The United States and the Soviet Union held meetings to discuss their 
respective peaceful nuclear explosion programs. 

1970 

--The United States and the Soviet Union deposited their instruments of 
ratification of the NPT. (March 15. ) 

--A second set of bilateral meetings was held between representatives 
of the United States and the Soviet Union to discuss their peaceful nuclear 
nuclear explosions programs. 

--Foreign orders were placed with United States suppliers for nine nu- 
clear powerplants in seven countries. 

--By the end of 1970, the Export-Import Bank had authorized 18 pro- 
jects involving American-supplied materials and equipment in nuclear plants 
aborad totaling approximately $600 million. 

--Export shipments to cooperating countries totaled approximately 
3, 521 kilograms of U-235 under toll enrichment agreements, 2, 597 of U-235 
under sale and lease agreements, and 45 kilograms of Pu. 



CRS-14 

--As of mid-1970 the Commission had distributed abroad through sale, 
lease, and deferred payment sales, special nuclear material and other ma- 
terials worth about $437.6 million. The Commission negotiated the sale 
to Canada of 500 tons of heavy water valued at $29. 4 million. 

--Ten shipments of spent fuel were received from Canada and Japan 
for reprocessing in the United States. 

1971 

— President Nixon announced in his foreign policy report to Congress on 
Feburary 25, 1971, that the Administration had consulted with the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy concerning ways in which the United States 
might assist its allies to construct multinational uranium enrichment faci- 
lities. The Commission informed several nations that it was prepared to 
undertake exploratory discussions on the possibility of making gaseous dif- 
fusion technology available outside the U. S. Preliminary discussions were 
held in November. 

--Seventeen uranium enrichment contracts were executed under agree- 
ments for cooperation. 

--Export shipments to agreement nations totaled approximately 19, 707 
kilograms of U-235 under toll enrichment agreements and 1,264 kilograms 
of U-235 under sale and lease agreements. 

--As of mid-1971, the Commission had distributed abroad through sale, 
lease, and deferred payment sales, special nuclear material and other ma- 
terials worth about $572. 3 million, resulting in revenues of $491. 9 million. 



CRS-15 

--The United States participated in the Fourth United Nations Confer- 
ence of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. 

1972 

--Forty-one facility inspections were carried out by U.S. personnel 
in the five countries in which safeguards continue to be applied under agree- 
ments for cooperation. 

--Meetings were held with other nuclear material and equipment sup- 
plier nations to define the extent of their responsibilities under Article III 
of the NPT. 

--In the interest of strengthening international safeguards for nuclear 
materials, the Commission participated with the IAEA and the U. S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency in testing prototype safeguards instru- 
mentation. 

1973 

--The Commission continued to support the objectives of the NPT, in- 
cluding the IAEA's responsibility for administering the treaty's safeguards 
provisions. 

— Discussions continued on the 1967 offer to permit the IAEA to apply 
its safeguards to all United States nuclear activities, excluding those with 
direct national security significance. 

1974 

--The Commission provided technical support to the IAEA for safeguards. 



CRS-16 

--Negotiations, in which the Commission played a major role, neared 
completion on a safeguards agreement with the IAEA under which the IAEA 
will implement safeguards at selected U.S. nuclear facilities. 

--The Commission negotiated bilateral information exchange agreements 
with five nations covering systematic reciprocal exchanges of data on oper- 
ating experience and other technical informatition related to the safety and 
environmental impact of nuclear power plants. 

--In mid-1974, the Commission began a small-scale program of as- 
signing a limited number of foreign regulatory employees from countries 
with embryonic nuclear power programs to work for one to two years within 
the AEC regulatory organization. 



APPENDIX IV 

PRINCIPLES FOR ESTABLISHING THE SAFEGUARDS AND 
• CONTROL SYSTEM UNDER THE EURATOM AGREEMENT 



The principles which will govern the establishment and operation 
of the safeguards and control system are as follows : 

The euratom Commission will : 

1. Examine the design of equipment, devices and facilities, in- 
cluding nuclear reactors, and approve it for-th o purp ose-of assur- 
ing that it will not further any military purpose and that it will 

permit the effective application of safeguards, if such equipment, 
devices and facilities : 

(a) are made available pursuant to this Agreement; or 

(b) use, process or fabricate any of the following materials re- 
ceived from the United States: source or special nuclear ma- 
terial, moderator material or any other material relevant to 
the effective application of safeguards; or 

(c) use any special nuclear material produced as the result of 
yk the use of equipment or material -referred to in subpara- 
graphs (a) and (b). 

2. Require the maintenance and production of operating records 
to assure accountability for source or special nuclear material made 
available, or source or special nuclear material used, recovered, or 
produced as a result of the use of source or special nuclear mate- 
rial, moderator material or any other material relevant to the ef- 
fective application of safeguards, or as a result of equipment, 
devices and facilities made available pursuant to this Agreement. 

3. Require that progress reports be prepared and delivered to 
the euratom Commission with respect to projects utilizing mate- 
rial, equipment, devices and facilities referred to in paragraph 2 
of this Annex. \ 

4. Establish and require the deposit and storage, under continu- 
ing safeguards, in euratom facilities of any special nuclear mate- 
rial referred to in paragraph 2 of this Annex which is not cur- 
rently being utilized for peaceful purposes in the Community or 
otherwise transferred as provided in the Agreement for Coopera- 
tion between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Community. 



5. Establish an inspection organization which will have access at 
all times : 

(a) to all places and data, and 

(b) to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with 
materials, equipment, devices or facilities safeguarded un- 
der this Agreement, 

necessary to assure accounting for source or special nuclear mate- 
rial subject to paragraph 2 of this Annex and to determine whether 
there is compliance with the guarantees of the Community. The 
inspection organization will also be in a position to make and will 

make such independent measurements as are necessary to assure 
compliance with the provisions of this Annex and the Agreement 
for Cooperation. 



It is the understanding of the Parties that the above principles 
applicable to the establishment of the Community's inspection and 
control system are compatible with and are based on Article XII of 
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,^] Chapter 
VII of Title Two of the Treaty establishing the P^uropean Atomic 
Energy Community, and those adopted by the Government of the 
United States of America in its comprehensive Agreements for 
Cooperation. 



UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 




1262 09113 1713